Manx took issue when I said in another thread that BB had been less "consistent" in his drafting since 2010 than Carroll/Schneider, but I think the latter had a clearer vision of where they wanted to go and executed it more consistently.
So let's time capsule back to 2010:
Seattle:
The Seahawks have just hired Pete Carroll as their head coach and John Schneider as GM. The team made it to the SB in 2005 after a 13-3 season, but had fallen on hard times, and was coming off consecutive lousy seasons (4-12 in 2008, 5-11 in 2009). They were fortunate in that they inherited two top 15 draft picks (#6 and #14) from their predecessors. As far as I can tell, they sat down and pretty quickly agreed on a vision for where they wanted the team to evolve on both offense and defense, how the existing roster talent fit into that vision, and where to remedy the deficiencies in FA and the draft. They may have been lucky that Pete Carroll's old ideas happened to fit so well, and they may have had some luck on how the draft fell and some of their draft choices, but they had a clear and decisive vision and executed to it:
- The used their top 2 draft picks on a franchise LT and a defensive QB/captain in Russell Okong and Earl Thomas.
- They drafted big, physical DBs in Walter Thurmond and Kam Chancellor (2010 4th and 5th round picks), followed by Richard Sherman, Mark Legree and Byron Maxwell (2011 5th, 5th and 6th round picks), Jeremy Lane and Winston Guy (2012 5th rounds picks) and Tharold Simon (2013 5th round pick), plus signing 6'4" 221# Brandon Browner out of Canada in 2011. Obviously not all of those guys worked out, but they didn't have too.
- They traded for a Leo-type player in Chris Clemons (2010), and drafted another in Bruce Irvin (2012).
- They loaded up on fast, aggressive LBs and 4-3 DEs who could play multiple roles.
Again, they had nowhere near 100% success rate, and they churned the roster several times, but they aggressively dumped everyone who didn't fit (including 2009 #4 overall pick Aaron Curry). The only significant defensive players still on the roster drafted before 2010 are Brandon Mebane and Red Bryant.
Regardless of whether they had won the SB or not this year, I think it was obvious by last year that they had a championship-caliber defense.
New England:
In 2010 the Pats were coming off a disappointing 2009 season, in which the return of Tom Brady was spoiled by poor team chemistry and a lack of leadership and toughness. BB took a hatchet to the team in the off-season, jettisoning a lot of veterans.
In the 2010 draft it seems that BB wasn't clear about a move away from a 3-4 base, because he bypassed 4-3 DEs like Carlos Dunlap and Greg Hardy in favor of Jermaine Cunningham, as well as more mobile MLBs like Sean Lee, Daryl Washington and Navorro Bowman in favor of a 3-4 thumper like Brandon Spikes. He drafted Devin McCourty at CB at 27, having spent 1st or 2nd round picks on DBs in 2007 (Brandon Meriweather), 2008 (Terrance Wheatley, plus a 4th on Jonathan Wilhite), 2009 (Patrick Chung, Darius Butler). All the the CB picks had been on smaller, less physical guys, even though the best CB on the roster in 2009 had been 6'1" Leigh Bodden, who the Pats had signed to a 4 year extension.
By 2011 BB seems to have been more clear about a move away from a 3-4 base, as he bypassed guys like Cameron Jordan and Muhammad Wilkerson - I can't fault the choice of Nate Solder at #17. I don't even mind the choice of Ras-I Dowling at #33 if BB had decided that bigger and more physical was the way to go at CB, even though in retrospect he turned out not to be a good choice. It makes sense from this perspective as well that he passed on guys like Justin Houston. By training camp 2011 BB was tinkering with a 4-3 under scheme, and he was bringing more physical cover safeties like Dashon Goldson in for a look (he let Goldson re-sign to a 1 year deal with San Francisco). 3 weeks later BB scrapped the safety position, cutting both James Sanders and Brandon Meriweather; Leigh Bodden didn't come back effectively from IR and was cut, as was Darius Butler.
So in 2012, with a relative paucity of draft picks but 2 first and 2 2nd round choices what does BB do? He trades up for Chandler Jones, a guy who is clear departure from the 3-4 mold. And then, he has 2 options:
A) Trade up to get safety Harrison Smith, who probably won't last to #31 since Mark Barron went #7 overall and there aren't any more top safeties on the table; then take a speedy versatile LB at 48 like Lavonte David, Bobby Wagner, or Zach Brown. Trade back from 62 and get some more picks, and maybe pick up some guys once considered day 1-2 talents who are in free fall like Alfonzo Dennard and Vontaze Burfict.
B) Trade up to take another 3-4 thumper LB like Dont'a Hightower who is a questionable fit in a 4-3 and somewhat redundant with Brandon Spikes, then reach for a safety at 48, losing out on a more mobile LB who can help cover the middle of the field.
To me it's inconsistant to choose option B. If we had picked option A, then we could have taken a DT like Brandon Williams at #93 in 2013 to groom behind Wilfork, and maybe used #235 on a moon shot athletic freak like Lawrence Okoye to groom behind Tommy Kelly. Those would have been decisive, consistent moves.
There's no crying over spilt milk, but I think that BB has definitely suffered from a "mixed" approach in his defensive draft selections, and it has slowed down the development of the defense.
It's not just about adding talent. It's about adding talent that fits.