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Bill Barnwell of Grantland on last night's game at Atlanta

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If I'm understanging you, you're omitting the difference between the success rates of scoring the initial field goal versus scoring the initial TD.

Using this data, the same data someone else used earlier in the thread, we see that kicking the field goal gives the team the better chance. The FG is roughly a 95% chance, followed by a TD drive with about the same chance of success as a FG drive would have following the TD, assuming the TD actually happened.

No, I'm not omitting that at all. Otherwise the chances of scoring EITHER a td or fg after an initial td would be much higher.

Are you taking into account that after an initial TD you can go for either score on the second drive?
 
No, I'm not omitting that at all. Otherwise the chances of scoring EITHER a td or fg after an initial td would be much higher.

Are you taking into account that after an initial TD you can go for either score on the second drive?

Given the data chart, the odds of the TD and the FG are essentially the same at the distance where an onsides kick is recovered. It's one of the problems with relying on this data, since that would certainly seem counterintuitive when were talking about end-of-game situations, but someone had used it earlier, so I went with it.

We're looking at, basically:

95% (Bryant's FG percentage from that distance) + about 28-30%, versus 60% (someone else's number used for the 4th down conversion) + the 28-30% PLUS the required percentage for the score after the initial successful conversion.

Using the given data, the percentages favor trying for the FG first.
 
I thought going for the FG on 4th and 1 was the right call but after reading Barnwell's article and forum comments I looked a little further. I used Advanced NFL Stats 4th down calculator and surprised to see that the calculator supports Barnwell's theory.

Not making the 4th and 1 Falcons chance to win 1%
Making the 4th and 1 Falcons chance to win 11%
Kicking the FG on 4th and 1 Falcons chance to win 3%

So in conclusion a whole lot of things had to go wrong (onside kick not secured, Blount's 3rd and 1 run, Brady's subsequent 4th and 1 fumble) from the Pats for the Falcons to even have a chance to tie the game.

I used the same calculator on the Pats subsequent 4th and 1.

Making it Pats 99% to win
Losing it Pats 87% to win
Punting Pats 88% to win
 
Given the data chart, the odds of the TD and the FG are essentially the same at the distance where an onsides kick is recovered.

Right. But the odds of scoring (either TD or FG) > (either individual type of score). You don't seem to be factoring that in, which might be the main place our calcs differ.

95% (Bryant's FG percentage from that distance) + about 28-30%, versus 60% (someone else's number used for the 4th down conversion) + the 28-30% PLUS the required percentage for the score after the initial successful conversion.

Can you explain what the "28-30%" figure is? Also, there's the possibility of scoring a touchdown rather than just 1st down on the initial play. It's plenty complicated.
 
We're looking at, basically:

95% (Bryant's FG percentage from that distance) + about 28-30%, versus 60% (someone else's number used for the 4th down conversion) + the 28-30% PLUS the required percentage for the score after the initial successful conversion.

Using the given data, the percentages favor trying for the FG first.

Wow. Now I believe that you ARE a lawyer. This is truly a bumbling, child-like attempt at a mathematical analysis of the problem. If you don't see that, then you should stop posting in this thread.
 
I thought going for the FG on 4th and 1 was the right call but after reading Barnwell's article and forum comments I looked a little further. I used Advanced NFL Stats 4th down calculator and surprised to see that the calculator supports Barnwell's theory.

Not making the 4th and 1 Falcons chance to win 1%
Making the 4th and 1 Falcons chance to win 11%
Kicking the FG on 4th and 1 Falcons chance to win 3%

So in conclusion a whole lot of things had to go wrong (onside kick not secured, Blount's 3rd and 1 run, Brady's subsequent 4th and 1 fumble) from the Pats for the Falcons to even have a chance to tie the game.

Exactly.

And the probability of a team making a 4th and 1 in that situation on average is about 2/3s; thus, the 9% overall win probability in going for it.

Of course, that 2/3s is not the same probability as the Falcons might have going for it in that particular situation. The crucial stat from the 4th down calculator to evaluate whether they should go for it then is the break-even probability; that is, the liklihood of success in going for it on 4th and 1 at which it is just as good to kick the field goal. With this statistic, the coach looks into his playbook, finds his best play, and decides what he feels like his probability of success is. If he thinks is more likely to succeed than the break-even probability, then (all other things being equal*) he goes for it.

That break-even probability of success was 16%. That is, if Smith though he had better than a 1 in 6 chance of making it on 4th and 1, he should have tried. That's a no brainer.

* In this particular case, other things don't have to be equal. They don't even need to be close to equal, because the probabilities are so heavily skewed in favor of going for it.
 
Right. But the odds of scoring (either TD or FG) > (either individual type of score). You don't seem to be factoring that in, which might be the main place our calcs differ.



Can you explain what the "28-30%" figure is? Also, there's the possibility of scoring a touchdown rather than just 1st down on the initial play. It's plenty complicated.

The Chart gives about a 28-30% chance of scoring one or the other when the ball is starting around the distance it would be for an onsides kick recovery. And you're right about the need to double. I cut that out during an edit, so my mistake. It still leaves

95% (Bryant's FG percentage from that distance) + about 28-30%, versus 60% (someone else's number used for the 4th down conversion) + the 28-30% (doubled) PLUS the required percentage for the score after the initial successful conversion.

The problem is that the data is incomplete, as we both noted, and it doesn't give us the followup off the conversion.
 
Wow. Now I believe that you ARE a lawyer. This is truly a bumbling, child-like attempt at a mathematical analysis of the problem. If you don't see that, then you should stop posting in this thread.

I'd be worried about this if I actually thought you knew what you were talking about here.
 
The Chart gives about a 28-30% chance of scoring one or the other when the ball is starting around the distance it would be for an onsides kick recovery. And you're right about the need to double. I cut that out during an edit, so my mistake. That doesn't change the final outcome, though.

The chart is not a good tool for this question. It simply presents the liklihood of a team scoring from a particular point on the field regardless of game situation. It's a pretty picture, but it's simply a small piece of data that feeds into more sophisticated EPA/WPA analysis. The WPA (win probability) data are really the only relevant statistical data to use in this case, and they should be balanced against an assessment of matchups and circumstances specific to the game being played.
 
The chart is not a good tool for this question. It simply presents the liklihood of a team scoring from a particular point on the field regardless of game situation. It's a pretty picture, but it's simply a small piece of data that feeds into more sophisticated EPA/WPA analysis. The WPA (win probability) data are really the only relevant statistical data to use in this case, and they should be balanced against an assessment of matchups and circumstances specific to the game being played.

While I don't disagree with your first sentence, that chart is what someone used earlier in the thread, so I continued with it to maintain the thread flow. The truth is that, much like during the discussion of 4th down against the Colts, all the metrics fail in the end, because they can't take the context of individual situations fully into account.

Here, for example, you've got Gonzalez and Jones as receivers, as opposed to, say, Thompkins and Edelman. You've also got Brady rather than Ryan, 3 full minutes left, with 3 timeouts, etc....

Barnwell's argument is easily dismissed because it's a poor one in the context of Patriots v. Falcons last night. I don't claim that it's not possible to make a better argument than Barnwell made, particularly under different circumstances. Had that been the Jaguars in a 13-3 game, for example, we'd probably all say that they should have gone, because they suck and they probably wouldn't get that close again, so the general percentages can really only serve as guidelines.

I quoted his arguments in a post, just to show how easily they are dismissed. They were garbage. His "easier than the 4th and 7" argument is an obvious example of just how bad his case was, and I'm sure he knows it.
 
The right move is to take the 3 points. If you do not get t he td, you are still down 10. Take what you can get, worry about the td on the next possession

I know time was a factored but they could still get a 1st down
 
While I don't disagree with your first sentence, that chart is what someone used earlier in the thread, so I continued with it to maintain the thread flow. The truth is that, much like during the discussion of 4th down against the Colts, all the metrics fail in the end, because they can't take the context of individual situations fully into account.
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Barnwell's argument is easily dismissed because it's a poor one in the context of Patriots v. Falcons last night. I don't claim that it's not possible to make a better argument than Barnwell made, particularly under different circumstances.
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I quoted his arguments in a post, just to show how easily they are dismissed. They were garbage. His "easier than the 4th and 7" argument is an obvious example of just how bad his case was, and I'm sure he knows it.

His arguments weren't garbage, but they sure were sloppy, as should be expected of a football reporter working on a deadline in the wee hours of a Monday morning. He did say that we would address this in further detail in his Tuesday column, so we should get a clearer idea tomorrow of what he wanted to say last night.

In the case of 4th and 2 against the Colts, the decision was less clear, although I and Brian Burke of Advanced NFL Stats have both argued (with varying degrees of eloquence ) in favor of BB's decision then, in consideration of both the stats and the circumstances. In last night's case, I don't think the conservative/conventional decision to kick the FG has much merit at all, despite the somewhat mitigating circumstances of Atlanta's big play offense and their 3 time outs.
 
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