Originally Posted by patchick
So while I can't offer any "definitive info," King's account doesn't sound especially plausible.
Not only that, articles like this dance around a point instead of just saying it:
"Belichick let his infatuation with Dowling cloud his judgement and missed out on a team willing to significantly overpay (for no apparent reason) for pick #33"
"Belichick was too stupid to realize that his guy would almost certainly be available 12 picks later so trading down for anything would be great value"
You took apart the notion that SF was going to overpay for pick #33 (580 pts) with #45 and #76 (670 pts, for a differential equal to a high 4th)...and then was willing to throw in a 2012 3rd for good measure. But the other insinuations deserve equal scrutiny:
Belichick was overly locked onto Dowling...Nonsense. If he got a 2nd in 2012, he was willing to miss out on Dowling entirely. He just didn't get the value he was looking for and Dowling was the top guy on his board.
Dowling would be there at #45...I'd rate this one as 50/50 at best. Even if Dowling makes it past Buffalo at #34, there was an entire block of team from #40 to #44 (Dallas, Washington, Houston, Minnesota, Detroit) that could be targeting Dowling. That doesn't even count teams like SD (reached for Gilcrest at #50) and Philadelphia (reached for Jarrett at #54 and took Marsh at #90) trading ahead of the Pats for Dowling.
Trade value of SF's offer...Just looking at trade chart values only gives you part of the equation. You need the context of the draft class to make an accurate assessment. Belichick clearly saw the talent cliff in this draft class at around #75, so getting pick #76 likely didn't thrill him. Next year's class isn't setting up to be very deep so getting a future 3rd with the uncertainty of Juniors declaring probably wasn't appealing either. Getting a 2nd in what is looking like a superior (but top-heavy) 2012 class was his target and he couldn't get it.