I have to guess that the protection scheme calls contribute to the pass route package complexity. The "70 Series" protections discussed in the tweet thread appear to set the starting positions of at least some of the potential passing targets for the route package of that particular play (RBs and TE, included). The "Terry" and "Tally" pre-snap blitz protection adjustment calls that keep the TE in to block would seem, of necessity, to affect the route package overall, and likely the coverage sight adjustments of the remaining pass-targets.
The playcall terminology derives from the concept of "route package" itself, IIRC. The basic premise, as I understand it, is that instead of the QB calling something like "X-7, Z-9-8, Y-hiphop-4, bogie-smash-6, circle-1-zag, drift Lackawanna on two" for the route package, the whole thing (plus specific sight-read adjustments) is incorporated into some term like "Ruby Tuesday". Pre-snap adjustments may be single-word like "Terry" or "Tally", and a shift into an alternate package or to/from a run-play might be signaled by calling out something like "Omaha".
Obviously, this requires a metric-crap-tonne of memorization for everyone on the field and, in the past, receivers who had played their entire careers under the first type of play-calling system often had extreme difficulty adjusting to the package-concept system (Ochocinco's problem, I'd bet). Nowadays, most teams (including most college teams) are using some form of package system terminology, so the adjustment is mostly learning a new vocabulary for familiar packages and then the nuances of the differences in the packages themselves. Still not easy, even in the absence of the conceptual hurdle, since I'd guess that the Pats playbook has many more packages and more nuances in each package, especially when it comes to pre-determined pre-and-post-snap sight adjustments.
I know that the Colts and the Broncos, under Peyton Manning at least, used "levels" concepts in their route packages, and that the Saints also do so with Brees. Other teams likely do, as well. Many teams also require at least some pre-snap/post snap sight adjustments from their pass-catchers. As far as other teams integrating all these things to the extreme that the Pats offense does, yeah, probably not. The ability to effectively implement such complexity depends on the mental "sophistication" and creativity of not only the QB, but also the pass-catchers the position coaches and the OC.
One of the notes that Warren Sharp had on the Jags' 2017 offense was that there were certain packages (and "disguised" versions thereof) that Bortles and his pass-catchers executed extremely well and successfully, but they were limited in number and, later in games, they'd often begin repeating them (without variation or "tweaks") out of necessity (probably due to Bortles' limitations as a QB). He noted that smart defenses that had the ability to adjust would pick up on this and often shut down the Jags offense in Q4 (e.g., the Pats in the AFCCG).
OTOH, one of the criticisms of the Colts' offense in recent years was the lack of play-calling creativity by OC Rob Chudzinski, especially later in games when they'd fall into easily-predictable patterns. It might not be unreasonable to think that the OC's game-planning and play-calling has been the limiting factor there, as opposed to Luck, or even Brissett, being able to handle something more sophisticated and complex. It'll be interesting to see what happens in 2018 with Frank Reich as the new HC and Nick Sirianni as the new OC - plus a lot of interesting, young skill position players and (at last) some real effort invested in upgrading their OL.
Keep in mind that Reich was the Eagles' OC in 2016-17 and, in the Superbowl, they never ran out of plays that kept the Pats guessing.
Just after the draft, I made this post on another forum. You might enjoy it.
I've been reading up on the Patriots offensive scheme today, and I learned something very interesting. Guys like Braxton Berrios are essentially Julio Jones in that system, and I'll explain why. It's such a different system from the rest of the NFL that most people don't understand how someone who's not tall or incredibly fast is the ultimate 'matchup nightmare'.
A lot of people talk about setting up the run with the pass (or vice versa). Well, there's also setting up the pass with the pass. By that, I mean affecting the defense in such a way to make them give you one coverage, and then you throw it to the guy that can best beat that coverage. In plainer English, you can develop a passing scheme that is designed to destroy zone defense. Then, when the defense gives up and is playing man, you've now set up the second part of your passing gameplan. This also works vice versa -- some passing attacks are more geared towards destroying a man defense.
So, one quick bit of background that I have to get out of the way. When people talk about the WCO, the Coryell or digit system, and the Erhardt Perkins (the three primary offensive systems in the NFL), they are strictly talking about the playcalling systems. Each playbook is written in one of these three languages. You'd be naive, however, to think that you run all of the exact same plays in different systems, except you call them different things. The different languages have their strengths and weaknesses, and the complexity of the playcalls center around that linguistic base.
The WCO and the Coryell system use words and numbers (respectively) to describe individual routes. When you had 2 WRs and a TE, these were effective. The Coryell system had the additional benefit of being easier for a WR to play anywhere on the field. If he knew the route tree and the formation, he was basically good to go. As offenses have gotten more complex and more spread out (e.g. 3 WRs or more), these languages are more poorly adapted to describe plays. That is why you hear the horrors of the 15 word playcalls in the WCO.
The Erhardt Perkins offense uses words to describe groups of routes. They're concepts. Like the Coryell (except different, because we're talking about concepts that a receiver has to fit, not a particular route number from the route tree), they do make it very easy to run a single play from an infinite number of formations. All you have to know is the concept being ran and which receiver you are (the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd from the outside on a given side of the field). Also, crucially, on every single play, each receiver has basically three different routes that they could run. If they read man coverage, there's a route for that. If it's a certain type of zone, there's a route for that. If the defense is lined up a certain way (off, inside shade, close, etc), there's a route for that. You can apply option routes to the other playcalling languages, but it's more complex and difficult to do so. The Erhardt Perkins makes certain things simple to allow other things to be complex. The WCO and Coryell use their finite amount of complexity in different areas, and they just don't have the currency to be complex here.
Ok, so this E-P offense is essentially designed from the ground up to obliterate zone coverage. I'm going to contrast that with the WCO and the Coryell, which were formed at a time when man coverage was more of a thing. Or, maybe I should say, zone defense was not nearly what it is today. The WCO and Coryell have very tight throwing windows in zone, so there's great stress placed on the timing components of these routes. If you perfect this, so the theory goes, the defense will give up trying to play zone, and they will go to man. At this point, you have your Jerry Rices, your Terrell Owenses, your Julio Joneses (aka the cliche "#1 WR"), and you shred the defense because nobody covers those guys 1-on-1 consistently. What else makes them great though? You give them a limited number of routes to run, and the defense *still* can't stop them. It's like having a workhorse running back that no one can tackle, no matter what the playcall is.
Hopefully I'm not being pedantic here when I say the E-P does the complete opposite. You have this complex set of reads that the WRs and QB make on every play, so you have to pick personnel that can fit that scheme. Chances are, you aren't getting a lot of the best athletes because great athleticism and intelligence often don't go hand in hand (and I'm not necessarily talking potential here... it's just practical, just like Shanahan talks about wanting pocket QBs because they grow up developing a cerebral because of their limitations). The point is that defenses want to play man against this offense, by default. Your WRs are slower, and if they make good reads, they make your coverage not just wrong by tiny throwing windows (as in the WCO and Coryell); they make your defense *way* off. Now, throw a Wes Welker in the mix. Here's a guy that is able to make these reads and be part of the zone defense attack, but he's crucially this guy that could run circles around a mongoose. He's impossible to cover man to man for a certain range of routes. Sure, you can cover him with a single man, perhaps, if he runs a streak. But what if he makes a hesitation move and cuts multiple times in his route? He's basically uncoverable. In the E-P offense, he IS the Julio Jones of the passing attack. That's why he is special, and that's why Braxton Berrios could be special. He has that same suddenness.
You couldn't just take a random WR who's great in another system due to his athleticism and think that the Patriots system would give him even better results. If he can't handle the reads on the option routes, he's not much use to the offense. But if he can handle those reads, then any single physical advantage that he has versus a defender in man coverage is more exploitable in the E-P than in any other system, because they can very simply call very complex routes. The WCO needs a name for each route, not to mention a 15 word play call to put it all together and huge attention to the timing portion of the offense, to keep everything together. The Coryell needs a number, and there are only 10 single digits.
This doesn't just go for small jitterbug receivers. Anything that creates a mismatch is usable. What they actually do, if they read man, is isolate their two or three best mismatches while drawing coverage away with the rest. You might have a Wes Welker doing his thing on one side. On the other, you might have a RB on a LB, or you might have a TE on a LB or S or CB. Gronk is their size mismatch. If you've forced the defense into man, which they probably don't want to do if they're facing Gronk, you know have a Power Forward going anywhere he wants to beat a woeful Point Guard who's trying to not get boxed out.
If you look at the consistency of Tom Brady, not only over the years but also game to game, you can see how this attack is simply impossible to stop with the right pieces in place. And it doesn't require Julio Joneses to make it work. Their star receiver was just taken in the 5th round. Gronk was technically a 2nd rounder, but still, we're not talking about elite talents that only come around every 10 years and always go in the top 10 of the draft. This levels the playing field in terms of talent acquisition. This is a big advantage over the long haul.
I got a little more long-winded than I expected there. Here's a post on another forum that describes the E-P system perhaps more succinctly than I can:
The Erhardt-Perkins System: Warning Long Read
