Judge Nelson denies stay

[MoLewisrocks]

The players were more than willing to continue with the CBA. It was the owners who opted out. The players repeatedly stated their willingness to continue playing under the rules in place. The league turned down the offer.

Again, ignore it if you like, the status quo ended under duress (at gunpoint if you will) in 2006. The players willingness to continue that deal isn't surprising nor did it represent status quo. What that deal did call for in addition to sea change revenue computation was an opt out provision if the owners found the terms onerous. They did. The NFLPA always anticipated they would. Hence the red herring offers to maintain the status quo, the red herring requirement for full financials for each franchise, and what the rank and file believe is a red herring lawsuit. Hope they don't find out that was never their lawyers intention.

 

[lamafist]

Again, ignore it if you like, the status quo ended under duress (at gunpoint if you will) in 2006. The players willingness to continue that deal isn't surprising nor did it represent status quo. What that deal did call for in addition to sea change revenue computation was an opt out provision if the owners found the terms onerous. They did. The NFLPA always anticipated they would. Hence the red herring offers to maintain the status quo, the red herring requirement for full financials for each franchise, and what the rank and file believe is a red herring lawsuit. Hope they don't find out that was never their lawyers intention.

How exactly did the status quo change in 2006?

As far as the players' cut of the NFL's revenue, it really didn't change that much -- from 2000 to 2009, the player's compensation as a percentage of all actual revenues (not Total Revenues, which is less ~1 billion in credit deductions) has been: %56.5 %52.6 %51.8 %50.5 %52.3 %51.1 %52.7 %51.8 %51.0 %50.6.

That's right -- the player's cut of the NFL's gross revenues in the year's since the 2006 CBA has actually been on average a full percentage point lower than the six years prior.

The players big "win" in the 2006 CBA agreement wasn't a big bump in compensation independent of revenue increases, but rather, tying their compensation into the rapidly increasing retained revenue streams in addition to the shared revenue, thus ensuring that their compensation would rise along with the NFL's rising fortunes.

The problem is that the past 4 years have seen the continuation of a rapidly progressing trend toward greater revenue disparity between the NFL's franchises, as the retained revenue streams become an increasingly larger percentage of the NFL's gross. So now, for every $32 million in local revenues that owners like Jerry Jones and Bob Kraft bring in, the salary cap and floor rises $1 million for all teams, even though they don't share in any of that money.

What's unsustainable about the NFL's current business model isn't the player's wages, it's the unequal growth in revenue between the NFL's "have" and "have not" franchises... and don't think the owners don't all realize this. It's just that they correctly realize that at this juncture, it would be easier for them to make up for this growing disparity by getting money back from the players, instead of going to war with each other over revenue sharing plan alterations.

Unfortunately for NFL fans, this is at best a temporary stopgap fix. So long as the revenue disparity continues to increase, these problems will keep cropping up every time a new CBA is on the table.

 

[PatsWickedPissah]

What's unsustainable about the NFL's current business model isn't the player's wages, it's the unequal growth in revenue between the NFL's "have" and "have not" franchises... and don't think the owners don't all realize this. It's just that they correctly realize that at this juncture, it would be easier for them to make up for this growing disparity by getting money back from the players, instead of going to war with each other over revenue sharing plan alterations.

Unfortunately for NFL fans, this is at best a temporary stopgap fix. So long as the revenue disparity continues to increase, these problems will keep cropping up every time a new CBA is on the table.

This is a fundamental issue that a new CBA is unlikely to address. I'm in Draft mode and can't think what the owners should do to help fix this other than the obvious more league welfare for those franchises unable and unwilling to work their revenue streams.

 

[Deus Irae]

Again, ignore it if you like, the status quo ended under duress (at gunpoint if you will) in 2006. The players willingness to continue that deal isn't surprising nor did it represent status quo. What that deal did call for in addition to sea change revenue computation was an opt out provision if the owners found the terms onerous. They did. The NFLPA always anticipated they would. Hence the red herring offers to maintain the status quo, the red herring requirement for full financials for each franchise, and what the rank and file believe is a red herring lawsuit. Hope they don't find out that was never their lawyers intention.

This makes absolutely no sense whatsoever in light of the actual facts, sorry.

 

[Rob0729]

The players big "win" in the 2006 CBA agreement wasn't a big bump in compensation independent of revenue increases, but rather, tying their compensation into the rapidly increasing retained revenue streams in addition to the shared revenue, thus ensuring that their compensation would rise along with the NFL's rising fortunes.

That isn't true. Prior to 2006, players didn't participate in revenue sharing for things such as luxury boxes, club seats, and certain individual team marketing deals. Individual owners got all that money. Now all of those are included in the cap #. Those aren't new revenue streams.

 

[Ring 6]

The players were more than willing to continue with the CBA. It was the owners who opted out. The players repeatedly stated their willingness to continue playing under the rules in place. The league turned down the offer.

Of course the players wanted to continue and the owners did not, because the current deal heavily favored the players.
The owners want to continue A CBA but one that addresses what they feel is an inequity in the split.
The players decertified, ending any possibility of a CBA and are suing to have the whole system obliterated.

Everything the owners have done is evidence that they want the system to remain in place, but want to adjust the percentages.
Everything the players have done is evidence that they are suing to blow up the system and create an at will employment with no draft, full free agency and none of the collectively bargained aspects of the league as we know it.

You are pretending that the onus of who wants what is a player saying they want to continue the deal that turned out more favorable to them than either side expected.

 

[lamafist]

That isn't true. Prior to 2006, players didn't participate in revenue sharing for things such as luxury boxes, club seats, and certain individual team marketing deals. Individual owners got all that money. Now all of those are included in the cap #. Those aren't new revenue streams.

We don't disagree. If my post suggested otherwise, I misstated.

Prior to 2006, fewer revenue streams were included in the cap/floor amount, but the players got a higher percentage of them. Post 2006, the players got a lower percentage of a greater number of revenue streams, minus somewhere around 11% for expense deductions. This was important to the players because the revenues from the local streams were increasing at a much greater rate than those in the shared revenue streams.

 

[lamafist]

Of course the players wanted to continue and the owners did not, because the current deal heavily favored the players.
The owners want to continue A CBA but one that addresses what they feel is an inequity in the split.
The players decertified, ending any possibility of a CBA and are suing to have the whole system obliterated.

Everything the owners have done is evidence that they want the system to remain in place, but want to adjust the percentages.
Everything the players have done is evidence that they are suing to blow up the system and create an at will employment with no draft, full free agency and none of the collectively bargained aspects of the league as we know it.

You are pretending that the onus of who wants what is a player saying they want to continue the deal that turned out more favorable to them than either side expected.

And yet, as I pointed out above, this supposedly radically inequal split actually resulted in the player's making slightly less money as a percentage of actual NFL revenue.

 

[Ring 6]

And yet, as I pointed out above, this supposedly radically inequal split actually resulted in the player's making slightly less money as a percentage of actual NFL revenue.

Well, I think we can all understand that the owners are looking ahead not back in making their decisions.
But can you clarify your statement on how you are calculating that percentage? From the way you wrote it I can not tell if oyu are taking a percentage of the total revenue or a percentage of the revenue remaining after the off the top discounting. Oh, and can you give a data source?

By the way, I didnt call the split RADICALLY inequal.

 

[lamafist]

Well, I think we can all understand that the owners are looking ahead not back in making their decisions.
But can you clarify your statement on how you are calculating that percentage? From the way you wrote it I can not tell if oyu are taking a percentage of the total revenue or a percentage of the revenue remaining after the off the top discounting. Oh, and can you give a data source?

By the way, I didnt call the split RADICALLY inequal.

The data comes from Forbes, via the first of this site's excellent series of articles on revenue disparity and the lockout. Right up top, a chart lists the players take as a percentage of both "all revenue," which is, quite literally, the total of all of the NFL's revenues, as well as of TR.

 

[Ring 6]

The data comes from Forbes, via the first of this site's excellent series of articles on revenue disparity and the lockout. Right up top, a chart lists the players take as a percentage of both "all revenue," which is, quite literally, the total of all of the NFL's revenues, as well as of TR.

Those numbers are a tiny piece of the puzzle. Clearly you don't think that a chart showing the percentages of split have remained very close is the only factor in determining whether the last CBA was more advantageous to the owners or players.
Frankly, the shift from 50/50 to 60/40 after a 1 bill deduction becomes a huge advantage to the players are revenues rise.
Its an unarguable fact that both sides felt the deal favored the players because the owners opted out, and the players are thrilled with it. If we are trying to discern why, we have to look deeper than a chart.

 

[lamafist]

Those numbers are a tiny piece of the puzzle. Clearly you don't think that a chart showing the percentages of split have remained very close is the only factor in determining whether the last CBA was more advantageous to the owners or players.
Frankly, the shift from 50/50 to 60/40 after a 1 bill deduction becomes a huge advantage to the players are revenues rise.
Its an unarguable fact that both sides felt the deal favored the players because the owners opted out, and the players are thrilled with it. If we are trying to discern why, we have to look deeper than a chart.

Well, sure -- the new CBA is highly beneficial for the players in that it ensures their cut, as a percentage of the NFL's actual gross revenues, remains ~50%, and will not precipitously decline as retained revenues go from less than fifth of the NFL's take to well over half. Absent the player's coup in 2006, they would be getting a cut of a large but steadily marginalizing revenue stream, and would have seen their stake drop, as a percentage of the NFL's combined fortunes.

You say that the chart represents a "tiny piece of the puzzle," but that couldn't be further from the truth -- more accurately, represents a low-resolution picture of the entire puzzle from a good distance away. You cannot see nearly enough detail to see how the various bits fit together, but you get a clear, macro-view of the outcome so far.

Your suggestion that the players cut will expand "as revenues rises" is a mathematical impossibility. The players' compensation amount, the credit deductible amount, and the owner's share are all functions of Total Revenue, and TR is derived from both shared and retained revenue streams -- all of them will increase in relative proportion to one another, resulting in a fairly stable cut at around 51%. This is truly inarguable: it's math. What we take away from the owner's opting out is vague speculation, in comparison.

We know that all but two of the owners approved of the 2006 CBA, after Kraft devised the supplemental revenue sharing system at its core. We know that by 2008, the number of objecting owners had surpassed the threshold of eight that would be sufficient to trigger the opt-out. Knowing that the opt-out was inevitable, the owners elected to make the vote unanimous, so as to present a unified front to the NFLPA.

Now you're right -- you need to look deeper than the simple (and stable) breakdown of revenue shares between owners and players to see what was behind the problem. That's exactly what the article series I linked to spends its time doing. The answer is clear -- it's the increasingly inequitable division of the owners' share of revenues amongst the NFL's 32 franchises that is causing the problem.