some interesting analysis here:
WSJ: Why NFL Coaches Take No Chances
(clicking on the link takes you to lmgtfy.com, which performs a google search for the article. this is to get past WSJ's pay wall)
no direct mention of belichick, but the bills and the jets are mentioned. in the chart ranking teams by aggressiveness, the patriots are fairly aggressive on 4th down. they're conservative on overall playcalling (a combined measure of offensive and defensive aggressiveness), but that's probably because the patriots don't blitz very often.
some quotes:
in the chart below, a negative score indicates aggressive play-calling, a positive score indicates conservative play-calling.
WSJ: Why NFL Coaches Take No Chances
(clicking on the link takes you to lmgtfy.com, which performs a google search for the article. this is to get past WSJ's pay wall)
no direct mention of belichick, but the bills and the jets are mentioned. in the chart ranking teams by aggressiveness, the patriots are fairly aggressive on 4th down. they're conservative on overall playcalling (a combined measure of offensive and defensive aggressiveness), but that's probably because the patriots don't blitz very often.
some quotes:
Rex Ryan faced the most crucial call of his coaching tenure in Buffalo on Saturday.
Needing a win to stay in playoff contention, the Bills had a fourth-and-2 on their own 41 with 4:09 left in overtime. Buffalo’s offense had set a team record with 589 net yards. But Ryan opted to punt.
The Bills never got the ball back and lost the game. Ryan was fired Tuesday morning.
“I thought I’d pin them deep and then get the ball back,” Ryan said after the game. “But every coach in America would have done the same thing.”
It turns out that Ryan is right. The NFL’s current roster of coaches is a very conservative bunch. And that might not be a formula for success.
A Wall Street Journal analysis of NFL play calling this season shows that—despite a legion of mathematicians, economists and win probability models urging them to take more chances—most of the league’s coaches still reach for the conventional choice by habit.
The Journal analysis examines how coaches played their hand this season across three broad categories of game management: fourth downs; play calling (blitzing on defense; passing on early downs or with the lead on offense) and special teams (going for a 2-point conversion and onside kicks when ahead).
The analysis shows that the four most aggressive coaches are on track to guide teams to the playoffs—the New York Giants’ Ben McAdoo, Detroit’s Jim Caldwell, Green Bay’s Mike McCarthy and Atlanta’s Dan Quinn. Eight of the top 10 most risk-averse coaches, will watch the playoffs from home.
University of Pennsylvania professor Cade Massey, who researches behavior and judgment, said many NFL coaches habitually choose to postpone the certainty of losing in football for as long as possible—even if doing so actually lowers the odds of winning in the end, such as opting to punt on fourth-and-short in overtime.
Strangely, when faced with fourth and five or less, coaches opt to punt about as frequently (9 times out of 12). The New York Jets’ Todd Bowles has been in the latter situation three times this year and punted each time.
After one such instance in October against the Steelers, Bowles said, “If it was the same situation again, I’d probably punt it. I still stand by that decision.”
Bowles’ conservative mindset was on full display earlier this month. With the Jets trailing the Dolphins by 24 (three possessions) and facing a fourth-and-4 from the Miami 18, Bowles opted to kick a 36-yard field goal—meaning the Jets still needed three touchdowns to potentially tie the game. He then kicked off deep rather than attempt an onside kick. Saturday, he kicked a field goal on fourth down and goal—down 41-0.
Adi Wyner, a professor of statistics at the University of Pennsylvania said, “I watch the Jets get pummeled and I think, ‘Why don’t you try something? It’s fourth-and-3 and you’re punting? Go for it. Try onside kicks. Try to win the game.”
in the chart below, a negative score indicates aggressive play-calling, a positive score indicates conservative play-calling.