Going for it on 4th down was CORRECT...here's why...

[TyronePoole]

Football is a game of inches and each drive is different. Just because he did it in 3 minutes the drive before doesn't mean that the extra 20-30 yards wouldn't make a difference on the next drive around.

Manning starting from an average field position from that punt in that situation nets the Pats .02-.05 more in winning %. That's against the baseline of the NFL, against Peyton Manning it's an even smaller number because he's a better QB. Bellichick risked .02 to for the chance at nearly 100% wp, increasing his overall equity in the game and making it a definitively +ev decision. There really is no argument here.

 

[RobertWeathers]

Sure I did. We had a double digit lead and under 10 minutes left to play. In that situation, you give the opposing quarterback the longest field possible to drive so it decreases the odds of scoring while also taking time off the clock. Your reading comprehension issues are not my problem.

And the calls are similar as the Patriots should have punted in both instances.

Your are completely overvaluing the state of the Patriots defense's capability of stopping Manning on a consistent basis in the 2nd 1/2 of games and throughout his career. Let's set aside the mathematical probabilities for a moment and look at the historical and in-game circumstances.

If BB had the 2003 or 2006 defense at his disposal, then maybe he might be ok with punting and putting the game in the defense's hands to win. Even with those defenses and others that were not quite as good, Manning faired quite well vs them late in games.

What if they did punt to say the 20 and PM drives down the field in 3 min and its now 31-21 with say 5:00 left instead of 6:43, McGahee doesn't fumble and it's 31-28, they get the onside kick, make the FG and it's 31-31. Now what?

The fundamental problem in both instances was not the choice- it was the execution (fumble, playcall, etc) and because the execution was poor, the choice is questioned.

BB has always and will continue to be aggressive and take advantage of opportunities to close out games. Use the SB and the 4th and 3 call @ TN 33 w/ 5:14 to go vs TN in the 03 div as examples of how being aggressive has benefited the team.

Sometimes they work out. Sometimes they don't.

 

[Kontradiction]

Of course that drive was in the 3rd quarter when there wasn't as much urgency. It more likely would have taken less time then that. Essentially your argument is that the extra 20 yards was going to burn a significant amount of time which is nonsense. Thats about 30 seconds as opposed to if you get the first down you can burn at least 2 minutes.

Or it could have ended in an INT, forced fumble, unforced fumble, three and out, four and out, or a punt back to our offense. Prior to that drive, Manning had trouble sustaining drives against the defense throughout the game, either by lack of execution or through our defense forcing the issue. You just don't take the chance of making it a one score game on top of giving a quarterback like Manning the ball back at midfield. You make him work as hard as possible, as long as possible for it.

 

[TyronePoole]

Or it could have ended in an INT, forced fumble, unforced fumble, three and out, four and out, or a punt back to our offense. Prior to that drive, Manning had trouble sustaining drives against the defense throughout the game, either by lack of execution or through our defense forcing the issue. You just don't take the chance of making it a one score game on top of giving a quarterback like Manning the ball back at midfield. You make him work as hard as possible, as long as possible for it.

what % of the time do you think that extra 20 yards is the difference between the Pats winning and losing when up 17 with 8 minutes to go?

 

[BSR]

Or it could have ended in an INT, forced fumble, unforced fumble, three and out, four and out, or a punt back to our offense. Prior to that drive, Manning had trouble sustaining drives against the defense throughout the game, either by lack of execution or through our defense forcing the issue. You just don't take the chance of making it a one score game on top of giving a quarterback like Manning the ball back at midfield. You make him work as hard as possible, as long as possible for it.

All those things could have happened on a shorter field as well. And there wasn't the chance of making it a one score game with that decision when you are up by 17 points.

Plus you've totally ignored the whole issue of clock which is obviously the biggest factor in winning the game at that point. It didn't really matter if they managed to score once more at that point (which is also why it wasn't like the 4&2 call), all that mattered was burning out the clock.

 

[The Brandon Five]

To be fair to BB, the spot on the 4th-and-2 in 2009 was BS.

The Patriots go for it on 4 and 2 against the Colts 11/15/2009 - YouTube

If that's not a first down, then Wayne didn't score on this play last Sunday:

 

[Deus Irae]

you are embarrassing yourself

Not at all. It was a stupid decision. If you think the league will all be doing it, it will be an entire league making stupid decisions. Even the people pimping going for it on more 4th downs (I'm actually a believer in that, as a matter of fact) point out that you can't just go by blanket percentages and have to take other factors into account.

I've called both 4th down calls bad calls, because they were bad calls in the context of the flow of the game, regardless of what the percentages say. I've called them bad calls before the plays were actually run, too, so it's not as if they were "hindsight" calls. They were stupid decisions, regardless of whether or not they succeeded (the earlier 4th down was a successful one that was missed because the official spotted the ball incorrectly), just as the last set of downs in the first half was horribly done, regardless of whether or not it worked.

 

[TyronePoole]

Not at all. It was a stupid decision. If you think the league will all be doing it, it will be an entire league making stupid decisions. Even the people pimping going for it on more 4th downs (I'm actually a believer in that, as a matter of fact) point out that you can't just go by blanket percentages and have to take other factors into account.

I've called both 4th down calls bad calls, because they were. I've called them bad calls before the plays were actually run, too, so it's not as if they were "hindsight" calls. They were stupid decisions, regardless of whether or not they succeeded, just as the last set of downs in the first half was horribly done, regardless of whether or not it worked.

This is not an argument. It's just more "it was stupid because I say it was stupid."

You think your "feel" for the game outweighs the gulf in statistical percentages for this play and that makes you nothing more than Joe Morgan. Even if all the game-specific factors made it a closer call it would still be correct not to punt. But they don't. And your assertion that you've deduced enough from the game that you can throw out statistics and call it "mind-numbingly stupid" is just that.

This is baseball circa 1995. A bunch of dumb coaches doing the same dumb things because they aren't aware of optimal game theory and the ones who are don't have enough tenure to go against the grain. Which is why BB is the only coach capable of even approaching good decision making, though he falls victim to the same thinking much of the time also.

 

[Deus Irae]

This is not an argument. It's just more "it was stupid because I say it was stupid."

It's an argument. You just don't like it. I brought up a thread involving this at the start of the month.

http://www.patsfans.com/new-england-patriots/messageboard/95/951372-deadspin-article-going-4th-down.html

You think your "feel" for the game outweighs the gulf in statistical percentages for this play and that makes you nothing more than Joe Morgan. Even if all the game-specific factors made it a closer call it would still be correct not to punt. But they don't. And your assertion that you've deduced enough from the game that you can throw out statistics and call it "mind-numbingly stupid" is just that.

I think that even one of the men leading the charge for this stuff acknowledged my point, although he was only applying it in close situations:

Sometimes, the old fogeys are right: No, you don't go for it on fourth-and-1 from your own 30 if your running back is Jahvid Best and he's running behind the Miami offensive line (dead last in 2011, converting only 46 percent of runs in short yardage).

Was The Panthers' Fourth-Down Decision Dumb Enough To Change The NFL's Punt-To-Win Philosophy?

The game-specific, and team-specific circumstances matter, not just the numbers.

This is baseball circa 1995. A bunch of dumb coaches doing the same dumb things because they aren't aware of optimal game theory and the ones who are don't have enough tenure to go against the grain. Which is why BB is the only coach capable of even approaching good decision making, though he falls victim to the same thinking much of the time also.

No, what it is is a bunch of geeks who think numbers are all that matter battling against a stubborn group who don't use the numbers at all. Instead of realizing that both numbers and team-specific/game-specific situations matter, people like you get it just as wrong as those you deride for being out of date.

 

[TruthSeeker]

I am only talking about situations where the game is on the line and BB goes for it on 4th down specifically to keep the other team's offense from getting back on the field because he is AFRAID to punt and let the defense try to stop the other team.

Why is this a question of fear rather than probability?

Perhaps some posters are AFRAID to let the offense win the game?

As you can see, the fear emotion argument can be turned both ways. In actuality, I expect fear has absolutely nothing to do with it other than being a convenient way of avoiding the real question - what gives you the best chance to win? People have different opinions on this, but the statistics show that NFL teams don't keep the offense on the field in these situations nearly enough - including BB who goes for it about as much as any NFL coach.

 

[TyronePoole]

I think that even one of the men leading the charge for this stuff acknowledged my point, although he was only applying it in close situations:

And as I said, this is not a close situation.

The game-specific, and team-specific circumstances matter, not just the numbers.

they matter when the base rate is close, and you have some objective way of measuring game-specific factors that definitively make the decision an outlier. That is not the case here at all, and your assertion that it is and that you uniquely recognize that is laughable but telling.

No, what it is is a bunch of geeks who think numbers are all that matter battling against a stubborn group who don't use the numbers at all. Instead of realizing that both numbers and team-specific/game-specific situations matter, people like you get it just as wrong as those you deride for being out of date.

You think the numbers matter you just have no idea what they mean or how to apply them. And you didn't even mention any compelling game-specific factors that would make this decision an extreme outlier from the base rate (which is what you need to show).

Anyway, I know better than to waste more of my time on another "argument" with you. Anyone who wants to see an actual fairly in depth discussion of why Deus' and others thinking is flawed should read this thread starting at post #3905 (amongst almost no Pats fans):

Post here when coaches do something obviously stupid - Page 261 - Sporting Events and Fantasy Sports - Sporting Event Forum

 

[Kontradiction]

Brilliant reasoning. Which would decrease their chance of scoring and run down the clock more, punting to them or holding onto the ball? Which one?

In this case, it wasn't holding onto the ball. With each 4th down try, there are good odds that you're not going to convert. Since 2009, this team has converted 25 out of 47 4th down attempts. That equates to a 53% chance that you're going to convert and a 47% chance that you aren't. In essence, using the last three seasons as a sample size, you run quite a risk of giving Peyton Manning the ball back near midfield if you fail to convert. The safest bet would be to punt the ball back and make him cover as much distance as possible, using as much time as possible to score.

Either way, your scenario clearly did not work and, as a result, we needed the Broncos to bail us out.

 

[Deus Irae]

And as I said, this is not a close situation.

What you said means nothing.

they matter when the base rate is close, and you have some objective way of measuring game-specific factors that definitively make the decision an outlier. That is not the case here at all, and your assertion that it is and that you uniquely recognize that is laughable but telling.

They always matter, and objectivity is not required. That's kind of the point, really.

You think the numbers matter you just have no idea what they mean or how to apply them. And you didn't even mention any compelling game-specific factors that would make this decision an extreme outlier from the base rate (which is what you need to show).

I think numbers in isolation are often meaningless. It's certainly the case when you're dealing with percentages on football plays. As for what I mentioned or didn't, others have mentioned most, if not all, of the relevant circumstances.

Anyway, I know better than to waste more of my time on another "argument" with you. Anyone who wants to see an actual fairly in depth discussion of why Deus' and others thinking is flawed should read this thread starting at post #3905 (amongst almost no Pats fans

And yet you felt that you had to make the first disparaging comment. Please feel free to put me on ignore. I promise not to cry.

 

[BSR]

In this case, it wasn't holding onto the ball. With each 4th down try, there are good odds that you're not going to convert. Since 2009, this team has converted 25 out of 47 4th down conversions. That equates to a 53% chance that you're going to convert and a 47% chance that you aren't. In essence, using the last three seasons as a sample size, you run quite a risk of giving Peyton Manning the ball back near midfield if you fail to convert. The safest bet would be to punt the ball back and make him cover as much distance as possible, using as much time as possible to score.

What does it matter if you are giving it back to him a little closer? It makes it slightly harder for him. You have to give it back to him eventually. Meanwhile if you do succeed you run off much more time which greatly increases your chance of winning. You are really missing the point that the most important factor is running off the time. Its situational football.

Either way, your scenario clearly did not work and, as a result, we needed the Broncos to bail us out.

It clearly did. What part of winning by two scores did you miss? If they get the TD there you win by 3 even with terrible execution by the offense. In otherwords, it ended up not mattering that you gave it back to Manning with a short field in that situation. That point would have been driven home even more if Ridley doesn't fumble the ball on their 30.

 

[TyronePoole]

In this case, it wasn't holding onto the ball. With each 4th down try, there are good odds that you're not going to convert. Since 2009, this team has converted 25 out of 47 4th down conversions. That equates to a 53% chance that you're going to convert and a 47% chance that you aren't. In essence, using the last three seasons as a sample size, you run quite a risk of giving Peyton Manning the ball back near midfield if you fail to convert. The safest bet would be to punt the ball back and make him cover as much distance as possible, using as much time as possible to score.

Either way, your scenario clearly did not work and, as a result, we needed the Broncos to bail us out.

I'll ask again, what % of the time do you think an extra 20 yards is the difference between winning and losing against Peyton Manning when up 17 with 8+ minutes to go?

 

[TyronePoole]

Just two quick highlights:

They always matter, and objectivity is not required. That's kind of the point, really.

What does this even mean?

I think numbers in isolation are often meaningless. It's certainly the case when you're dealing with percentages on football plays.

What are you basing this on? Please say "my gut"

 

[BSR]

The game-specific, and team-specific circumstances matter, not just the numbers.

I'd love to hear what the game/team specific circumstances were in this case that you thought it was a stupid call.

This should be interesting.

 

[Ring 6]

Your are completely overvaluing the state of the Patriots defense's capability of stopping Manning on a consistent basis in the 2nd 1/2 of games and throughout his career. Let's set aside the mathematical probabilities for a moment and look at the historical and in-game circumstances.

If BB had the 2003 or 2006 defense at his disposal, then maybe he might be ok with punting and putting the game in the defense's hands to win. Even with those defenses and others that were not quite as good, Manning faired quite well vs them late in games.

What if they did punt to say the 20 and PM drives down the field in 3 min and its now 31-21 with say 5:00 left instead of 6:43, McGahee doesn't fumble and it's 31-28, they get the onside kick, make the FG and it's 31-31. Now what?

The fundamental problem in both instances was not the choice- it was the execution (fumble, playcall, etc) and because the execution was poor, the choice is questioned.

BB has always and will continue to be aggressive and take advantage of opportunities to close out games. Use the SB and the 4th and 3 call @ TN 33 w/ 5:14 to go vs TN in the 03 div as examples of how being aggressive has benefited the team.

Sometimes they work out. Sometimes they don't.

This is epic failure.
You want to base your analysis on what actually happened, then dismiss it with WHAT IF.
WHAT IF wins every argument.

 

[Kontradiction]

I'll ask again, what % of the time do you think an extra 20 yards is the difference between winning and losing against Peyton Manning when up 17 with 8+ minutes to go?

That's a loaded question and a logical fallacy. In this instance, I'll ask another: How did putting it on the defense a year after the infamous 4th and 2 turn out for the Pats?

 

[RobertWeathers]

This is epic failure.
You want to base your analysis on what actually happened, then dismiss it with WHAT IF.
WHAT IF wins every argument.

Huh? So is this entire thread. I'm not trying to win an argument. Maybe others are.

What if they ran the ball instead? Why didn't they run and force DEN to call a 2nd TO?What if they punted and it was blocked? Why didn't TB try a hard count and pull 'em offsides.

You missed the point of the post. BB is an aggressive coach and has confidence in his offense's ability to convert and PMs ability to shred his defense. I'm sure he knew the %s and what ifs and made the call- thats the point. It just didn't work out.