Let's break down the reasonable odds.
At your own 43 you can punt and it is almost certain that you tie. Say 95%.
If you go for it, 4th and 4, chances are probably less than 50-50 that you make it. Say 40%.
If you go for it, make it and get a 1st down, you still have two timeouts so your chance of making another 20 yards then kicking a field goal to win isn't great, but it is possible. Say there's 25% chance of a win in that scenario, 75% chance of a tie (don't get enough yards, run out of time, miss the FG, etc.).
If you go for it, don't make it and don't get a 1st down, your opponent still has one TO and only needs 10 yards to kick a FG and win. Say there's 60% chance you lose, 40% chance you tie (opponent doesn't get enough yards, run out of time, miss the FG, etc.)..
Let's assume my percentages are right:
Going for it:
chance to win: 0.4 x 0.25 = 10%
chance to lose: 0.6 x 0.6 = 36%
chance to tie: 54%
Not going for it:
chance to tie: 95%
chance to win or lose, due to punt return, block, fumble, etc: 5%
Reich's choice had about a 10% chance for complete success, meaning to result in a win.
Contrast it to Belichick's 4th and 2 decision, when if they made the first down, game over. A 4th and 2 play has better odds than a 4th and 4 play, and it's maybe a coin flip. Thus (assuming the odds are right) Belichick's decision had a 50% chance for complete success, meaning to result in a win.
So... what do we have? Reich's choice was pretty bold, risky, and a lot more "out there" than was Belichick's. You can say that both were warranted, but you can't say that Reich's was wise and Belichick's was stupid.