Bill Barnwell of Grantland on last night's game at Atlanta

[PatsWickedPissah]

Hope and fear do not constitute an effective game plan.

You potentially forego the Opportunity to have good stuff happen by failing on 4th down. By taking the vastly more probable 3 points and trusting your team to make opportunities to win, I see it as extending the game with confidence in your capabilities. Why play the long card that could most likely end the comeback well before 60 minutes? I say subsequent events made the case for that strategy. It was execution and bounce of the ball that made them lose, NOT the strategy.

edited to reduce incoherence

 

[BradyFTW!]

I read Barnwell's argument. My point is that the success rates kill his arguments. If you kick the field goal (94%), you're within 7. If you get stopped on 4th (which has a lower percentage of success, which varies depending on whether you're averaging everyone or looking at specific teams*), you're going home a loser without ever having gotten a chance to tie.

His argument is lousy. You should have known that the moment he made the "only way to win in regulation" stuff part of his argument.


*according to team rankings.com, the Falcons have converted 25% and 22% of their 4th downs in their last two seasons.

In large part because they keep getting stuck on 4th-and-long in do or die situations due to game mismanagement, which happened once again last night.

 

[Deus Irae]

Deus, Barnwell might be wrong, but your argument continues to be mistaken. FG% is completely meaningless. See my post above.

I've read your post. You're getting it just as wrong as Barnwell.

 

[voluntarysaftey]

I dunno. They needed two scores and had already failed on 4th and short near the end zone earlier in the game. I don't think they did the wrong thing. Heck, it almost worked! Miss on 4th and short and the game is over. I thought the bigger mistake was not kicking the FG earlier in the game (where they would have been down only 7-6). That miss on 4th and 2 gave our guys a lot of confidence, I thought, even though at the end of the game they still would have been down by 4. Then they would have been going for the win rather than a tie.

Agree; Failing on 4th and short and the game is over.
Getting it is still no guarantee that you score a TD and you still need a FG and it also takes time off the clock.

The FG there was the right move

 

[Deus Irae]

In large part because they keep getting stuck on 4th-and-long in do or die situations due to game mismanagement, which happened once again last night.

But, apparently, that wouldn't happen if they went for it on 4th down there and got the first down. They'd never face another 4th down in that game, and certainly not a 4th and long, as they went merrily on their way to unquestionably scoring 14 unanswered points in the last 3 minutes of the game.

 

[Deus Irae]

Agree; Failing on 4th and short and the game is over.
Getting it is still no guarantee that you score a TD...

Winner!
Winner!

Chicken dinner!

 

[letekro]

Neither you nor Barnwell are correct.

Haha. if you say so

 

[letekro]

You potentially forego the Opportunity to have good stuff happen by failing on 4th down. By taking the vastly more probable 3 points and trusting your team to make opportunities to win, I see it as extending the game with confidence in your capabilities. Why play the long card that could most likely end the comeback well before 60 minutes? I say subsequent events made the case for that strategy. It was execution and bounce of the ball that made them lose, NOT the strategy.

edited to reduce incoherence

Everyone in this thread, including you, that is opposing Barnwell's argument is falling into the same fallacy --- the option that gives the better chance of continued competiveness (the FG) is NOT the same thing as the option that gives the better chance to win the game (the TD).

 

[Oswlek]

Everyone in this thread, including you, that is opposing Barnwell's argument is falling into the same fallacy --- the option that gives the better chance of continued competiveness (the FG) is NOT the same thing as the option that gives the better chance to win the game (the TD).

This is the post that deserves this reply:

Winner!
Winner!

Chicken dinner!

 

[pencilneckgeek]

You potentially forego the Opportunity to have good stuff happen by failing on 4th down. By taking the vastly more probable 3 points and trusting your team to make opportunities to win, I see it as extending the game with confidence in your capabilities. Why play the long card that could most likely end the comeback well before 60 minutes? I say subsequent events made the case for that strategy. It was execution and bounce of the ball that made them lose, NOT the strategy.

edited to reduce incoherence

Thanks for the latter. We should all be so considerate.

Being down by 17 with 4.5 minutes left is what made them lose. The strategic decision was between being almost certain to lose and being highly likely to lose. Smith chose to be almost certain to lose and barely lost. The bounces went the Falcons way, if anything.

Take a close look at the link I posted and related material. Extending the game can mean trusting your capability to stop the opponent and mount a long drive; but I submit that in this case, that is simply being scared to put in on the line at the optimal moment and try to make a play, and instead hoping that you will make the plays in the more nebulous moments to come, despite the fact that you will need more of those plays and face longer odds of success by deferring the moment of truth.

 

[Observer]

By missing on the TD you've dug a deep hole
By taking the 3 you allow time and opportunity for another "stuff happens" which could be another Brady-center miscue, gamble, pick, long pass for a TD, whatever. These potential gifts or great plays by your team would be "not enough" were you down 10.

Absolutely! Barnwell talks about net yards and hypothetical probabilities of success but completely disregards the structure of the game. Conversion of a 4th down is a typically low likelihood play and had they done that, the higher likelihood would be that the game would end then and there. By taking the field goal, they allowed themselves not another opportunity but another SET of opportunities to score. Going to the end zone from the 35 yard line might not be difficult when you have 4 tries to make 10 yards each, especially if you can get dozens with one long bomb to Julio (as they demonstrated).

 

[Avenger]

Success percentages have nothing to do with which is the better option?



Seriously?




Is this some online version of Candid Camera, or something?

To get win percentage you need to factor the percentage of a FG on the 4th down with the onside kick recovery % and the 70 yard touchdown drive and compare that to getting the 4th down conversion for the TD and the onside kick and a drive of 35 yards for a FG. The onside recovery is on both sides of the equation so take that out, FG percentage is close enough that you can take that out for the most part now, are you saying it's easier or harder to get a 1 yard touch down or a 35 yard touchdown?

Advanced NFL Stats: How to Talk to a Skeptic about Risky 4th Downs

 

[Demosthenes]

Primarily because in that situation you assume the FG to be a foregone conclusion. The only reason why you would consider FG percentages on such a short kick is if you had a reason to think it wouldn't be made, in which case the TD becomes more attractive. Without negative evidence, though, you take those three points for granted.

Ultimately, the argument isn't FG% vs. 4th down conversion rate, it is guaranteed three points and still needing a 60 yard TD drive vs. getting a single yard to try for a TD and then only needing 25 yards to be in makeable FG range, with the added bonus of possibly even winning outright if the drive is better than you hope. The fact that the defense now needs to guard against the FG paradoxically would make a TD even easier.

Yes, you probably lose if you don't get that first yard. But you are likely to lose either way in that situation, and your odds of victory are much higher with that yard and subsequent TD than any time in regulation with the FG.

FG percentage still needs to be taken into account. IF scoring a FG or making a TD was equally likely, then sure, go for the TD.

BUT, a FG there and 3 points was basically automatic, AND, they needed the 3 pts and it brought the deficit down to 7 pts.

If they don't convert the 4th and 1, it's definitely game over.

If they convert the 4th and 1 for a TD, then sure, all they need is a FG. BUT, if they take the 3 points, while they would need to drive the field further for a TD, they have more chances to do so. That's another thing that Barnwell leaves out. They don't have to score a TD on the next play presuming they get the ball back. They have time on the clock and 4 chances to get 10 yards and another set of downs.

 

[Deus Irae]

Haha. if you say so

Look at simple facts and logical inferences.

If you fail, in either case, you're likely done, because you end up with 0 points and give the ball back to the opponent with 3 minutes or less left in the game, and a 2 score lead . The failure rate in going for it is higher than the failure rate in kicking the FG.

Advantage FG, and that kills the "• The Falcons need to go for it on one of the two drives anyway, and a failure will be demoralizing regardless of when it comes. " argument put forth by Barnwell. This is part of why Oswlek is wrong in claiming the FG% doesn't matter.



If you go for it, you're not guaranteed to stop the clock if you convert. You're more likely to have to run more clock down, while kicking the FG stops the clock immediately. You also are still not guaranteed to score and you're still down two scores with less than 3 minutes left. Nobody knows how that next series of downs plays out, and a penalty of play for a loss could result in just the sort of 4th-and-7 he's talking about

Advantage FG, and this kills his "• Not only was the fourth-and-1 they passed up easier than the fourth-and-7 the Falcons eventually had to try to convert, it was easier than the average situation they would expect to be in on the subsequent drive.", particularly because he seems to ignore that such a "subsequent drive" will be needed whether they score a TD or a FG.


His "• The only way to win the game in regulation is by going for it on the first drive of the two." is meaningless, because you need to not lose in regulation much more more than you need to win in regulation.

Even the best argument he has is a lousy one. His "• They lose if the Patriots score on their next drive." ignores his own, earlier arguments about needing to drive the ball, ending up with 4th downs and the like.

Essentially, what he's trying to do is take a worst case scenario and apply it to the FG, while taking an absolutely best case scenario and applying it to the conversion attempt.

 

[Deus Irae]

Everyone in this thread, including you, that is opposing Barnwell's argument is falling into the same fallacy --- the option that gives the better chance of continued competiveness (the FG) is NOT the same thing as the option that gives the better chance to win the game (the TD).

And, again, you are incorrect.

 

[Oswlek]

Essentially, what he's trying to do is take a worst case scenario and apply it to the FG, while taking an absolutely best case scenario and applying it to the conversion attempt.

Actually, that isn't at all what I am doing, but nice spin job! :rocker:

 

[Deus Irae]

To get win percentage you need to factor the percentage of a FG on the 4th down with the onside kick recovery % and the 70 yard touchdown drive and compare that to getting the 4th down conversion for the TD and the onside kick and a drive of 35 yards for a FG. The onside recovery is on both sides of the equation so take that out, FG percentage is close enough that you can take that out for the most part now, are you saying it's easier or harder to get a 1 yard touch down or a 35 yard touchdown?

Advanced NFL Stats: How to Talk to a Skeptic about Risky 4th Downs

There was no 1 yard touchdown available.

 

[Deus Irae]

Actually, that isn't at all what I am doing, but nice spin job! :rocker:

That's what Barnwell is doing. What you're doing is ignoring the obvious.

 

[Demosthenes]

To get win percentage you need to factor the percentage of a FG on the 4th down with the onside kick recovery % and the 70 yard touchdown drive and compare that to getting the 4th down conversion for the TD and the onside kick and a drive of 35 yards for a FG. The onside recovery is on both sides of the equation so take that out, FG percentage is close enough that you can take that out for the most part now, are you saying it's easier or harder to get a 1 yard touch down or a 35 yard touchdown?
Advanced NFL Stats: How to Talk to a Skeptic about Risky 4th Downs

Red herring as you don't need a 35 yard TD. Rather, you need a 45 yard drive for a TD. With that, you have 4 plays to make 10 yards to get another set of downs.

 

[PatsWickedPissah]

Everyone in this thread, including you, that is opposing Barnwell's argument is falling into the same fallacy --- the option that gives the better chance of continued competiveness (the FG) is NOT the same thing as the option that gives the better chance to win the game (the TD).

Of course they are different.
one is much more probable that the game most likely ends there, in failing to convert.
And even converting does not mean 7 pts. More time could be pissed away post conversion attempting to score 7. And worse yet a FG being a frustrated result but with less clock.

In the real world we saw the 3 taken and plenty of time & opportunity to get the subsequent 7. It was lack of execution, and a non-PI call by the refs that sealed our W. We've seen that called as PI before.