Unpopular Opinion: I think Reich made the right call.

[Oswlek]

You are using stats but really, they are imaginary.

Of course, but the point still stands that a conversion just means work needs to be done. Even if we bias the numbers greatly and say Indy has a 50% chance of converting and then a 80% of getting the FG, you still end up with a 60% chance of a tie or loss, with the odds of it being the latter substantially increased.

Even in the best of circumstances, it's not a good decision.

 

[brdmaverick]

They've got guts, but given the risk vs reward, I say they made the wrong call.

 

[primetime]

You can apply stats to the aggregate to make decisions, but really in football there are way too many variables on a situation by situation basis to be able to use statistics to make any informed decisions.

Yeah, you should definitely avoid using statistics, like Doug Pederson, and instead rely on gut feeling, like Jeff Fisher.

 

[1960Pats]

Colts called timeout right before the kick and he missed....but made the re-kick.

I can't stand that move. All the coach does in that situation is give the kicker a practice kick and a chance to shake out the butterflies. Has BB ever done it?

 

[QuantumMechanic]

EdjSports (some analytics house) via Football Outsiders:

The set of game variables (clock, field position, score) in this decision came together in a perfect storm, greatly magnifying the impact of this fourth down decision. Make no doubt about it, this was an aggressive call. Perhaps surprisingly, the simulation model from which we derive our usual aggressive fourth down stance actually disagreed with Coach Reich. The Edj model was in favor of punting the ball and estimated that the GWC (game winning chance) sacrificed by going for it was 3.5 percent. This conclusion was further supported by substituting a top passing offense and weak passing defense into the simulation. Even under that extreme scenario, the punt is still the top choice.

An important assumption that enters the model’s assessment is the value of a tie. The model values a tie as half a win. It’s important to note that Coach Reich is likely valuing a tie much differently than the model. He made this clear in his postgame press conference by declaring, “I’m not playing to tie.” To try to account for this difference in assumptions, we re-assessed this decision by assuming it occurred in the postseason when tie games are not an option. In this alternative scenario, the Colts would need to convert the fourth-and-4 approximately 81 percent of the time to justify the more aggressive approach. Historically, NFL teams would be expected to succeed closer to 50 percent. Again, we see the punt being favored.

To unpack this surprising finding a bit, the Colts’ field position played a significant role in this decision. At their own 43-yard line, the Colts were at an important threshold of the field. From their own side of midfield, they could expect to receive the maximum benefit from swinging field position with a punt. To hone in on this effect, we ran a sensitivity analysis by varying the yard-line where the Colts faced this fourth-and-4 decision, keeping all other game variables constant. We found that the “crossover” point or the yardline where the two decisions reached parity with one another in terms of GWC was the Indianapolis 48.

 

[Nunchucks]

Yeah, you should definitely avoid using statistics, like Doug Pederson, and instead rely on gut feeling, like Jeff Fisher.

Well, you watch how the individual matchups are going, how your play calling is working, and make a decision based on whether you think you can catch somebody making a mistake or having one player beat another player. You have to follow the flow of the game. I would say that a lot of people believe that you can throw the "stats" out once the game begins because on any given day the Patriots can get pushed around by the Lions or push around the Dolphins.

 

[A Defiant Goose]

The probability of winning for the Colts was very low, though, in that situation. The probability of tying was much higher. The marginal value of the win wasn't worth it if you play the odds. The problem with NFL coaches is that they're often irrationally conservative, relative to the odds of success and the result of that success on any given play; hence my confusion when teams, like the Patriots yesterday, kick a field goal on 4th and goal at their opponent's 1 yard line.

In this case, Reich was irrationally aggressive. I guess there's an irrational bias against ties that both coaches and fans seem to share, in part because they were extremely rare until recently.

IMO, if you think the probability was low for the Colts to win, you must also think it was equally low if not LOWER for them to lose, since turning it over on downs puts Houston in the exact same predicament only with no timeouts. Well, okay, maybe not EXACT same because of 4th vs 1st down, but they were both basically equidistant from field goal range

 

[primetime]

IMO, if you think the probability was low for the Colts to win, you must also think it was equally low if not LOWER for them to lose, since turning it over on downs puts Houston in the exact same predicament only with no timeouts. Well, okay, maybe not EXACT same because of 4th vs 1st down, but they were both basically equidistant from field goal range

The Colts were on their own 43, so the Texans needed only 15 yards or so to get to a relatively easy field goal, which mean they essentially got three shots, either sidelines or run up and clock it. The Colts, on the other hand, needed to convert a 1st down and still would have needed 25 yards to get into a field goal range they might have felt comfortable with. If they had converted the first down on that play, the clock would be running so they probably only had twenty or so seconds to take shots at the sideline and they wouldn't have time to run plays to the center of the field and still run up and spike it.

So, no, you're wrong.

 

[primetime]

Well, you watch how the individual matchups are going, how your play calling is working, and make a decision based on whether you think you can catch somebody making a mistake or having one player beat another player. You have to follow the flow of the game. I would say that a lot of people believe that you can throw the "stats" out once the game begins because on any given day the Patriots can get pushed around by the Lions or push around the Dolphins.

Sure, but the sample size on these situations is generally large enough that these little things are accounted for. Every coach who went for it on those plays thought his guys could do it, thought that he could catch someone off-guard.

 

[primetime]

EdjSports (some analytics house) via Football Outsiders:

The set of game variables (clock, field position, score) in this decision came together in a perfect storm, greatly magnifying the impact of this fourth down decision. Make no doubt about it, this was an aggressive call. Perhaps surprisingly, the simulation model from which we derive our usual aggressive fourth down stance actually disagreed with Coach Reich. The Edj model was in favor of punting the ball and estimated that the GWC (game winning chance) sacrificed by going for it was 3.5 percent. This conclusion was further supported by substituting a top passing offense and weak passing defense into the simulation. Even under that extreme scenario, the punt is still the top choice.

An important assumption that enters the model’s assessment is the value of a tie. The model values a tie as half a win. It’s important to note that Coach Reich is likely valuing a tie much differently than the model. He made this clear in his postgame press conference by declaring, “I’m not playing to tie.” To try to account for this difference in assumptions, we re-assessed this decision by assuming it occurred in the postseason when tie games are not an option. In this alternative scenario, the Colts would need to convert the fourth-and-4 approximately 81 percent of the time to justify the more aggressive approach. Historically, NFL teams would be expected to succeed closer to 50 percent. Again, we see the punt being favored.

To unpack this surprising finding a bit, the Colts’ field position played a significant role in this decision. At their own 43-yard line, the Colts were at an important threshold of the field. From their own side of midfield, they could expect to receive the maximum benefit from swinging field position with a punt. To hone in on this effect, we ran a sensitivity analysis by varying the yard-line where the Colts faced this fourth-and-4 decision, keeping all other game variables constant. We found that the “crossover” point or the yardline where the two decisions reached parity with one another in terms of GWC was the Indianapolis 48.

Yeah, the bias against ties is weird.

 

[TommyD4207]

I have no problem with the call, it was fine. 24 seconds left on the clock and at mid-field. Even with a turnover on downs, it isn't a terribly likely scenario that the Texans score. Oh well, that is life. No need to kill the guy for taking a risk and believing in his team.

Vrbel basically made the same call twice in the game. Nobody is killing him.

It wasn't a divisional game. To me, that's what makes the difference.

 

[primetime]

Also wasn't at midfield. 7 yards makes a huge difference there; not sure why that's turned into a meme in this thread. If the Colts had actually been in Texans territory, it would have been a better call.

 

[A Defiant Goose]

The Colts were on their own 43, so the Texans needed only 15 yards or so to get to a relatively easy field goal, which mean they essentially got three shots, either sidelines or run up and clock it. The Colts, on the other hand, needed to convert a 1st down and still would have needed 25 yards to get into a field goal range they might have felt comfortable with. If they had converted the first down on that play, the clock would be running so they probably only had twenty or so seconds to take shots at the sideline and they wouldn't have time to run plays to the center of the field and still run up and spike it.

So, no, you're wrong.

How are you gonna tell me I'm wrong on an opinion based argument? lol

 

[primetime]

How are you gonna tell me I'm wrong on an opinion based argument? lol

Your assertions were factually incorrect. The Colts were not at midfield, the teams were not equidistant from field goal range (the Texans were in fact 14 yards "ahead" of the Colts after the turnover on downs) and the probability of the Texans winning there was not equal to that of the Colts winning, based on the likelihood of scoring in that situation.

 

[A Defiant Goose]

Your assertions were factually incorrect. The Colts were not at midfield, the teams were not equidistant from field goal range (the Texans were in fact 14 yards "ahead" of the Colts after the turnover on downs) and the probability of the Texans winning there was not equal to that of the Colts winning, based on the likelihood of scoring in that situation.

The midfield argument is just semantics. If people meant the 50 yard line precisely they'd say the 50 yard line. It's more of a general area on the field.

That aside, I don't know what nerd does the probability calculation but you hope they take into account that the Colts had 1 (could've been two if they didn't try to draw Houston offsides, but they did, so) timeout left and Houston had none. Houston is also working with a year 1 kicker on the road, Indianapolis is working with the GOAT at home. They probably have different FG target lines. It's not as simple as calculating probabilities because it probably doesn't take intangible factors like that into account.

A lot of people think it was a bad call. I don't blame them. I don't think it was a bad call though

 

[primetime]

The midfield argument is just semantics. If people meant the 50 yard line precisely they'd say the 50 yard line. It's more of a general area on the field.

That aside, I don't know what nerd does the probability calculation but you hope they take into account that the Colts had 1 (could've been two if they didn't try to draw Houston offsides, but they did, so) timeout left and Houston had none. Houston is also working with a year 1 kicker on the road, Indianapolis is working with the GOAT at home. They probably have different FG target lines. It's not as simple as calculating probabilities because it probably doesn't take intangible factors like that into account.

A lot of people think it was a bad call. I don't blame them. I don't think it was a bad call though

Houston won, by the way.

 

[A Defiant Goose]

Houston won, by the way.

It's almost as though good calls can still have bad effects

 

[Palm Beach Pats Fan]

IMO, if you think the probability was low for the Colts to win, you must also think it was equally low if not LOWER for them to lose, since turning it over on downs puts Houston in the exact same predicament only with no timeouts. Well, okay, maybe not EXACT same because of 4th vs 1st down, but they were both basically equidistant from field goal range

If you assume that a 50 yard FG is the outer limit,

Houston needed 10 yards (IND 43 to IND 33)
Indy needed 24 yards (IND 43 to HOU 33)

Are you arguing that 10 equals 24?

Last I checked, it doesn't!

 

[A Defiant Goose]

If you assume that a 50 yard FG is the outer limit,

Houston needed 10 yards (IND 43 to IND 33)
Indy needed 24 yards (IND 43 to HOU 33)

Are you arguing that 10 equals 24?

Last I checked, it doesn't!

I'm arguing that that difference in yards needed to get into whatever each team's respective field goal range is is balanced out by the timeout differentials and quality of kickers and environment

 

[TommyD4207]

I have no problem with the call, it was fine. 24 seconds left on the clock and at mid-field. Even with a turnover on downs, it isn't a terribly likely scenario that the Texans score. Oh well, that is life. No need to kill the guy for taking a risk and believing in his team.

Vrbel basically made the same call twice in the game. Nobody is killing him.

Also, the Titans were behind in the game, 23-20. It was 4th and 15 on their own side of the field, they HAD to go for it to stay in the game.

The 4th and 4 would have been a 50 yard FG try, certainly no sure thing, certainly not just to tie the game. If it's 4th and 4 from the Eagles 20, they kick the FG.