Why Not Two Point Conversions?

[mosslost]

I tell ya this, after the first TD and subsequent missed XP, I predicted BB would go for 2 the rest of the day. Obviously I was wrong but it certainly is in line with the above.

Think of it this way.. In the red zone with THREE chances it is often tough to score a TD. I don't have the numbers but I wonder what the percentages are just inside the 5 first and goal. With one chance, unless you know you kicker can't hit them, I think it is a mistake.

The Ravens definitely made a mistake.

 

[mosslost]

You stated the reason we shouldn't go for two is that "...it is a fool's errand inviting additional attrition...". By that logic, if we score quicker on offense our star players risk less injury because they are on the field less. In turn, your approach to two point conversions does intimate that time of possession and inflicting attrition on the defense is less important than preserving our guys in the grand scheme of things.

Well, Belichick himself has called TOP a very overrated stat. Points are what matters, both on O and on D. That said, I think the extra point is what you do. The main focus needs to be on TDs over FGs.

 

[1960Pats]

Two point conversion plays seem to be “special” plays teams practice and save up. In that scenario, the current two point conversion rate is artificially high. It may be difficult to come up with and practice winning 2 point plays on a weekly basis. That also takes away from time spent on other areas of game prep.

I’m guessing teams evaluating this are saying their conversion rates over the course of a season will be lower than 48%, while also affecting game prep time.

Another good point.

I remember the talk after the comeback vs Atlanta was about how the Pats had practiced a certain amount of two point conversions and used them all during the game. I think the number was 3 but I could be wrong.

 

[Deus Irae]

Harbaugh revisited this topic today.

John Harbaugh: We understand the math on fourth downs, going for two


Significantly, I think, is one area where he kind of poo poo'd the result of going for the XP:

“Getting it to nine gives you a much better chance of winning,” Harbaugh said. “You still have a chance to do that with the second two. And if for some reason they happen to kick a field goal or score a touchdown, it also enhances your odds. So while you may think getting to 10 is the thing to do, it’s the thing to do if you want to go to overtime. It’s not the thing to do if you want to win the game in regulation, and that’s what we were trying to do.”

I think that shows the inherent issue, here, and we can look at it as a significant difference between the BB and JH approaches. BB's approach is that to win, it's best to start by not losing. Harbaugh's approach, by result, is going to be "to increase the odds of winning in regulation, you choose to increase the odds of losing in regulation".

If find that sort of thinking foolish, as a general approach, in the context of sports. And, to make it seem more strange to me, he followed that up with

“The analytics guys will tell you I don’t follow the analytics nearly enough,” Harbaugh said. “They’ll tell you I go by my gut way more than I go by the analytics, and I do. Because the flow of the game, the feel of the game, situations you’ve been in . . . all those things are something, as a coach, you have a real sense for. So I’ll go against the analytics a lot more than I’ll go with it, in terms of 50/50 close calls...

So he basically acknowledge that he threw out his game feel and went with the analytics, then justifies losing that way by saying "But I'm sure we'd definitely have lost if we'd done it the other way", when he obviously cannot be sure. Admittedly, he's couching that more with regards to the 4th down attempts, but the general premise still stands.

"It failed, but it would have been worse. I just know it!" is now his defense.

 

[TommyD4207]

Teams have been trying that this year, and losing because of it, or because of it in part. The math really only matters if you can get enough attempts at the play in one game. Since you're not going to be putting up 10 TDs a game, you're better off taking the PAT, because you're less likely to be chasing the lost point(s).

Generally speaking, going for two when you don't have to is a stupid idea.

If cost Baltimore the game yesterday.

 

[TommyD4207]

Baltimore just lost a game today, in part, because they could not make a 2 point conversion. 0 for 3 on the day.

And they have the best kicker in the league.

 

[TommyD4207]

Harbaugh revisited this topic today.

John Harbaugh: We understand the math on fourth downs, going for two


Significantly, I think, is one area where he kind of poo poo'd the result of going for the XP:



I think that shows the inherent issue, here, and we can look at it as a significant difference between the BB and JH approaches. BB's approach is that to win, it's best to start by not losing. Harbaugh's approach, by result, is going to be "to increase the odds of winning in regulation, you choose to increase the odds of losing in regulation".

If find that sort of thinking foolish, as a general approach, in the context of sports. And, to make it seem more strange to me, he followed that up with



So he basically acknowledge that he threw out his game feel and went with the analytics, then justifies losing that way by saying "But I'm sure we'd definitely have lost if we'd done it the other way", when he obviously cannot be sure. Admittedly, he's couching that more with regards to the 4th down attempts, but the general premise still stands.

"It failed, but it would have been worse. I just know it!" is now his defense.

This. He coached that game like they were 50-point underdogs. As soon as they went for 2 the first time, KC must have known they had the game won, since Baltimore was going to play desperate.

 

[MainePatsFan26]

This. He coached that game like they were 50-point underdogs. As soon as they went for 2 the first time, KC must have known they had the game won, since Baltimore was going to play desperate.

It feels like John Harbaugh should watch some of Dennis Green's pressers. Kansas City is an excellent team but not without significant flaws on defense. Baltimore had no reason to enter that game with such low confidence. In Green's language, Harbaugh had already "crowned their @sses."

In regard to Harbaugh going for two repeatedly, what is appalling to me is how poorly Baltimore executed. I would have hoped the Ravens would have prepped all week for the two point play if that was part of Harbaugh's strategy. However, their poor execution would suggest otherwise. It's not like Kansas City showed they were an elite defense leading up to those failed conversions.

 

[jmt57]

It is a small sample size, but so far in 2019 the conversion rate when going for two is 50% (10-20).

This site doesn't have the raw numbers, but it is easy to figure out from the percentages:

NFL Football Stats - NFL Team Two Point Conversion Attempts per Game on TeamRankings.com

NFL Football Stats - NFL Team Two Point Conversions per Game on TeamRankings.com

 

[jmt57]

In regards to the 2-point attempt needing to be special:

What if a coach simply approached it as another 3rd and 2 (or 4th and 2) play?

Obviously you don't have the full playbook (I'll trick them with a 15 yard pass down the seam!) like you would it if it was 3rd and 2 at the 40. The shortened field does limit your choices, and more defenders in a smaller area does make it possible to better defend that limited space - but how much of this play is truly different from most of your short yardage practice and playbook?

 

[Deus Irae]

In regards to the 2-point attempt needing to be special:

What if a coach simply approached it as another 3rd and 2 (or 4th and 2) play?

Obviously you don't have the full playbook (I'll trick them with a 15 yard pass down the seam!) like you would it if it was 3rd and 2 at the 40. The shortened field does limit your choices, and more defenders in a smaller area does make it possible to better defend that limited space - but how much of this play is truly different from most of your short yardage practice and playbook?

I would say that you can't really compare 3rd and 2 with 4th and 2 or the conversion. That's because the 3rd and 2 is not final. If you fail, you've still got another down. 4th and 2 is final. The conversion is pass/fail.

And the problem with considering the 4th and 2 as the same as a conversion is, as you alluded to, the field. Unless you're down inside the 5 yard line, the 4th and 2 still requires a defense to defend more field than does a conversion, and that changes what you can call. So 2 point conversions, by their nature, are going to be the most limited bunch of plays in football outside of special teams.

The 2 point conversion really is a special case. It's final, and the space is about as limited as it gets.

 

[TruthSeeker]

Every two point play is something that has to be designed, installed, and practiced. Once a play is run, it goes into upcoming opponent's tape and you lose the element of surprise on that play. If you have a play that works in that winner take all situation, would you really want to use it for just one additional point and not for a critical 3rd or 4th down? Extra points, presumably, requires no additional practice time beyond the usual field goal practice. Using plays for relatively low stakes early two point plays is a misuse of your staff's time unless the reward is significant. It is not. Save your good conversion plays for when you most need it.

This is the key point (pun intended) and it took to the second page of the thread for someone to state it.

Yes, injuries, generally conservative play calling and following the crowd mindset all play a role. But the primary reason is to have a play or a small number of plays that can be executed that the defense hasn't properly prepared for thus significantly increasing the odds of success when they are called. And since success is often critical in these situations, a small increase of odds is very important.

Since most teams do take special preparations for these conversions, they tend to be completed at a higher percentage than they otherwise would. So even if current statistics indicate there is a slight advantage to go for the 2 point conversion, it could well turn into a slight or even significant disadvantage if this became standard practice as the surprise and extra preparation are both greatly diminished or lost. We don't really know as there has never been a team which attempted this. But that would be the expectation.

 

[Sicilian]

I'd like to echo the point of the poster(s) who said that 2-pt plays tend to be a little special and designed to only be executed a few times. Doing them too often reduces their chances of success each time, and there are only so many plays you can design in a space that condensed.

It would be like if Brady went for the QB sneak on every single 3rd/4th and 1. It works such a high percentage of the time now, because he only does it when he sees that the defense isn't set up to look for it and stop it. If he was doing it every time, even the most incompetent coaching staff would start to key on it, and the success rate would plummet.

2-pt conversions being successful about 50% of the time when used once every other game or so doesn't mean they'll maintain that rate if used 3-4 times every week, so the equation changes drastically.

 

[TruthSeeker]

The odds of going for the 2-point conversion when down by, say, 14 points near the end of the game are very interesting. Let's use the commonly cited statistical average of 47.5% 2-point conversion rate, 94.4% single point conversion rate and also assume a small amount of time left in the game so it is unlikely the other team will score again (or if they do score again, the game is effectively out of reach with at least a 17 point i.e. 3-score lead).

Scenarios with 2-point conversion on first attempt:
- score touchown and make 2-point conversion, 47.5% chance. Score again and kick extra point 94.4%. This is a 44.84% (.475 * .944) chance of winning the game.
- score touchown and make 2-point conversion, 47.5% chance. Score again and miss extra point 5.6%. This is a 2.66% (.475 * .056) chance of tying the game.
- score touchdown and miss 2-point conversion, 52.5% chance. Score again and make 2-point conversion, 47.5% chance. This is a 24.94% (.525 * .475) chance of having a tie game
- score touchdown and miss 2-point conversion, 52.5% chance. Score again and miss 2-point conversion, 52.5% chance. This is a 27.56% chance of losing the game

Summary of 2-point conversion on 1st attempt:
Win/Lead: 44.84%
Tie: 27.60% (2.66 + 24.94)
Loss by 1 point: 0.00%
Loss by 2 points: 27.56%
Total: 100.00%

Scenarios with 1-point conversion on first attempt:
- score touchdown and make 1-point conversion, 94.4% chance. Score again and make 1-point conversion at 94.4% chance. This is a 89.11% (.944 * .944) chance of a tie.
- score touchdown and make 1-point conversion, 94.4% chance. Score again and miss 1-point conversion at 5.6% chance. This is a 5.29% (.944*.056) chance of a loss
- score touchdown and miss 1-point conversion, 5.6% chance. Score again and make 2-point conversion, 47.5% chance. This is a 2.66 (.056 * .475) chance of a tie.
- score touchdown and miss 1-point conversion, 5.6% chance. Score atain and miss 2-point conversion, 52.5% chance. This is a 2.94% (.056 * .525) chance of a loss.

Summary of 1-point conversion on 1st attempt:
Win/Lead: 0%
Tie: 91.77% (89.11 + 2.66)
Loss by 1 point: 5.29 %
Loss by 2 points: 2.94%
Total: 100.00%

Note that what you have effectively done by using the 2-point conversion is to increase your odds of an outright win significantly by being willing to suffer a 2-point loss instead of a 1-point loss.

The stats are clear. Down by 14 points towards the end of the game (say 5 minutes remaining), it is clear to go for 2 in hopes of getting an immediate victory (44.84%!) should you score another touchdown while the chance of ending in a tie vs. a loss remains essentially equal (27.6% vs. 27.56%). Why would you do anything else? (Note that converting the 2-point conversion on the first try also brings in the 2 more field goals to tie scenario into play.)

The alternative is to give you a 0% chance of win and a 91.77% chance of a tie.

Stupid, right? Yet this is what coaches do ALL THE TIME. At every level.

The bottom line is that situationally, going for 2 is essentially mandatory because it increases your chances of winning so greatly. In time (don't know if this will be 3 years or 30 years), teams will start to do this. But conventional wisdom in the NFL can change slowly in some ways and this is one of those ways.

 

[slam]

If you hit the first XP, you have the option of going for 2 and the outright win with the second TD, which happens on occasion.

No matter if the math is correct, if you're in the 27.56% of times you go for 2 and miss twice you will be pilloried forever for it as the coach that got too greedy. People still bring up 4th and 2 from 2009 as a black mark on Belicheck's career even though the math is justifiable. There is reward but there is risk as well.

 

[borg]

The numbers for the 2 point argument often seem compelling but on the field it's about more than just numbers on a screen, the more plays you run down where things get tight the greater the injury risk. A team's hardest to replace big money offensive players aren't at risk on a PAT. I never hear that simple fact brought up in the conversion/PAT discussion but if I were a HC it would be a huge factor in my decision making

So what you are saying is O Lineman should be on a pitch count and preservation trumps extra points.
And going for it on 4th down should be off the table as well?

 

[maust]

So what you are saying is O Lineman should be on a pitch count and preservation trumps extra points.
And going for it on 4th down should be off the table as well?

(sigh)

 

[TruthSeeker]

No matter if the math is correct, if you're in the 27.56% of times you go for 2 and miss twice you will be pilloried forever for it as the coach that got too greedy. People still bring up 4th and 2 from 2009 as a black mark on Belicheck's career even though the math is justifiable. There is reward but there is risk as well.

So true. Fear of change is huge in all societies and is a significant reason why progress in so many areas has been ******ed over the centuries. Despite this, younger people with less invested in the current (economic, social, political, etc.) systems press on for change and set a new standard - from which many of them are then unwilling to move on from.

So, you can be a stagnant leader who listens to the potentially mocking crowd, afraid to do what you know in your heart and mind is better. Or perhaps just not even willing to entertain the possibility of change in a given area because the perceived threat is too much.

Or you can risk the ridicule of the unwise, of the traditionalists, to forge ahead and pave new ground.

Which will it be? Everyone gets to make their own choice.

But know this. The change will come. If it's clearly for the better, it will come. The only question is when and who. And our descendents will look back on us (like we look on our ancestors) and ask, "why in the world didn't they do this before?" This is the lesson of history.

 

[Deus Irae]

If you hit the first XP, you have the option of going for 2 and the outright win with the second TD, which happens on occasion.

No matter if the math is correct, if you're in the 27.56% of times you go for 2 and miss twice you will be pilloried forever for it as the coach that got too greedy. People still bring up 4th and 2 from 2009 as a black mark on Belicheck's career even though the math is justifiable. There is reward but there is risk as well.

The issue with analytics is always the same. No matter how they might slant in one direction or another, they cannot, or at least currently do not, take the immediate context into account. Is it Brady going against the worst defense in history? Context tells you to favor analytics that imply a QB win. Is it Luke Falk going against the best defense in history? Context tells you to be very careful about analytics that imply a QB win.

Even Truthseeker's attempt to justify going for 2 when down 14 demonstrates the folly of relying on analytics. Using his numbers, the chance of losing if you go for 2 ends up being 27.56%. The chance of losing if you go for 1 is just 8.23%. So, barring unusual circumstances, you're a fool if you go for 2. Yet Truthseeker thinks it's a no brainer to go for it, because the analytics has him twisted to the point of ignoring the loss potential in favor of the win potential. And that's not a shot at Truthseeker. That's just an inherent problem with relying on the analytics. In football, a loss is what kills you. If you're tied, you still have a shot in overtime.

 

[SlowGettingUp]

In general, the Pats are better than their opponents, and so they want to do everything to reduce variance. It is the Pats' opponents that should often be going for it on 4th down and trying for two point conversions.
Right now it's important to get Gostkowski straightened out, and that adds to the reason for always kicking the extra point (except of course for situations at the end of the game where the score dictates otherwise).