Lazar: Belichick’s in-game decision-making is holding the Pats back

[aluminum seats]

now it seems they just do things to be contrarian for its own sake.

See 90% of Bolden’s carries

 

[reflexblue]

That and he hasn't challenged any calls either. A red flag could have helped their chances last Sunday.

I wonder if Ernie Adams no longer being in the both has anything to do with this. I recall reading on here that adams would sit up in the both and relay down to BB if he should challenge a play or the stats for going for it on fourth down. This could be a thread un to itself.

 

[SVN]

before the decision making even comes in play, they need to first play mistake free, 2 blocked punts, fumbling at the goal line, fumbling period, defenders running free to the QB. These all should be gone . helps making decisions .

 

[FCB02062]

I knew Belichick lost it when he didn't challenge a clear first down by James White vs Denver last year. I think it was White, maybe Burkhead, just don't remember. But the guy had the yards to gain and they got a schitt spot. Coach Bill just stood there gazing into nothingness and every Pats fan watching on tv is losing their minds yelling to challenge. the game, or at least some parts of it, have passed the coach by.
There were several games last year - vs KC and the playoff vs Tenn IIRC, where instead of trying to set up a punt return and drive for a score, Coach Bill decides his chances are better to try to block a kick and he has no one back to return a punt....wtf is he thinking? it didn't work either time...
it's almost as though Coach Bill has so much job security that he's treating this entire season as practice for next year. There's no other way to explain his risk averse decision making as it related to Mac Jones...

 

[Deus Irae]

I disagree with you partly

Is this the best way to analize agressiveness? doubtful

Is this a decent proxy? Yes, I think it is

But it's not. It's note even close to a decent proxy. 1% doesn't mean ****.

 

[borg]

BB axioms that may no longer apply:

"Don't get in dumb teams' way, let them self implode"..... has not held true during the Three Belichicks era

"No days off".............(except in Covid/cap reset years)

"In the best interests of the team"..........Gilmore waves goodbye, Tompa 7 Rings too busy selfying with Gronkie to care any more

-----------------------------------------------------------
New axiom

"Protect Mac, home wins are overrated"

 

[Nehalem]

View attachment 36772

Looks like Tom Brady is a coward too

 

[Deus Irae]

It’s not the best way to quantify the risk:reward, but it does align with the extreme risk averse nature of the team this year, no? I agree; I would rather see the ranks and percentages used differently. @venecol noted all four coaches at the bottom are also the four oldest coaches in the league. That’s a notable coincidence that may suggest correlation. There’s no way to really assess this perfectly because of all the factors for each decision, but the overall rankings seem to align pretty well with perception.

Again, 1% doesn't mean ****. The context of slippery paint on the grass is more important than a 1% geek claim. The variance among players, weather, wind, game pressure, etc... so many things are more important than the geeks' 1%.

 

[Tony2046]

See 90% of Bolden’s carries

Please no. I don't want to.

 

[Twentytothree]

Is this a decent proxy? Yes, I think it is

The translation from the historical data sample on which the 1% difference in average win probability is determined to any particular real-world situation has a much larger variance than 1%. For in-game decision making this is a meaningless distinction.

 

[Vindicate]

Bleh. I think it's fair to criticize questionable decisions like this, but statistical analysis in football is far from.. anything. Period. There are an absurd amount of variables at play, all of which can drastically change play-to-play. Also, some of the most important variables are going to be player feedback and reads on the field, something of which none of us are privy.

Furthermore, maybe I'm reading this wrong, but the author says "So what's causing this? And before you say Tom Brady's departure, it started before then..." and then ends up at "...it seems the Patriots don't trust Mac." So, I'm not sure the point he's trying to make.

The piece is a bit all over the place - as are all of us - trying to make sense of what we're seeing because we're not used to it and it's losing. So it seems like, and I think we have a wealth of evidence on this board alone, we're all trying to grasp at straws, because should we find that one straw that explains everything (Is Steve B. the problem with the defense? Is Matty P the problem? Is Josh McDaniels the problem (I'm guilty of this one)? Does Bill suck?) makes it convenient and simple, thereby "more fixable." Otherwise, we have to wallow in nuance while in absence of information that informs these decisions.

That's not to say that it is a futile exercise to try and understand - it's just that these little "oh I figured it out" pieces aren't going to do it. You have to look at everything, and even then, concede that there's a lot of information we will never know (who has final call on what, who's communicating what to whom, what people are saying on the field, in the booth, etc.)

 

[Ice_Ice_Brady]

Again, 1% doesn't mean ****. The context of slippery paint on the grass is more important than a 1% geek claim. The variance among players, weather, wind, game pressure, etc... so many things are more important than the geeks' 1%.

No…the 1% itself doesn’t mean much. I think the measure, though, is simply “when the odds are in favor of going for it on fourth down, how often do you go for it?” 1% is just a minimum amount needed to designate that scenario as a “favorable fourth down opportunity” where the odds say go for it. It doesn’t mean that many of the actual scenarios are actually a measly 1% increase, but I think the formula is created like this to include as many opportunities as possible.

On any individual call, sure, it could be a tiny percentage gain by analytics and not supported in the reality of the game. Over a larger sample size, the degree of risk per coach can theoretically start to solidify.

 

[Deus Irae]

On any individual call, sure, it could be a tiny percentage gain by analytics and not supported in the reality of the game. Over a larger sample size, the degree of risk per coach can theoretically start to solidify.

But the number of questionable decisions needed to form a reliable database would likely require longer careers than just about any HC ever has, because you'll never be able to get pure analysis without context.

Or, to put it another way:


BB went for it on the famous 4th down when facing Manning and the Colts. Says it's because he's facing Manning. Well, regardless of whether or not it was the "right" call, how many times is that situation ever going to arise over the course of even the longest career? It happened only once.

 

[JayNM]

The translation from the historical data sample on which the 1% difference in average win probability is determined to any particular real-world situation has a much larger variance than 1%. For in-game decision making this is a meaningless distinction.

I Truly dont see where they said they gain 1% in average or studied only changes of 1% in average. And I also dont see any averages in this picture...

It says gains of at least of 1%.

And saying with confidence what is the variance of any given equation is... bold. Unless you are saying that any given event has large variance, to which I respond "Obvs"... no studies is determined by any single event


Ps - if you did the math (like, adding all samples, derivating the average based on graphs) and reversed engineering these probabilites, I just applaud you.

 

[Ice_Ice_Brady]

I Truly dont see where they said they gain 1% on average. And I also dont see any averages in this picture...

It says gains of at least of 1%.

And saying with confidence what is the variance of any given equation is... bold.


Ps - if you did the math (like, adding all samples, derivating the average based on graphs) and reversed engineering these probabilites, I just applaud you.

They could say, we’re going to find all the examples of where the probability is within 10%, so between -10 and +10. The problem is that you’d then get skewed data because by chance Coach X might have a big number of negative fourth down situations (probability favors punt/fg) and Coach Z would have positive ones (probability favors going for it). So in that sense, the +1 in terms of probability favoring going for it is the only way to do it fairly. You can’t really penalize a coach for playing the odds because the entire point here is about taking the higher probability, not just “going for it” because the coach is “aggressive.”

You could set it to +5% or +8%, but then you run into problems with small sample sizes.

 

[jimnance]

Lazar? No credibility.
I put much more stock in that other guy,
Lazur. @Ashley thinks highly of him.

 

[venecol]

I wonder if Ernie Adams no longer being in the both has anything to do with this. I recall reading on here that adams would sit up in the both and relay down to BB if he should challenge a play or the stats for going for it on fourth down. This could be a thread un to itself.

Fat Matt took his place in the booth. Problem is every time Matt sees a play to challenge and calls Bill, he's got a mouthful of food and Bill can't understand a fv&king thing he's saying.

 

[Pats1971]

But the number of questionable decisions needed to form a reliable database would likely require longer careers than just about any HC ever has, because you'll never be able to get pure analysis without context.

Or, to put it another way:


BB went for it on the famous 4th down when facing Manning and the Colts. Says it's because he's facing Manning. Well, regardless of whether or not it was the "right" call, how many times is that situation ever going to arise over the course of even the longest career? It happened only once.

You hit it on the head. Coaching decisions are based on results. If you make the right call as a coach, and the players do not execute, the coach is said to have made a bad decision. If he makes a stupid call and somehow the players pull it off, then the coach is a genius. Bill didnt forget how to coach and make decisions, but maybe the players are not executing like they did before.

Carroll was called an idiot and trashed when Wilson threw that pick in the superbowl. Had that been a td pass, its a genius call because the pats were in goal line and didnt expect it and were loading up on the run, etc etc, but since it didnt work, he is an idiot becuase Butler made a spectacular play.

 

[venecol]

You hit it on the head. Coaching decisions are based on results. If you make the right call as a coach, and the players do not execute, the coach is said to have made a bad decision. If he makes a stupid call and somehow the players pull it off, then the coach is a genius. Bill didnt forget how to coach and make decisions, but maybe the players are not executing like they did before.

Carroll was called an idiot and trashed when Wilson threw that pick in the superbowl. Had that been a td pass, its a genius call because the pats were in goal line and didnt expect it and were loading up on the run, etc etc, but since it didnt work, he is an idiot becuase Butler made a spectacular play.

If you're going to bring up Butler, we have to talk about SB 52.

 

[Deus Irae]

If you're going to bring up Butler, we have to talk about SB 52.