Well, thanks for block quoting a Louisianna state case on a point that's not really inconsistent with anything that I said, I guess.
I'd also perhaps note that if you want to string cite cases, you really need to know what they say and not just pull them out of a source that cites them for a general proposition. I'm sure whatever you're quoting had some sentence that is supported by the string citation, but Globe Newspapers (the first and only supreme court case in your string cite) expressly rejected, on first amendment grounds, a Mass law sealing a courtroom in certain criminal cases. The Court's holding was that the public has a strong interest in free access to criminal trials, and the state can only seal those proceedings for compelling reasons where no reasonable less restrictive alternatives are present. Which is sort of the point I was making.
Here you go......
(e) Impounding Versus Sealing. In Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 827, 906 N.E.2d 320 (2009), the Supreme Judicial Court addressed the difference between impounding and sealing:
“The terms ‘impounded’ and ‘sealed’ are closely related and often used interchangeably, but are meaningfully different.
Under the Uniform Rules o[n] Impoundment Procedure 1708 (LexisNexis 2008), which governs impoundment in civil proceedings and guides practice in criminal matters as well, ‘impoundment’ means ‘the act of keeping some or all of the papers, documents, or exhibits, or portions thereof, in a case separate and unavailable for public inspection.’
Rule 1 of the Uniform Rules o[n] Impoundment Procedure. Consequently, an order of impoundment prevents the public, but not the parties, from gaining access to impounded material, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A document is normally or- dered ‘sealed’ when it is intended that only the court have access to the document, unless the court specifically orders limited disclosure.
Therefore, we directed in Commonwealth v. Martin, [423 Mass. 496, 505, 668 N.E.2d 825, 832 (1996),] that the record of the in camera hearing ‘should be kept, under seal.’ Similarly, we ordered that privileged psychological or counseling records of an alleged victim of a sexual assault be ‘retained in court under seal,’ but permitted defense counsel to have access pursuant to a strict protective order. Com- monwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 146, 859 N.E.2d 400, 419 (2006).”
Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. at 836 n.12, 906 N.E.2d at 328 n.12. Martin hearings are discussed in the note to Section 511(b), Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Privilege of a Witness. The Lampron-Dwyer protocol is summarized in Section 1108, Access to Third-Party Records Prior to Trial in Criminal Cases (Lampron-Dwyer Protocol).