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Going for it on 4th down was CORRECT...here's why...

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Why bother? You don't even read or try to understand what people write and how do I even begin to counter this type of logic: "You punt it every time in this situation because it's the decision that isn't completely boneheaded."

Try to consider that you can't begin to counter that type of logic because it's correct. Start there.

































:rocker:
 
Are you serious?

Sure I am. In his example, the field goal attempt was the only thing that wasn't boneheaded while going for it on 4th and 5 up multiple scores with under 10 minutes left and the momentum completely was. The call should have been a punt and an attempt to pin Manning deep in his own territory.
 
Sure I am. In his example, the field goal attempt was the only thing that wasn't boneheaded while going for it on 4th and 5 up multiple scores with under 10 minutes left and the momentum completely was. The call should have been a punt and an attempt to pin Manning deep in his own territory.

Now I am trying to figure out if you are just trolling the thread.

You realize you are just making a circular reference, right?
 
Now I am trying to figure out if you are just trolling the thread.

You realize you are just making a circular reference, right?

Then I suggest you re-read the posts in the thread between myself and Mr. Poole before just jumping in half-****ed. The example that I was responding to was the example that he gave me (the Arizona field goal attempt). I didn't give that example to myself.

You're more than welcome to present other examples to me or anybody else so that we can compare and contrast them to the botched 4th down conversion attempt. Believe it or not, there are quite a few instances where I would support going for it on 4th down.

At this point, I guess I'll just repeat myself. Maybe one day it'll get through and the common sense bell will ring: It doesn't make any sense to go for it on 4th and 5, up multiple scores with under 10 minutes remaining just near midfield.

EDIT: You're confusing a circular reference with circular reasoning, which is not what I am using either.
 
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Lots of posts but the fact that the Patriots closed the game by holding onto the ball and running out the clock somehow seems to be overlooked (even though it was brought up earlier in the thread).

Yup, having the offense hold the ball and run out the clock is really a great way to win games - as opposed to giving our less than stellar defense the task.

The statistical probability studies I've mentioned a few times that have been available for years now assume an average offense and an average defense. I wonder how much more they slant to going for it when you have a stellar offense and a mediocre (at best) defense - particularly when that defense is up against a Peyton Manning led offense.

Another way of looking at the same question is:

What are the chances the Patriots stop the Broncos before they recover the field position the Patriots had when they would have punted? Given the way the Patriots were playing defense, I'd expect the Broncos to get back that 17-38 yards (with a first down) a very high percentage of the time - I'll take 75% to 80% - at a relatively small cost of time (a minute?). But that estimate could be high.

What are the chances the Patriots get a first down on 4th and 5? And what do they gain if they get it?

I'll leave the answers as an exercise to the reader. But there are so many positive things that happen should the Patriots succeed that I would think many who are questioning this decision would have second thoughts. Admittedly, that's uncommon on this board but I'm an optimist.
 
I provided that to you. Now you want to say that he isn't consistent.
I already have provided four instances in two previous games where the New England Patriots offense was faced with 4th and 2 or less inside opponent's territory and the New England Patriots offense was not given a chance to convert based upon the coach's decision.

I even gave you a possible explanation for that inconsistency.
Completely incoherent reasoning on your part.
 
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Then I suggest you re-read the posts in the thread between myself and Mr. Poole before just jumping in half-****ed. The example that I was responding to was the example that he gave me (the Arizona field goal attempt). I didn't give that example to myself.

You're more than welcome to present other examples to me or anybody else so that we can compare and contrast them to the botched 4th down conversion attempt. Believe it or not, there are quite a few instances where I would support going for it on 4th down.

At this point, I guess I'll just repeat myself. Maybe one day it'll get through and the common sense bell will ring: It doesn't make any sense to go for it on 4th and 5, up multiple scores with under 10 minutes remaining just near midfield.

EDIT: You're confusing a circular reference with circular reasoning, which is not what I am using either.


No, you weren't talking about Arizona. It was from here:

Let's dig into it without looking at the size of the leads then...

1. 2009: Go for it. Fail to convert. Game results in a loss.

2. 2010: Punt. Manning throws interception. Game results in a win.

In the last two instances, going for it has netted a loss while punting it ultimately netted a win. In THIS instance, the lead was more sizeable than the other two. You punt it every time in this situation because it's the decision that isn't completely boneheaded.

You make no argument as to why it was "boneheaded" other than because punting it was right. You've offered no statistics or even reasoning. The best you have is "because it make sense". Its the very definition of a circular argument.

Explain it to me one more time. Why does the risk of giving it to Manning at near mid field when up by 17 minutes with 8:17 left on the clock exceed the potential benefit of keeping the ball and running down more clock or even scoring?
 
For one, your question was not straight forward. It was a loaded question. That you don't understand how it was a loaded question is not my issue. In the definition itself, should you chose to have read it (doubtful based upon your insistance here), it states, clearly: "Aside from being a logical fallacy, such questions may be used as a rhetorical tool: the question attempts to limit direct replies to be those that serve the questioner's agenda". In this instance, you directly admitted that a few posts ago. In other words, I can ask you to go look up the amount of instances in which a team up by three scores and barely in their opponent's territory has gone for it and accomplish the same thing since there is no viable way to look up the information requested and, if you tried, you'd be limited to replies that only served my stance.

So your explanation of how it is a loaded question is to pick out one attribute (not a sufficient definition) from wikipedia that could be applied to any question ever asked in a disagreement. Seriously just stop. This is getting silly. I didn't ask you a loaded question. I asked you to assign a probability based on what you think is going to happen. When you think something is the best course of action you are innately assigning a probability to it. I am asking you for that number.

You have stated that you think giving the ball back to Manning at midfield down 17 with 8 minutes to go is more risky than giving it to him on the 20 yard line. I am simply asking you, in a very standard way to attempt to quantify how much more risky you think it is. I didn't ask for a definitive number, or past data points, or specific examples. I asked for what % of the time YOUT THINK those 20 yards are the difference between winning and losing, and what % of the time YOU THINK Manning wins the game from the 20 yard line in that situation.

If you can't or won't do this you have no business making or criticizing decisions of other because that is how decisions are made. You are being what now seems like deliberately evasive and obtuse in answering this question because I think you know that your assertion that the smart move is to "always" try to pin him back isn't based on any coherent logic. It's staggering just how much some people struggle with this.

For another, you've clearly never heard of the terms mean, median, and mode. Those are three ways, for starters, you can take the amount of instances that something happened, compare it with the amount of instances it was successful, and find a percentage. But what do I know? I'm just spewing nonense.

So you just decided to throw in completely superfluous pieces of 8th grade information to make it seem like you have a grasp on statistics? What other possible reason is there for this little blurb. "yeah well, have you ever heard of regression to the mean?!?!? pshaww boom in yo face!" Big time lol @ you here.


I just showed you that I very clearly didn't misuse the term. Again, here is your question:

I'll ask again, what % of the time do you think an extra 20 yards is the difference between winning and losing against Peyton Manning when up 17 with 8+ minutes to go?

I'll reiterate before you keep going with this why this is not a loaded question before you spew forth more silliness: There are no assumptions in this question. The fact that you haven't seen a question phrased like this is simply because you have never thought about things in this way, as many people haven't, because you haven't learned to think analytically. This is a 100% standard question concerning the presumed probability of an event in game theory.

So here we go to demonstrate that you still have no clue what's going on and are just arguing from ignorance....

So here is what I have to peel through the game logs, historical contests between the two teams, Google, NFL, and ESPN.com for...

1. Games played against Manning.

2. Times that we punted and gave him an extra 20+ yards of field to navigate.

a) Times that we did this when up three scores.
b) Times that we did this when up three scores with 8+ minutes left to go.
c) How many times did we win when this happened?
d) How many times did we lose when this happened?

3. Formulate percentage based on the results.

Again, if you can't see how this isn't a loaded question, then I can't help you. I can tell you that off the top of my head, I can think of a couple of instances, the last of which came when Manning fired a pick to James Sanders in 2010. But the score was closer than three scores... which sort of plays into my point.

This is so mindbogglingly dumb I don't even know where to begin. For starters, as explained above you didn't even understand the question. What else are you using to formulate your opinion on the likelihood of manning winning the game fromt he 20? And you ignored the most significant numbers in determining this; the base rate. Instead what you've written here is basically "never happened before derp de derp." The fact that in your mind the presumed probability is limited to a universe of these numbers is just insanely idiotic, and all it really shows is that instead of going and actually thinking about this you are just arguing for the sake of arguing.

As for your second weak question, here is what a Google search nets when I input your incredibly loaded question into it: what % of the time do you think an extra 20 yards is the difference between winning and losing against Peyton Manning when up 17 with 8+ minutes to go - Google Search

Happy hunting. :rocker:

What is this even supposed to mean? facepalm.jpg

Standard questions net standard results when an explanation is searched for. A standard question is something like: What is the fourth down conversion rate for the 2011/2010/2009 New England Patriots? Or, how many times has going for it when having a lead against Peyton Manning netted a win for the Patriots? Your's was not standard. It was loaded. As such, it has no place in a debate no matter how much you want it to. But if it makes you feel better, than keep on trucking.

I've already explained why this is completely lol, so I'll just reiterate, what do you think the flawed assumptions are in my question? I won't hold my breath.

The Patriots were running out of time, out of downs, and needed a field goal to win in the Cardinals game. A field goal was the ONLY thing that made sense there so the comparison sucks, as I'm sure you already know. In the Broncos game, the Patriots were up multiple scores, had under ten minutes on the clock, were on Denver's 48, and had the momentum. Going for it with a 47% probability that you won't convert and, thus, give the Broncos the momentum based on the previous three seasons did not make sense.

NO. Your logic was that the fumble occurred only because of the decision to go for it. That's what you said. I showed you how that is completely idiotic. My example was in a game where the field goal was obviously the correct choice but according to your previous results-oriented argument, it must have been incorrect because he missed. You also go on later in the post and your previous one to make the same asinine argument that because Brady fumbled Belichick must have not considered the possibility that he would (this somehow makes sense in your mind). You've proven totally myopic to this point thoug so I don't expect you to do anything other than continue to shift the goalposts wrt this point.
 
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Let's dig into it without looking at the size of the leads then...

1. 2009: Go for it. Fail to convert. Game results in a loss.

2. 2010: Punt. Manning throws interception. Game results in a win.

In the last two instances, going for it has netted a loss while punting it ultimately netted a win. In THIS instance, the lead was more sizeable than the other two. You punt it every time in this situation because it's the decision that isn't completely boneheaded. In THIS instance, we went for it and botched it. The Broncos scored a touchdown on the ensuing drive pulling it to within a two score lead. They were then driving for what looked like another touchdown on their next drive until McGahee fumbled the football and saved the game. That would have pulled it to within a three point lead with an ample amount of time to go. Further, we've already seen that the Patriots weren't exactly "running the ball" at will on them at that point in the game. So, again, how exactly was going for it the decision that made sense?

jfc. First of all, nice sample size. Second of all, this is laughable cherry-picking by a results-oriented mind at work.

The 2009 decision was correct because even though we failed to convert (a 25% event can occur you know), the chances of us converting were greater than the chances of us punting and keeping Manning from scoring. The fact that people can't think aboutthings in this way without saying "hurr durr stats aren't everything" just shows how stupid they are.

You want to compare it to one time we punted and manning threw an INT. The fact that you think this is meaningful says everything really but I'll walk you through it anyway. How many times have we punted and Manning has not thrown an INT? What do you think the chances are that Manning throws an INT if we punt? You are talking about a situation where Manning is down 3 scores with 8 minutes left. What do you think the chances are that Manning being pinned behind the 20 or on the 47 are the difference between him throwing an INT or not in that situation? I know you can't answer questions that cause you to re-evaluate your terrible logic so I'll just go ahead and write in your next response here: "zommggg dats a lowdud questionsssszzz"

How so? For one, anything could have happened. For another, Manning showed at numerous times throughout that game, either forced or through a failure of execution either on his part or his receiver's part, that 20 or 30 yards of field position (depending on the quality of the punt) wasn't as easy to make up as you say it is. And, at the very least, the way we were playing on defense (conservatively) to that point in the game, it would have taken one to two plays to make it up.

How so? You can't figure out why 20 yards represents less game equity to one of the five best passing QBs in the league than to a lesser QB or a running team? Then you go on to say how easily he makes it up. right. What % of the amount of ground Manning has to make up in order to overcome a that deficit in that amount of time is 20 yards? Why are you even trying to argue here I seriously don't get it.



When you're assessing risk vs. reward when trying to decide to punt or go for it, it's not. Your point here? Oh you didn't have one. Moving on then...

Do you have ADHD or something? You said originally that "53% isn't that much greater." I asked you "than what?" You then said "47%" I then asked you what your point was and your answer is now that I didn't have a point? Why don't you take a deep breath befre your next response and make sure you actually understand what you are typing. And 47% isn't the risk. The risk is the % that they lose in game equity, 47% is the chance that they don't convert the first down. Something your next response shows you are lost about as well....

Your reading comprehension skills are failing you again. 1-3 plays takes more time off the clock on average. Note that nowhere did I say that the chances of winning improve (though I'm sure I could make a case).

WAT. You said it yourself that it's 1-3 plays for Manning. Your entire argument hinges on punting being a smart decision for the Pats in trying to win the game and therefore the correct choice to increase their chances of winning by an amount greater than going for it would. So if 1-3 plays only negligibly increases their chances of winning, and increases it less than going for it does your whole argument is moot. Please read this a few times and at least try to understand it before writing more to show that you didn't.

the irony is thick

gotta love these back to back gems:

There's your reading comprehension going against you again. 53% has been the success rate of going for on 4th downs over the last three seasons. 47% has been the rate of failure. When up three scores with under 10 minutes left to play, why take that chance?

This is really the crux of where you aren't thinking correctly or even trying to. 47% is not the risk. That's the chance that we don't convert. The risk is the % that we lose the game based on the decision. This is extremely basic stuff. We are taking a 53% of converting for a near 100% of winning the game. It's the correct decision because even the extremely low percentage play that occurred; Brady fumbling, only reduced our chances of winning to 89%. It's a no brainer decision and it's laughable how ignorant so many people are about this.



If he took it into account, the decision looks that much more awful.

so let me get this straight: event X occurs. You say that BB must not have weighed the chance that X occurred because it did. And your evidence for this is that x occurred. You then have the audacity to start talking about logical fallacies. And you cap it off with well if he did incorporate it then that's even worse? So coaches should only make decisions that have a 100% success rate?

Just stop.
 
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I already have provided four instances in two previous games where the New England Patriots offense was faced with 4th and 2 or less inside opponent's territory and the New England Patriots offense was not given a chance to convert based upon the coach's decision.

They weren't the same situation, were they?

Completely incoherent reasoning on your part.

So I take it you now agree with me that you've moved to goal posts? So what is your point? Are you now suggesting that he should go for it on 4th down more often? What's your assertion?
 
They weren't the same situation, were they?
The New England Patriots offense was in more favorable situations in the Buffalo and Arizona games.

So I take it you now agree with me that you've moved to goal posts? So what is your point? Are you now suggesting that he should go for it on 4th down more often? What's your assertion?
If the coaching staff of the New England Patriots won't go for it on 4th and 2 or less in opponent's territory (as was the case previously mentioned in the Arizona and Buffalo games), there is no reason whatsoever to go for it on 4th and 5.
 
The New England Patriots offense was in more favorable situations in the Buffalo and Arizona games.

If the coaching staff of the New England Patriots won't go for it on 4th and 2 or less in opponent's territory (as was the case previously mentioned in the Arizona and Buffalo games), there is no reason whatsoever to go for it on 4th and 5.

How is up 7 in the first quarter more favorable then up 17 in the fourth quarter?

These are not the same situations. Your attempts at trying to point out inconsistencies is impossible because we don't know all the criteria that BB uses when making his decisions. Furthermore, your entire premise is nonsense. Are you really trying to make the argument that because he didn't go for it on a 4th and 2 in Buffalo that should never go for it on any 4th and >2 ever again in any situation? Really?
 
How is up 7 in the first quarter more favorable then up 17 in the fourth quarter?
The study is about probability of success based upon 4th down scenarios (refer to slide 29 for details) and the associated risk taken depending on field position.

Go forIt on 4th Down

These are not the same situations.
The rate of failure on fourth down is greater at 5 yards than 2 yards or less (refer to slide 29 for details).

Go forIt on 4th Down

If the coaching staff of the New England Patriots won't go for it on 4th and 2 or less in opponent's territory (as was the case previously mentioned in the Arizona and Buffalo games), there is no reason whatsoever to go for it on 4th and 5.
 
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...Your attempts at trying to point out inconsistencies is impossible because we don't know all the criteria that BB uses when making his decisions...

If this is your position, you have no basis for claiming his decisions are either correct or incorrect. At this time, you should go back and delete all your posts on this topic.
 
If this is your position, you have no basis for claiming his decisions are either correct or incorrect. At this time, you should go back and delete all your posts on this topic.

I can make a claim as to whether a decision was a good or bad one using my own criteria. I don't need to know BB's criteria. He's the one making the claim that they were wrong because they weren't internally consistent. Just because I disagree in no way means that I am trying to argue the opposite.
 
The study is about probability of success based upon 4th down scenarios (refer to slide 29 for details) and the associated risk taken depending on field position.

Go forIt on 4th Down

The rate of failure on fourth down is greater at 5 yards than 2 yards or less (refer to slide 29 for details).

It also states "Then they can use their experience to adjust the average rate for their current situation"

This situation is different then those others so it yields different results.

Go forIt on 4th Down

If the coaching staff of the New England Patriots won't go for it on 4th and 2 or less in opponent's territory (as was the case previously mentioned in the Arizona and Buffalo games), there is no reason whatsoever to go for it on 4th and 5.

So if the pats are 4th down at the opponents 4 yard line down by 4 with 1 minute left you are saying that they shouldn't go for it? That is what you are saying above.
 
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It also states "Then they can use their experience to adjust the average rate for their current situation"

This situation is different then those others so it yields different results.
Only if it fits your argument, which has been flawed from the commencement of this discussion, and inconsistent with the New England Patriots coaches decisions on fourth down prior to the Denver Broncos game.

So if the pats are 4th down at the opponents 4 yard line down by 4 with 1 minute left you are saying that they shouldn't go for it? That is what you are saying above.
Non sequitur
 
Only if it fits your argument, which has been flawed from the commencement of this discussion, and inconsistent with the New England Patriots coaches decisions on fourth down prior to the Denver Broncos game.

Non sequitur

How is it inconsistent? Under this coaching staff the Patriots have faced 4th down with less than 5 yards to go in the opponent's territory 226 times and have only punted 30% of the time. (i.e, they go for it much more often than they don't). You are trying to make the absurd argument that if it isn't 100% one way or the other that it somehow discredits the probability analysis. It doesn't. The analysis itself states that certain other outside situational factors should be considered.

You make these claims as to why the decision was bad. When I show you evidence to the contrary, you change your argument to something else. Now that I have shown that is again wrong you call my argument flawed. You are seriously bending over backwards trying to prove the decision "bad" for some strange reason. I don't get it.
 
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