Our Coach and Economics (for all Mathematics Enthusiasts)

[Synovia]

Right -- except as I read it, in this study they only considered the opponent's expected points when the drive ended in a turnover. Field position after a punt, missed FG or failed 4th-down conversion wasn't a factor.

Right, except, like I said, expected points, the metric itself, already considers these things. Thats the reason why the expected points when you get the ball on your own 1 yard line is NEGATIVE.

 

[Pats171]

Brains over brawn has always been a formula for success.

Especially in the last decade for Boston sports teams.

There's an environment there with HBS, MIT, Theo/Bill James that you don't get anywhere else, even in an educated city like DC.

 

[patchick]

Right, except, like I said, expected points, the metric itself, already considers these things. Thats the reason why the expected points when you get the ball on your own 1 yard line is NEGATIVE.

OK, that's definitely NOT the impression I get from the slides, which state that the methodology "could be expanded" to include the following drive:
http://www.amstat.org/chapters/boston/nessis09/presentation_material/Alamar.pdf

But it's certainly possible that the slides don't represent the actual methodology clearly. PowerPoint has a way of doing that.

 

[weswelker#83]

I have to geek out on this one for a minute...

If I understand the slides correctly, this study seems weirdly simplistic. The authors evaluate options solely on expected points on that possession, with ZERO weight given to time of possession and opponents' ensuing field position. IOW, according to this model a possession that starts at the 10 yardline and consists of 3 straight incomplete passes carries the exact same value as a possession that starts at the 10 and ends with a punt 10 plays later at the 50.

I guess that's fine in a bubble, but they blithely say that their analysis "Could easily be expanded to include effects of 'next drive' or rest of game or half." If it's really so "easy," I'd say "go ahead and do it, then." Because prima facie, there are plenty of reasons to think the results might turn around. E.g., choosing to pump up variance should have the result of shortening drives, regardless of outcome. That has a significant effect on both defenses.

It's not like NFL coaches don't know that the expected value of a passing play is higher than a running play. Heck, we ALL know that. But this isn't baseball, where expected runs in the inning can be a be-all and end all-without repercussions for the rest of the game. (With a few exceptions, like swapping in relievers and pinch hitters.)

The Question is : Does your personel can deliver when you need it?
It's all about how you disguise your plays and leave your opponent 1 or 2 seconds before he understands of what s going on.

 

[PatsFanSince74]

The one you called "densely and poorly written"? OK, I'll try...

heh heh...yeah, that's a problem...but his thinking is good even tho his writing sucks...

 

[PatsFanSince74]

OK, that's definitely NOT the impression I get from the slides, which state that the methodology "could be expanded" to include the following drive:
http://www.amstat.org/chapters/boston/nessis09/presentation_material/Alamar.pdf

But it's certainly possible that the slides don't represent the actual methodology clearly. PowerPoint has a way of doing that.

interesting...i note he cites the first edition of the "poorly written" carroll text

he's thinking about the right things, namely not just projecting an expected outcome but also associating a risk factor with it, as I suggested in my earlier post before reading this deck

otherwise it's pretty thin soup, as one of my profs would have put it, but probably only because it's all that he'll give away for free, which most likely, more than anything else, accounts for the presentation's vagueness...

 

[PatsFanSince74]

Right, except, like I said, expected points, the metric itself, already considers these things. Thats the reason why the expected points when you get the ball on your own 1 yard line is NEGATIVE.

this is where things get hairy...saying that the expected outcome from our own one yard line is inferior to the expected outcome from our opponent's one yard line kind of falls in the "well, duh" category...

but getting the ball inside your own five with, for example, two minutes to go when you're ahead by 17 points suggests one set of behavior while ahead by 10 suggests another, ahead by seven suggests another and ahead by three or fewer suggests yet another, while getting it when you're behind by four to seven suggests one kind of behavior and behind by three or fewer suggests yet another...each of those has a very different risk profile...

and, the scenario will further be impacted by things like time outs remaining, the weather, how important the game is to one team or another in terms of the risks they will take...and lots of other stuff

the value of this model lies in how extensive/thorough the database is and how many variables it can accommodate...

 

[patchick]

Forgive me exhuming a dead thread, but:

Today's NYJ-MIA game is a nice illustration that this kind of analysis -- specifically on teams going for 2-point conversions far too often -- isn't just academic. Perhaps Mr. Ryan should be hitting the books?

 

[PatsFanSince74]

Forgive me exhuming a dead thread, but:

Today's NYJ-MIA game is a nice illustration that this kind of analysis -- specifically on teams going for 2-point conversions far too often -- isn't just academic. Perhaps Mr. Ryan should be hitting the books?

this is a great thread. no problem in bumping it.

i had similar thoughts when the jests had to score a td in the closing minutes rather than kick the FG they might have needed without two failed two pointers (assuming of course that the kicks were good)...

as for wrecks hitting the books, i'll take the obvious cheap shot and say he'll be too busy hitting the post game buffet...