The NFL's application for a stay is really good. I don't know if it's available yet on line. Two key parts are copied below. First is the section on the appropriate standard in the trial court for a stay pending appeal. As you'll see, the District of Minnesota has dealt with the problem that district court judges usually think they are correct, but that's not the standard -- the standard is whether the issues on appeal are "wholly free from doubt." Second are the two paragraphs from the brief that, I think, go to the heart of what the issues are on appeal and what I tried to discuss above. I think where the NFL really nails her is where she said there is no "temporal gloss" on the words "labor dispute" in Norris Laguardia. What she means by this is that a labor dispute can be ended immediately, by decertification, and it's over at that instant. The NFL says that's silly -- the statute itself creats a "temporal gloss," by using the word "growing out of" a labor dispute. Obviously, something that "grow out of" a labor dispute comes after the labor dispute.
Judge Nelson, unfortunatley, isn't a rocket scientist. She tends to use big words without fully understanding them. Not saying she'll be overruled, but the NFL tags her really good.
Standard
A district court considering a stay motion will seldom, if ever, believe that it is likely that the movant will prevail on appeal; the court ordinarily assumes that the appellate court will agree with its own ruling. But that does not mean that stays are or should be rarely granted. Instead, “district courts properly stay their own orders when they have ruled on an admittedly difficult legal question and when the equities of the case suggest that the
status quo should be maintained.” Protect Our Water v. Flowers, 377 F. Supp. 2d 882, 884 (E.D. Cal. 2004). Accord, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Esso Worker’s Union, 963 F. Supp. 58, 60 (D. Mass. 1997); Jock v. Sterling, 738 F. Supp. 2d 445, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). In such a case, the “likelihood of success” factor is satisfied “when the ‘question presented ... is not wholly without doubt.’” Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. Investment Advisors, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 234, 235 (D. Minn. 1995) (quoting In re Worker’s Compensation Refund, 851 F. Supp. 1399, 1401 (D. Minn. 1994)) (alteration in original).
Merits Discussion
This case raises several “substantial and novel legal questions” regarding both this Court’s jurisdiction and the contours of the nonstatutory labor exemption. Accordingly, the NFL need show only that the questions presented by its appeal are “not wholly without doubt.” In re Worker’s Compensation Refund, 851 F. Supp. at 1401. The NFL easily meets this threshold.
First, it is “not wholly without doubt” that, because of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Court lacked jurisdiction to issue the Order. No court had ever before entered an injunction barring a lockout (except for one court whose injunction was dissolved on appeal.) Consistent with the Act’s plain language, a number of other courts have held that the Act bars antitrust injunctions against lockouts, and that its protections are not tied to the existence of a union. (See Opp. 9-16.). The Court concluded that it was “not convinced” that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies here because of the NFLPA’s disclaimer. (Order 61.) It is “not wholly without doubt” that the Eighth Circuit will agree. The Court determined that there is no “temporal gloss” on the Act’s definition of a “labor dispute,” (Order 58), but the Act expressly applies not just to cases involving labor disputes, but to cases “growing out of” them, 29 U.S.C. § 104, providing an express temporal connection.
The Court also concluded that it was “not convinced that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies, absent the present existence of a union, so as to prohibit or condition injunctions.” (Order 61.) But the Supreme Court has
already held that the Act applies to a dispute between employees and employers in which no union at all was involved. See New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 561 (1938). And the plain language of the Act defines a labor dispute as one that includes a controversy over terms or conditions of employment that “involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft or occupation” and is “between one or more employers … and one or more employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 113(a). In addition, the fact that the Act expressly defines persons “participating or interested in a labor dispute” to include both employers and employees, id. § 113(b), indicates that the Court’s skepticism about whether Section 4 of the Act can apply to lockouts may be misplaced.
