If you had made a list of Most Indepensible Patriots the day prior to SB53, would Malcom Butler have been in your top 25? I’m starting to wonder if people were even paying attention during the 2017-18 season when he was not even an average player, let alone a solid cornerback. Rowe outplayed him for much of the season and his performance in the SB is being way overblown; he let up that long TD pass, though it’s not like Butler didn’t allow 6 TDs during the season (tied for third most in entire NFL). The entire defense was gashed because (a) they had a terrible pass rush due to not having any good pass rushers, and (b) they had even more terrible linebackers, and (c) their secondary, which masked an incredibly weak front 6/7 all season, finally broke due to the Eagles elite pass blocking, and their versatility and depth at skill positions. This defense had faced the Titans and Jaguars in the playoffs...those teams had very weak offenses.
This was not the most puzzling Belichick Super Bowl decision to me. That would be going for it on 4th and 11 in SB42 instead of a 48-yard (or so) field goal attempt. And both fourth down/field goal decisions in the second quarter of SB53 were also more puzzling. Kicking a FG on 4th and 1 at the Eagles eight, and then attempting a circus catch down the sidelines on 4th and 5 at the Eagles 35, both seem be in contrast to statistical probabilities for points. Those decisions there are biggest head scratchers for me. On 4th and 5, you attempt a 52 yard FG, and on 4th and 1 at the eight, you go for the seven points and hedge your bet with field position. These are basic football decisions they require little argument, yet it seems that due to the gravity of the game, Belichick has at times tried to be too smart when it comes to risk:reward, and made decisions that he would not have made during any other games.