Fourth-and-1 from the Pats’ 24-yard line

[Joker]

which tell you what, exactly, O Unrecognized Genius Of The Gridiron?

 

[eagle eye]

which tell you what, exactly, O Unrecognized Genius Of The Gridiron?

Most of the time you will see that I'm fully behind BB, I'm not saying his decision was wrong yesterday either, I'm simply stating that mathematical equations are not a way to decide whether it was a right or wrong play.
What I did say is that its not a recommended play imo. And its not BB like either.
My guess is that he did it because he was prepared to take a chance in the hope of not having to put the D back on the field that quickly.

 

[ForThoseAboutToRock]

Similarly, one can easily look up the probability the opposing team will score based on starting on our own 25 yard line.

1. There is no way the opponent's EV, from our own 25, is 3 points. That is the absolute baseline value, if they F up everything they still get 3 points. The EV is larger than 3.

The EV of a 1st and 10 for a team on the 25 yard line is just under 4, based on the chart I've looked at.

IMO It'd be reasonable to look at an offense like the Falcons and figure that the number bumps up to near 6.

 

[MoLewisrocks]

Most of the time you will see that I'm fully behind BB, I'm not saying his decision was wrong yesterday either, I'm simply stating that mathematical equations are not a way to decide whether it was a right or wrong play.
What I did say is that its not a recommended play imo. And its not BB like either.
My guess is that he did it because he was prepared to take a chance in the hope of not having to put the D back on the field that quickly.

Maybe it should be recommended. Bill is always ahead of the curve. Something he learned from Steve, who was a pioneer in the analysis of football trends and probabilities.

3. Love teams that use fourth down
Teams are considered successful on third downs if they convert 40 percent of the time. Of course, the longer the distance the less likely to convert.

I find it exciting football strategy when coaches go for it on fourth down. On Sunday, NFL coaches kept their offense on the field for 41 fourth-down situations, and they successfully converted 25 of those plays, or 61 percent. The most interesting teams using fourth down to maintain possession were the Patriots and Bengals. Both teams were 3-for-3 on the do-or-die down, and both won their game against formidable opponents.

The Patriots went for it on fourth-and-1 on their own 24-yard line, ahead 16-10 in the third quarter. Eight plays later in that same drive, they converted a fourth-and-3 with a 21-yard completion from Tom Brady to Randy Moss. Later in the game, Brady went back to Moss with an 8-yard pass on a fourth-and-1. The Patriots were not going to give the Falcons offense the ball and liked their chances on fourth down.

The Bengals were chasing the Steelers and had to use the fourth-down attack to win the game. A fake punt worked, and then they later moved the chains with two fourth-down passes.

More teams need to look at their fourth-down package and use it. Bad teams have nothing to lose and good teams will make more than they miss.

Six from Sunday: It might be time for Eagles to trade Vick

 

[JSn]

I've been thinking about this and certainly on the opponents side of the field, there's a lot to be said for going on fourth.

1) If you do it a lot, and succeed, defenses come in feeling the pressure of facing a four-down threat.

2) Odds of being picked off for a TD in designed 4th down packages are likely less than PR's for huge gains or TD's.

It's probably scarier to watch because it's not terribly common.

Seeing the Bengals and Pats both go 3/3 on 4th down conversions, it shows clear confidence in the O to make 10 yards at a min. in 4 plays and MUST make prep even tougher.

 

[TruthSeeker]

This isn't anything new, bud. Even Easterbrook has been harping on this strategy since even before the 2007 'eff-you' season.

It doesn't change the fact that there is a huge difference between the 4th downs Belichick generally tries to go for (99.9% of the time on the opponents' side of the field or at least very close), and doing it on your own 25 in the 3rd quarter trying to maintain a slim lead in what's been a close game.

I totally agree that this thought is nothing new (not sure why you thought I was trying to introduce new thinking here) - although there are so many here (and everywhere else) that talk about the idea of going for it as "risky" simply because it is uncoventional that you'd think the idea is indeed new.

It's possible, but please don't pretend like this is something you're going to see storming around the league like the wildcat. LOL

Again, I don't know if it will be 5 years or 50 years, but I definately believe the time will come when coaches start using the strategy that statistics show is winning strategy. And fans will (slowly) adjust. It happens in all sports; it will happen in the NFL as well.

 

[TruthSeeker]

BB or no BB I thought the call was ******ed

It would have given Atlanta at least an easy FG and changed the game dramatically

I don't want to see this again,A move like that is as risky as having Lung Cancer and still smoking 2 packs a day.

Some of you would have been hypocrites if it didn't work and said BB is on drugs for doing it - It was stupid IMO whether they made it or not,More dumb than gutsy IMO

BB looked brilliant when it worked...If he didn't we would hear synchronized whining of 'WTF' throughout Patriot Nation

...totally ignoring the statistic probability that punting loses more games than going for the first down...

 

[TruthSeeker]

Obviously everyone is happy that it worked out great, and it was a key point in the game.

However, no amount of pseudo-math or pseudo-stats can make a legit rational case why it was a smart move, based on reason or analysis, to prove that going for it on 4th down at your own 25 in the 3rd quarter in a close game, is a smart rational move.

Pseudo-math? Pseudo-stats? So your desire to ignore probabilities means that it isn't even true?

Using a simple payoff tree, the benefit/payoff is a 1st down near your own 25, the penalty/damage is a sure FG for the other team, or a decent chance at giving up a TD. No matter how much you manipulate the percentages of likelihood, it's not a smart call.

Well, if you refuse to believe the best indicator of the value of going for it vs. punting (which is an in-depth analysis of what has actually happened in these situations), then you are indeed left with your own prejudices and beliefs - which you "manipulate" to come to the conclusion you already desire. You can do that; lots of people live their lives that way. Personally, I prefer to seek the truth.

Even Belichick admitted it wasn't a smart rational move in his post game interview, he admitted he would have gotten roasted if it didn't work.

BB was wrong if he said it wasn't a smart, rational move.

Saying that he would have gotten roasted if it didn't work doesn't speak to the correctness of going for it, it simply speaks to the unconventional nature of the action.

I have read those research papers advocating going for it on 4th down. I generally agree that especially past your own 40 yard line, there are circumstances where you should go for it more. However, some of their research claims and inputs are just crazy. Some economists advocate that once you are past the opponent's 35 yard line, you should always go for it, even if it is 4th and 10. These people are using odd inputs, assumptions, and illogical football knowledge to make their cases.

Actually, they are simply using actual, hard data of what actually happens when teams actually do these things. There are no assumptions, football knowledge (illogical or otherwise) or "odd" inputs required.

I see that since you disagree with the conclusions, you haphazardly attack the research. You can't back up any of the claims you just made ("odd inputs", "assumptions", "illogical football knowledge") from a reading of the studies.

 

[TruthSeeker]

Maybe you should re-read the thread (and my point). I was pointing out that any ONE specific 4th down situation should not be determined by the overall statistical evidence that suggests going for it is the right play. I compared it to poker in the sense that just because a play is right against 90% of opponents doesn't mean you should ALWAYS make that play (for instance if you had a good read on your opponent that suggested it was the wrong move, you wouldn't make that move just because 90% of the time against the general poker population it would be right).

I agree with this.

However, earlier in the game (which I would include most of the third quarter in), I think it would be the relatively rare case when you should go against the general percentages.

By the way, one of the very interesting things that TMQ usually does when discussing this and looking at how many plays it takes before the team receiving the punt is at or beyond the punting line of scrimmage. I think it's a fair measuring stick; what did our team gain from the punt if the other team has the ball right where we punted from 4 plays later? The answer is, of course, nothing; you just lost the opportunity to make a first down. So a simplistic way to look at it is that it (may) pay off to punt if the other team doesn't get back to where you punted it from and it doesn't pay off if they do make it back (with a first down).

 

[TruthSeeker]

I've argued in this forum that these so called "studies" about going for it on 4th down are severely flawed. They simply do not take into account other bad scenarios that can occur to a team while on offense that are negated with a chance to punt. They also assume an unwarranted likelihood of success in the remainder of the drive.

Since the data that is used in the studies I've looked are a compilation of what has actually happened, there are no "assumptions", "bad scenarios", or "unwarranted likelihood of success".

There are only "what has happened probabilities".

 

[Synovia]

Most of the time you will see that I'm fully behind BB, I'm not saying his decision was wrong yesterday either, I'm simply stating that mathematical equations are not a way to decide whether it was a right or wrong play.

And what is?

I'm much more likely to trust win expectancy numbers and such than some monday morning quarterback's musings.


Facts are, Bellichick goes for it on 4th down more than almost anyone in the league, and the statistics consistently show that teams don't go for it enough. He makes a lot more decisions basd on math formulas than you think he does.

 

[chris_in_sunnyvale]

BB has a history of going for it on 4th and short, but:

1. Not all the time. He picks and chooses his spots.

2. Rarely on his half of the field.

He obviously calculates the odds of success and failure and the consequences thereof. On Sunday, he made a rare call because he was confident it was the right call to make against that team in that scenario. I doubt he makes the same call against the Ravens or Steelers. He's not suddenly going to make a habit of going for it on 4th and short on his half of the field. He'll continue to pick what he thinks are the right moments to try such a ploy. He's no dummy. He knows the potentially severe consequences if he's wrong, so he'll pick those spots wisely. He did Sunday. Let's cut him some slack.

Regards,
Chris

 

[Synovia]

I
Risk/reward. Risk - You give the ball to other team 24yds from your goal line. And,
staring at a defecit. Reward. You still only have the ball at your own 25 with a long way to go towards putting points on the board. IE. Reward wasn't worth the risk. If we were losing by 6 and you feel the game is slipping away. That puts more in the reward column if you get it. But, all in all I feel it was a helluva risk. And, not necessary.
s

Right, but you can't look at just risk reward without looking at the probability of each happening. Every time you do something there is a risk/reward.

If you go out for a drive to the supermarket, the reward is groceries. The risk is your family is killed in a crash. Why do you go out then? The risk is much worse than the reward. Why? Because the probability of the risk happening is so low.


In the case of the NFL, converting on 4th and 1 happens greater than 80% of the time, so while the downside is high, the risk of it happening is not.

 

[letekro]

Well, it seems like most of us are now on board with the notion that mathematics and probablity analysis form the foundation of rational decision making. Of course, as many have pointed out, there's more to decision making than simply running past events through a probability analysis and determining a course of action. The human mind also looks at the aspects of the situation at hand that are incapable of being easily quantified before it makes its decision. Here, these other aspects were : 1. We had been running over them all day; and 2. we were in danger of losing momentum after a quick 3 and out. Obviously, if they were shutting down the run all day, it probably would have been a bad decision, irrespective of Romer's analysis.