Fourth-and-1 from the Pats’ 24-yard line

[Kasmir]

Sweet alabama hot cakes eagle eye! Romer has no "theory". He simply did a probability analysis using observed data. This is not a "theory" - this is simple mathematics. The math is the same whether you're up 6, down 6, or tied. Using Romer's data, if BB thought 83% or better chance of getting the first, then it was a mathematically justified decision.

I made a slight calculation error, and my reading of his tables is inexact. Expectation on your own 25 is a little better than .5, and of your opponent on your 25 a little worse than -3 pts. But using those rough numbers, breakeven is then:

(success).5 = (1-success)3

Solving for (success) yields 6/7 or 85%.

Again, the actual numbers are rough and are mosty illustrative. I suspect Belichick has not only a precise measured function but possibly also adjustments for game conditions. 85% strikes Bayesian-me as a high success rate for 4 and 1, but what do I know

 

[letekro]

I made a slight calculation error, and my reading of his tables is inexact. Expectation on your own 25 is a little better than .5, and of your opponent on your 25 a little worse than -3 pts. But using those rough numbers, breakeven is then:

(success).5 = (1-success)3

Solving for (success) yields 6/7 or 85%.

Again, the actual numbers are rough and are mosty illustrative. I suspect Belichick has not only a precise measured function but possibly also adjustments for game conditions. 85% strikes Bayesian-me as a high success rate for 4 and 1, but what do I know

But you have to subtract the point value from 3 that is equal to them getting the ball on say, their own 35 after the punt. This dramatically lowers the 85% figure.

 

[maverick4]

If you want to ignore that converting the 4th down will lead to points on average, then you also MUST have to ignore that turning the ball over in the red zone will on average surrender points..

I generally respect your desire to use reason, but this statement is full of sh*t.

This statement makes zero sense.

At your own 24 yard line on 4th down, converting a 1st down means you are still at 1st down extremely deep in your own territory, with no less better chance at scoring points, compared to historical data on scoring points at that position.

At the same time, why do I have to ignore that losing the 4th down means the opponent has a sure 3 points, and a good chance at 7 points?

Your entire analysis is cow dung.

 

[maverick4]

But we're left with uncomfortable counter datum that Bill Belichick appears to agree with Romer,

Actually you're wrong. Belichick himself admits it was not a smart move based on any analysis or reason, that he knew he would be killed if it didn't work.

What he did, was as if he went all in with a pair of 5's in a tournament poker game, with no chance of re-buy-in.


We're all glad it worked, but it's beyond ridiculous you're trying to rationalize it as some sort of intelligent move.

If the entire league were to shift to only numbers-based decision making, going for it on 4th down on your own 24 yard line, up 6 points, in the 3rd quarter, is NEVER a justified rational move.

 

[Kasmir]

Actually you're wrong. Belichick himself admits it was not a smart move based on any analysis or reason, that he knew he would be killed if it didn't work.

What he did, was as if he went all in with a pair of 5's in a tournament poker game, with no chance of re-buy-in.


We're all glad it worked, but it's beyond ridiculous you're trying to rationalize it as some sort of intelligent move.

If the entire league were to shift to only numbers-based decision making, going for it on 4th down on your own 24 yard line, up 6 points, in the 3rd quarter, is NEVER a justified rational move.

I thought I covered the origins of exactly your logic in my original post, but I was obviously unsuccessful in persuading you. You win.

 

[eagle eye]

If you consider the Romer table, if Belichick thinks we had better than an 83% chance of converting, why wouldn't we go for it?

You see right here, you are saying if he thinks we have a better than 83% chance. Where does he get that figure from? We haven't played them in years so he cannot get it from games played between the two teams.

Our offense was doing what ever it wanted that game and the interior defense couldn't stop the running game. Why give the ball back when we could keep the drive going? It isn't as simple as "Oh, well, we don't want to give them a TD, so lets just punt". That is lose mentality. You play to win, not to "not lose". If you figure (as Belichick must have) that going for it there gives you the better chance to win the game (and possibly show confidence in his offense that might go beyond just that play, drive, or the game) you go for it. Period.

Its not lose mentality. Its looking at it from both sides. Reverse the situation and you are the Atlanta. What do you want the Patriots to do here, seriously. I know I'd want them to go for it and hope we stop them, I'd also believe that if we don't stop them it will fire up the defense and we will stop them in the next four downs.
Oh and fyi a full stop is a period, no need for three of them.
And Belichick admitted afterwards that it wasn't a good call to go for it.

I think this is very similar to a blind steal allin in a single table poker tournament. It is very high risk (A call would knock you out of the tournament a high % of the time), but the reward is not just worth it, but is pretty much a necessary risk to take to win in the long run.

I don't believe in allin blind stealing, I used a very different approach to that. Clearly it doesn't always work, but my approach is much safer. I use the pot size bet in later stages and 3x in the earlier stages. I can always get away from them. But I'm not here to talk about poker.

 

[Wolfpack]

I havent read the whole thread, but the appropriate analogy is making an excessively large bet on something you have a great chance of winning.
All in is not a good analogy because failing on that play does not mean you lose the game.

Except your odds of winning don't tell the whole story. Suppose I told you your odds of winning your next hand of blackjack was 90% (set aside all other factors like doubling down or splitting). Well those are great odds so yeah, let's make a huge bet..!!

But then suppose I said that for every $100 you bet, you're only going to win $5. We still have a great chance of winning but all of a sudden betting big doesn't seem so smart, does it?

 

[crypto]

Newsflash: It is the third quarter. You are on your own 24. You do not attempt to convert on fourth down.

That is all.

[Sticks hands back in trenchcoat and shuffles out of the quote war.]

 

[letekro]

Actually you're wrong. Belichick himself admits it was not a smart move based on any analysis or reason, that he knew he would be killed if it didn't work.

What he did, was as if he went all in with a pair of 5's in a tournament poker game, with no chance of re-buy-in.


We're all glad it worked, but it's beyond ridiculous you're trying to rationalize it as some sort of intelligent move.

If the entire league were to shift to only numbers-based decision making, going for it on 4th down on your own 24 yard line, up 6 points, in the 3rd quarter, is NEVER a justified rational move.

1. Belichick made a flippant comment. Your inability to comprehend the written word is matched only by your inability to comprehend nuances in the spoken word. Obviously, BB is a rational decision maker. Do you really think he was so worked up that he said, "OK, F it, I'm so pissed I'm going to do something stupid here!" Really?

2. Again, when you say it is NEVER justified, you are buying into the fallacy described above so eloquently by Kasmir (if you read it, you might learn something), and ignoring probability analysis, a topic on which you claim substantial expertise.

 

[maverick4]

If you want to ignore that converting the 4th down will lead to points on average, then you also MUST have to ignore that turning the ball over in the red zone will on average surrender points.

PLEASE, by all means, try to challenge me on this. I studied these topics at MIT, I look forward to any legit challenges you have to arguing that going for it on 4th down on your own 24, is a smart move.


1. I didn't say that converting 4th down leads to points (those were the insane laughable words by letekro). On the contrary, look at historical data. Starting on 1st down near your own 25 yard line, does not have encouraging numbers of scoring success, nowhere close to justifying the move on rational grounds.

2. Your second point is completely ridiculous. Failing on 4th down DOES give your opponent a sure shot at 3 points, a FG, and a decent chance at a touchdown (7 points).

You can try to do mathematical masturbation all you want, but you can't change the fact that the benefit of converting is only 1st down deep in your territory, and the damage is a sure FG, and possible TD for the opponent.

Also, any sort of math of payoff formula you provide, must admit that Belichick knew his defense and offense were already playing great, raising the chance of success. Any claim that Belichick did this to 'jump start his unit', is bogus. On rational grounds, it only makes sense for Belichick if he had ultimate confidence in both his defense and in his offense.



All this being said, everyone is happy that the actual 4th down call worked well.

 

[letekro]

PLEASE, by all means, try to challenge me on this. I studied these topics at MIT, I look forward to any legit challenges you have to arguing that going for it on 4th down on your own 24, is a smart move.

I knew I recognized you. You're Will Hunting!

 

[cmasspatsfan]

Well I'll say one thing, the level of arguments are more cerebral on this board than on the Jets board, Course theres a reason why the New Yawkers send their kids to Boston to get educated.

 

[maverick4]

I made a slight calculation error, and my reading of his tables is inexact. Expectation on your own 25 is a little better than .5, and of your opponent on your 25 a little worse than -3 pts. But using those rough numbers, breakeven is then:

(success).5 = (1-success)3

Solving for (success) yields 6/7 or 85%.

It doesn't take more than a few seconds to realize you pulled these numbers out your arse.

One can easily look up the probability that the Patriots would score (or avg points per starting pt), based on getting a 1st down at their own 25 yard line.

Similarly, one can easily look up the probability the opposing team will score based on starting on our own 25 yard line.

1. There is no way the opponent's EV, from our own 25, is 3 points. That is the absolute baseline value, if they F up everything they still get 3 points. The EV is larger than 3.

2. Where are you getting that 0.5 number?


No matter how one slices it, the only rational grounds Belichick can stand on, are if he argues that his offense and defense were already rolling, thus altering the percentages in favor of that play.

Any argument that he made a ballsy call on 4th down in the 3rd quarter, in order to 'jump start his offense or defense', make zero rational sense.

 

[letekro]

It doesn't take more than a few seconds to realize you pulled these numbers out your arse.

One can easily look up the probability that the Patriots would score (or avg points per starting pt), based on getting a 1st down at their own 25 yard line.

Similarly, one can easily look up the probability the opposing team will score based on starting on our own 25 yard line.

1. There is no way the opponent's EV, from our own 25, is 3 points. That is the absolute baseline value, if they F up everything they still get 3 points. The EV is larger than 3.

2. Where are you getting that 0.5 number?


No matter how one slices it, the only rational grounds Belichick can stand on, are if he argues that his offense and defense were already rolling, thus altering the percentages in favor of that play.

Any argument that he made a ballsy call on 4th down in the 3rd quarter, in order to 'jump start his offense or defense', make zero rational sense.

Here's the actual, OBSERVED data. Do with it what you will. I suggest you read it, digest it, and go quietly into the night.

First let's talk about what we're supposed to be talking about: fourth down strategy. Suppose you have fourth-and-one at your own 20 yard line. No one ever even considers going for it in this situation because everyone focuses on what happens if you fail. Indeed, if you don't get the first, you have given your opponent the gift of a +3.6 point situation. That's bad. But what people fail to see is that the punt --- let's assume it nets 40 yards --- puts them in a good situation too: +1.4 points. So you're not gambling 3.6 points, you're gambling 2.2 points.

Let's say your probability of picking up the first is p. If you get it, you'll be in a +.4 situation. If you don't, you'll be in a -3.6 situation. So if you decide to go, your expected situation is p * (.4) + (1-p) * (-3.6). If you punt, your expected situation is -1.4. Setting those two equal and solving for p yields a breakeven point of about p = .55. In other words, if you think you have a 55% or better chance of making the first, you are better off going for it. As any football fan knows, but Romer demonstrates anyway, there is good reason to believe that teams often have a better than 55% chance of making a first down, but punt anyway. (What Romer does is actually a bit more complex, and takes into account the possibilities of blocked punts, fumbled punts, longer gains on the 4th down attempt, and essentially anything else that might happen.)

 

[maverick4]

Setting those two equal and solving for p yields a breakeven point of about p = .55. In other words, if you think you have a 55% or better chance of making the first, you are better off going for it.

It's extremely amusing that this CLOWN is still trying to sound like he has one clue about what he's talking about.

If you truly think based on your equation (kudos to you by the way that you can even spell the words correctly) that teams should go for it on 4th down at all times, even on your own 24 yard line, if you think you have a 55% success rate, it would be the height of hilarity if you ever became a head coach. You would easily surpass the 19-straight-losses Lions record.

 

[Satchboogie3]

It doesn't take more than a few seconds to realize you pulled these numbers out your arse.

One can easily look up the probability that the Patriots would score (or avg points per starting pt), based on getting a 1st down at their own 25 yard line.

Similarly, one can easily look up the probability the opposing team will score based on starting on our own 25 yard line.

1. There is no way the opponent's EV, from our own 25, is 3 points. That is the absolute baseline value, if they F up everything they still get 3 points. The EV is larger than 3.

Lets see, they could end up turning the ball over (turn overs do occur, you know), they could lose 5+ yards on penalties/tackles for loss/sacks, or they could flatout miss a FG. All of those would result in ZERO points. It's very easy to see how 3 points is the expected pointloss at the 25.

2. Where are you getting that 0.5 number?

Did you bother to read where these numbers came from, you would see that it was a statistcal breakdown of league scoring from 1998-2000.

No matter how one slices it, the only rational grounds Belichick can stand on, are if he argues that his offense and defense were already rolling, thus altering the percentages in favor of that play.

Any argument that he made a ballsy call on 4th down in the 3rd quarter, in order to 'jump start his offense or defense', make zero rational sense.

We are arguing specifically that this is a very situational decision. We think that given the situation (our offense rolling and ATL not being able to stop our running game) the break-even point is probably closer to 60% than 83%, but, it also goes hand in hand, because the better success your offense is having, the more likely would are to convert on the 4th and inches.

 

[Kasmir]

But you have to subtract the point value from 3 that is equal to them getting the ball on say, their own 35 after the punt. This dramatically lowers the 85% figure.

You're of course correct, but that branch of the tree is much more difficult to calculate from his exposition

Upon further inspection, it turns out Romer actually specifically measures that case though, and claims the adjusted difference between a failed attempt to go for it and an average punt from your own 25 yard lines is about 2.1 pts, i.e. on average a 2 point swing in field position. So you're right, the breakeven on going for it is even better than I thought.

This time I think I'd better leave the actual calculation to someone practiced on decision theory; there seem to be several folks such on this board; too bad they all seem to be Bayesians

 

[Satchboogie3]

I don't believe in allin blind stealing, I used a very different approach to that. Clearly it doesn't always work, but my approach is much safer. I use the pot size bet in later stages and 3x in the earlier stages. I can always get away from them. But I'm not here to talk about poker.

The Blind-steal allin I discussed was when you are at 10 big blinds or less. When you get that shortstacked, you have no other play. If you try to just raise to 2-3 big blinds, the blinds could very well raise you, and you are left to either fold or gamble (with likely a -EV play). Shoving allows you to have the fold equity while elimanting the chance of someone restealing.

Of course, it does depend on the opponents. Against tight-passive blinds, you could probably get away with min-raising for a steal (with under 10BB). Against just about any other types you would really have to just move allin.

Your right, though, when it comes to a bigger stack. With more than 10 big blinds, it is foolish to use an allin as your primary blind steal, unless, again, the table dynamics call for it.

 

[maverick4]

Lets see, they could end up turning the ball over (turn overs do occur, you know), they could lose 5+ yards on penalties/tackles for loss/sacks, or they could flatout miss a FG. All of those would result in ZERO points. It's very easy to see how 3 points is the expected pointloss at the 25.

We are arguing specifically that this is a very situational decision. We think that given the situation (our offense rolling and ATL not being able to stop our running game) the break-even point is probably closer to 60% than 83%, but, it also goes hand in hand, because the better success your offense is having, the more likely would are to convert on the 4th and inches.

1. Absolutely ridiculous. On our own 25, even if the opponent is as smart as yourself or letekro, they still have 3 points if they have massive brain farts, and still a good chance at a TD. Averaging out all the historical outcomes, the EV is still over 3 points for the opponent, if we fail on 4th down. If you want to bring up fumbles and turnovers on the opposing team, why do you ignore the similar chances our own offense would have in those events.

2. So now you're arguing that if we think we can convert over a 60% chance on 4th down, we should go for it even on our own 24 yard line? This is as funny as letekro's pseudo-science. I apologize to all for assuming Satchboogie had half a brain more than letekro, they're both useless.


I'm not categorically ruling out that going on 4th down on your own 24 is always a bad move. However, it's justified only if you can make a strong case that your defense and offense are already dominant, not to jump start those units.

 

[weswelker#83]

Teachers and coachs always love to test their students , to see if they can handle it right.