Fourth-and-1 from the Pats’ 24-yard line

[letekro]

So you are saying we are trying to pull "stuff" out of our ass for a payoff, while ignoring the loss? Correct me if I'm wrong, but if you ignore the future payoff, you should also ignore the future loss. If you want to ignore that converting the 4th down will lead to points on average, then you also MUST have to ignore that turning the ball over in the red zone will on average surrender points. Your "point" ignores the payoff (ie, keeping the drive going) while take account of the possible loss (ie, the opposing team scoring with field position). Your point SHOULD be, "We either get a 1st down deep in our territory or we give the other team great field position. PERIOD". If anyone's argument is flawed, it is yours.

You realize the second you say "in exchange for possibly giving up points" you are actually ESTIMATING THE FUTURE CHAIN OF EVENTS! You are doing EXACTLY what you say we are failing to attempt to do. Take a good step back off of your high perch and look at what you are saying.

Good Luck Satch! These guys wore me out.

 

[LiveShot]

They made it so what's the big deal. BB had to go along with it but what does he know? Obviously more than most of the public. Thank God.

 

[Satchboogie3]

You are basing your 3.25 on how many possessions?
You are basing your 5 points on two possessions. This is totally inadequate.
Also you fail to realise that there are five possible score outcomes from a turnover which are 3, 6, 7 and 8. While 5 is an average its not workable in this situation as you are calculating one drive and the only possible results from a turnover are 3, 6, 7 or 8.

If this calculation was usable week after week and this situation came up in every game then it is workable to guarantee a good win ratio, but in football its about winning every game. Not just going over .500 for the season.

Did you miss the part in my original post where I said "crude". The method is valid, the numbers I used are in no means perfect, I was just making this an example. I even stated exactly how you could come up with reasonable estimates and calculations, but of course, you ignore that and just attack the example.

 

[Satchboogie3]

You don't get it do you?

I play poker and I understand ev and reverse odds and everything else about the game. This is not in any way similar to poker. There are too many variables that you do not have control over. Its incorrect to assess this using ev, well to assess it as a +ev play anyways.

The smartest play in that circumstance is to fake like you are going for it and try and get an offside call, but it they don't go for it you kick it away.

For someone attack my method of assessing whether to go for it on 4th and inches, saying there are too many variables, etc, you came up with the right play? May I ask, how did you come to that conclusion and what evidence can you show me to support why that is a better play than going for it?

 

[eagle eye]

Did you miss the part in my original post where I said "crude". The method is valid, the numbers I used are in no means perfect, I was just making this an example. I even stated exactly how you could come up with reasonable estimates and calculations, but of course, you ignore that and just attack the example.

What I've been saying all along is that its just stupid to try and put an ev on this because its not workable over such a small sample size.
You want to use the plays from one game to make a huge call based on maths. Its just not workable.

Its just a guess and not even a good one.

On our offense, we have major changes to last year, firstly we have Brady at QB, Welker is out and Gaffney is no longer a Patriot, neither is Hochstein and LeVoir is injured.

So all you can base this on is the game that is happeing and you don't have enough stats to make a good judgement.

And I can guarantee that if we failed to convert there and the Falcons go on to score a touchdown and win the game, none of you guys would be here with your ev calculations right now.

If you want to discuss the merits of ev in sport more, take it to 2p2 and see what they say. I'll probably end up reading it but I don't agree that there is enough to go on in this situation to make anything close to a good calculation.

 

[eagle eye]

For someone attack my method of assessing whether to go for it on 4th and inches, saying there are too many variables, etc, you came up with the right play? May I ask, how did you come to that conclusion and what evidence can you show me to support why that is a better play than going for it?

Simple really, we have a great punter and I'd hope that our defense is good enough to stop the Falcons from progressing from their own half to score a touchdown.

 

[Satchboogie3]

What I've been saying all along is that its just stupid to try and put an ev on this because its not workable over such a small sample size.
You want to use the plays from one game to make a huge call based on maths. Its just not workable.

Its just a guess and not even a good one.

On our offense, we have major changes to last year, firstly we have Brady at QB, Welker is out and Gaffney is no longer a Patriot, neither is Hochstein and LeVoir is injured.

So all you can base this on is the game that is happeing and you don't have enough stats to make a good judgement.

And I can guarantee that if we failed to convert there and the Falcons go on to score a touchdown and win the game, none of you guys would be here with your ev calculations right now.

If you want to discuss the merits of ev in sport more, take it to 2p2 and see what they say. I'll probably end up reading it but I don't agree that there is enough to go on in this situation to make anything close to a good calculation.

I'm not using just game stats, I'm using stats from previous season's and league averages adjusted to teams and games. If you spent the time figuring out the best educated guesses to use for the calculations, than, though it wouldn't be completely accurate, it would be close enough to be useful. Anyways, how else are you supposed to make such decisions? Are you supposed to just say "ah, its too hard to figure out, so lets just not even bother".

 

[Satchboogie3]

Simple really, we have a great punter and I'd hope that our defense is good enough to stop the Falcons from progressing from their own half to score a touchdown.

So you base your argument on "hoping" that our defense stops the Falcons. Really? You rather just "hope" the defense stops the Falcons rather than trying to assess the merits of going for it on 4th down?

You haven't give us a reason to not go for it on 4th and inches. All you have done is given us reasons (and not all that good) to not even attempt to figure out whether to go for it or not using some sort of calculation.

 

[Kasmir]

Good old Bayesian "paradox", i.e. fans are understandably applying Bayesian logic, which in this case happens to strongly disagree with classical probability analysis

Aside from end of game and end of half effects, field positions have consistent point value, taking *everything* into account. Romer purports to have created such a function, from data compiled from 1998-2000 play analysis. At its simplest: from his tables, 1st and 10 on your own 25 yard line is worth about half a point. Your opponent having 1st and 10 on your 25 yard line is worth about -3 points. So the break even on the decision to go for it on 4th and 1 is about 86%. That is, if Belichick thought the probability of getting a 1st down was greater than 86%, it was a mathematically justifiable decision according to Romer.

You can reasonably question the particular tables Romer used, and question whatever offsets Belichick may have or should have applied. But you can't reasonably question the tradeoff itself. It apparently makes sense makes sense to go for it on 4th and 1 in from your own 25 surprisingly more than you would think based on what coaches actually do.

That's where the Bayesian part comes in. We all *know* that NFL coaches *don't* go for it in those circumstances, so our Bayesian filter violently disagrees with Romer's recommendation. How could so many coaches be so wrong for so long? Bayesian logic suggests Romer's analysis must be flawed.

But we're left with uncomfortable counter datum that Bill Belichick appears to agree with Romer, so maybe Romer is onto something, lest we conclude Belichick is a fool sometimes.

So how *could* so many coaches possibly be so wrong? Romer considers the obvious, that they're risk averse, i.e that they'd rather punt the ball and slightly increase their probability of losing the game according to decision theory rather than to go for it and slightly increase the probability that they'll lose their job to the Bayesian mob. Romer dismisses this possibility because he believes losing games it what actually loses jobs for coaches.

But I think he underestimates the magnitude of the Bayesian driven risk to coaches. Just in reading this thread, you can see how powerfully the disbelief is in the Romer recommendation amongst clearly intelligent fans assessing the decision of a coach whom they believe to be one of the greatest of all time. Even *Belichick* is pilloried by his most fervent fans *after he won*; how then can a lesser coach, perpetually worried about job security, possibly be expected to put his reputation at risk for a small and controversial increased expectation of winning? The answer is clear: coaches fear ridicule more than they fear losing. The fear perpetuates a questionable practice, which reinforces the Bayesian disbelief, which perpetuates the fear. This status quo is quite resistant to change.

 

[eagle eye]

Good old Bayesian "paradox", i.e. fans are understandably applying Bayesian logic, which in this case happens to strongly disagree with classical probability analysis

Aside from end of game and end of half effects, field positions have consistent point value, taking *everything* into account. Romer purports to have created such a function, from data compiled from 1998-2000 play analysis. At its simplest: from his tables, 1st and 10 on your own 25 yard line is worth about half a point. Your opponent having 1st and 10 on your 25 yard line is worth about -3 points. So the break even on the decision to go for it on 4th and 1 is about 83%. That is, if Belichick thought the probability of getting a 1st down was greater than 83%, it was a mathematically justifiable decision according to Romer.

You can reasonably question the particular tables Romer used, and question whatever offsets Belichick may have or should have applied. But you can't reasonably question the tradeoff itself. It apparently makes sense makes sense to go for it on 4th and 1 in from your own 25 surprisingly more than you would think based on what coaches actually do.

That's where the Bayesian part comes in. We all *know* that NFL coaches *don't* go for it in those circumstances, so our Bayesian filter violently disagrees with Romer's recommendation. How could so many coaches be so wrong for so long? Bayesian logic suggests Romer's analysis must be flawed.

But we're left with uncomfortable counter datum that Bill Belichick appears to agree with Romer, so maybe Romer is onto something, lest we conclude Belichick is a fool sometimes.

So how *could* so many coaches possibly be so wrong? Romer considers the obvious, that they're risk averse, i.e that they'd rather punt the ball and slightly increase their probability of losing the game according to decision theory rather than to go for it and slightly increase the probability that they'll lose their job to the Bayesian mob. Romer dismisses this possibility because he believes losing games it what actually loses jobs for coaches.

But I think he underestimates the magnitude of the Bayesian driven risk to coaches. Just in reading this thread, you can see how powerfully the disbelief is in the Romer recommendation amongst clearly intelligent fans assessing the decision of a coach whom they believe to be one of the greatest of all time. Even *Belichick* is pilloried by his most fervent fans *after he won*; how then can a lesser coach, perpetually worried about job security, possibly be expected to put his reputation at risk for a small and controversial increased expectation of winning? The answer is clear: coaches fear ridicule more than they fear losing. The fear perpetuates a questionable practice, which reinforces the Bayesian disbelief, which perpetuates the fear. This status quo is quite resistant to change.

Even this argument would be massively swayed by the fact that you have a six point lead. In a game where all is even then the Romer theory might have some merit, but not in a game where you have a six point lead.

 

[eagle eye]

So you base your argument on "hoping" that our defense stops the Falcons. Really? You rather just "hope" the defense stops the Falcons rather than trying to assess the merits of going for it on 4th down?

You haven't give us a reason to not go for it on 4th and inches. All you have done is given us reasons (and not all that good) to not even attempt to figure out whether to go for it or not using some sort of calculation.

No its not based on just that. The probalility of them scoring a touchdown from their own half is not nearly as high as if we turn the ball over on our 24.

 

[Patspsycho]

Good old Bayesian "paradox", i.e. fans are understandably applying Bayesian logic, which in this case happens to strongly disagree with classical probability analysis

Aside from end of game and end of half effects, field positions have consistent point value, taking *everything* into account. Romer purports to have created such a function, from data compiled from 1998-2000 play analysis. At its simplest: from his tables, 1st and 10 on your own 25 yard line is worth about half a point. Your opponent having 1st and 10 on your 25 yard line is worth about -3 points. So the break even on the decision to go for it on 4th and 1 is about 83%. That is, if Belichick thought the probability of getting a 1st down was greater than 83%, it was a mathematically justifiable decision according to Romer.

You can reasonably question the particular tables Romer used, and question whatever offsets Belichick may have or should have applied. But you can't reasonably question the tradeoff itself. It apparently makes sense makes sense to go for it on 4th and 1 in from your own 25 surprisingly more than you would think based on what coaches actually do.

That's where the Bayesian part comes in. We all *know* that NFL coaches *don't* go for it in those circumstances, so our Bayesian filter violently disagrees with Romer's recommendation. How could so many coaches be so wrong for so long? Bayesian logic suggests Romer's analysis must be flawed.

But we're left with uncomfortable counter datum that Bill Belichick appears to agree with Romer, so maybe Romer is onto something, lest we conclude Belichick is a fool sometimes.

So how *could* so many coaches possibly be so wrong? Romer considers the obvious, that they're risk averse, i.e that they'd rather punt the ball and slightly increase their probability of losing the game according to decision theory rather than to go for it and slightly increase the probability that they'll lose their job to the Bayesian mob. Romer dismisses this possibility because he believes losing games it what actually loses jobs for coaches.

But I think he underestimates the magnitude of the Bayesian driven risk to coaches. Just in reading this thread, you can see how powerfully the disbelief is in the Romer recommendation amongst clearly intelligent fans assessing the decision of a coach whom they believe to be one of the greatest of all time. Even *Belichick* is pilloried by his most fervent fans *after he won*; how then can a lesser coach, perpetually worried about job security, possibly be expected to put his reputation at risk for a small and controversial increased expectation of winning? The answer is clear: coaches fear ridicule more than they fear losing. The fear perpetuates a questionable practice, which reinforces the Bayesian disbelief, which perpetuates the fear. This status quo is quite resistant to change.

Very interesting analysis.

 

[Kasmir]

Even this argument would be massively swayed by the fact that you have a six point lead. In a game where all is even then the Romer theory might have some merit, but not in a game where you have a six point lead.

In some near-end-game circumstances, sure. Maybe even the situation Belichick made the decision in. But you sure haven't made the case. Giving up points generally is a bad decision. Belichick appears to have disagreed with you. The Romer logic explains his decision. How would you explain it?

 

[eagle eye]

In some near-end-game circumstances, sure. Maybe even the situation Belichick made the decision in. But you sure haven't made the case. Giving up points generally is a bad decision. Belichick appears to have disagreed with you. The Romer logic explains his decision. How would you explain it?

Well very simply put, we kick away the ball and we are unlikely to give up points. We turn over the ball and we are very likely to give up points. We get a 1st and 10 and we are still not even close to certain to score. If we gain fail to gain another ten yards we are going to be giving them the ball in a similar position to where they would have gotten it without the risk. If they come down the field and score we get the ball back in something similar to the position that we decided to go for 4 and 1 on.

 

[letekro]

Even this argument would be massively swayed by the fact that you have a six point lead. In a game where all is even then the Romer theory might have some merit, but not in a game where you have a six point lead.

Sweet alabama hot cakes eagle eye! Romer has no "theory". He simply did a probability analysis using observed data. This is not a "theory" - this is simple mathematics. The math is the same whether you're up 6, down 6, or tied. Using Romer's data, if BB thought 83% or better chance of getting the first, then it was a mathematically justified decision.

 

[letekro]

Well very simply put, we kick away the ball and we are unlikely to give up points. We turn over the ball and we are very likely to give up points. We get a 1st and 10 and we are still not even close to certain to score. If we gain fail to gain another ten yards we are going to be giving them the ball in a similar position to where they would have gotten it without the risk. If they come down the field and score we get the ball back in something similar to the position that we decided to go for 4 and 1 on.

Just read this:

First let's talk about what we're supposed to be talking about: fourth down strategy. Suppose you have fourth-and-one at your own 20 yard line. No one ever even considers going for it in this situation because everyone focuses on what happens if you fail. Indeed, if you don't get the first, you have given your opponent the gift of a +3.6 point situation. That's bad. But what people fail to see is that the punt --- let's assume it nets 40 yards --- puts them in a good situation too: +1.4 points. So you're not gambling 3.6 points, you're gambling 2.2 points.

Let's say your probability of picking up the first is p. If you get it, you'll be in a +.4 situation. If you don't, you'll be in a -3.6 situation. So if you decide to go, your expected situation is p * (.4) + (1-p) * (-3.6). If you punt, your expected situation is -1.4. Setting those two equal and solving for p yields a breakeven point of about p = .55. In other words, if you think you have a 55% or better chance of making the first, you are better off going for it. As any football fan knows, but Romer demonstrates anyway, there is good reason to believe that teams often have a better than 55% chance of making a first down, but punt anyway. (What Romer does is actually a bit more complex, and takes into account the possibilities of blocked punts, fumbled punts, longer gains on the 4th down attempt, and essentially anything else that might happen.)

 

[maverick4]

Romer has no "theory". He simply did a probability analysis using observed data.

You're STILL pretending you have half a clue about what you're talking about?

This is the same clown who a day ago had zero clue about basic terminology as it pertains to decision making theory. He's a clown.

 

[Satchboogie3]

Well very simply put, we kick away the ball and we are unlikely to give up points. We turn over the ball and we are very likely to give up points. We get a 1st and 10 and we are still not even close to certain to score. If we gain fail to gain another ten yards we are going to be giving them the ball in a similar position to where they would have gotten it without the risk. If they come down the field and score we get the ball back in something similar to the position that we decided to go for 4 and 1 on.

If you consider the Romer table, if Belichick thinks we had better than an 83% chance of converting, why wouldn't we go for it? Our offense was doing what ever it wanted that game and the interior defense couldn't stop the running game. Why give the ball back when we could keep the drive going? It isn't as simple as "Oh, well, we don't want to give them a TD, so lets just punt". That is lose mentality. You play to win, not to "not lose". If you figure (as Belichick must have) that going for it there gives you the better chance to win the game (and possibly show confidence in his offense that might go beyond just that play, drive, or the game) you go for it. Period.

I think this is very similar to a blind steal allin in a single table poker tournament. It is very high risk (A call would knock you out of the tournament a high % of the time), but the reward is not just worth it, but is pretty much a necessary risk to take to win in the long run.

 

[letekro]

You're STILL pretending you have half a clue about what you're talking about?

This is the same guy who a day ago had zero clue about basic terminology as it pertains to decision making theory. He's a clown.

That's right. Keep on with the personal attacks. Pretty sad how some people deal with being shown that they're wrong

 

[Satchboogie3]

You're STILL pretending you have half a clue about what you're talking about?

This is the same guy who a day ago had zero clue about basic terminology as it pertains to decision making theory. He's a clown.

Just because he might not know everything doesn't make his point less valid. If you have a problem with what he said, point it out and explain exactly what is wrong with it.

Otherwise, don't attack someone because they don't know something, it just makes you out to look like an ass.