Confusion over Belichick's non-trade with SF on Pick # 33 in draft

[PatsFanStnfrd]

The confusion surrounds what SF offered the Pats to move up to 33. From Pats All-access inside the draft room show, my recollection is the offer was the Pats 33 for SF's 3rd rounder in 2011 and a 3rd rounder in 2012. (BB rejected the deal because he wanted a 2nd rounder in 2012).

Peter King in his MMQB today, suggests that the SF offer included their pick at 45 in round 2 this year in addition to 3rd rounders this year and next. So, three picks for # 33 in total. This puts a very different cast on BB's decision to turn down this trade especially since King contends that Ras-I Dowling would have been available at # 45 (SF's original spot).
Cris Collinsworth on labor, NFL Network Top 100 players, more - Peter King - SI.com (Point 8, middle of page)

Regardless of whether Dowling would have been available, can someone definitively clarify whether King is right on SF's offer or SF only offered two third rounders?

Also. if King is right, don't you think that BB should have taken it?

 

[patchick]

Well, 3 picks later SF did make its trade -- for #45, #108 and #141. Those picks have a combined chart value of 563 points vs. 530 for the #36 pick they got, which is very close given the jockeying for QBs that was going on.

The package King claims they offered the Pats would have been worth about 860 points (including a deduction for time value of 2012 picks) in exchange for a pick worth just 580 points. The version reported elsewhere is much closer to expected trade values.

So while I can't offer any "definitive info," King's account doesn't sound especially plausible.

 

[Sciz]

Well, 3 picks later SF did make its trade -- for #45, #108 and #141. Those picks have a combined chart value of 563 points vs. 530 for the #36 pick they got, which is very close given the jockeying for QBs that was going on.

The package King claims they offered the Pats would have been worth about 860 points (including a deduction for time value of 2012 picks) in exchange for a pick worth just 580 points. The version reported elsewhere is much closer to expected trade values.

So while I can't offer any "definitive info," King's account doesn't sound especially plausible.

Yeah, I agree with this. The trade at 36 shows that Bill wasn't going to get the value he wanted for pick 33.

 

[Metaphors]

So while I can't offer any "definitive info," King's account doesn't sound especially plausible.

Not only that, articles like this dance around a point instead of just saying it:

"Belichick let his infatuation with Dowling cloud his judgement and missed out on a team willing to significantly overpay (for no apparent reason) for pick #33"

"Belichick was too stupid to realize that his guy would almost certainly be available 12 picks later so trading down for anything would be great value"

You took apart the notion that SF was going to overpay for pick #33 (580 pts) with #45 and #76 (670 pts, for a differential equal to a high 4th)...and then was willing to throw in a 2012 3rd for good measure. But the other insinuations deserve equal scrutiny:

Belichick was overly locked onto Dowling...Nonsense. If he got a 2nd in 2012, he was willing to miss out on Dowling entirely. He just didn't get the value he was looking for and Dowling was the top guy on his board.

Dowling would be there at #45...I'd rate this one as 50/50 at best. Even if Dowling makes it past Buffalo at #34, there was an entire block of team from #40 to #44 (Dallas, Washington, Houston, Minnesota, Detroit) that could be targeting Dowling. That doesn't even count teams like SD (reached for Gilcrest at #50) and Philadelphia (reached for Jarrett at #54 and took Marsh at #90) trading ahead of the Pats for Dowling.

Trade value of SF's offer...Just looking at trade chart values only gives you part of the equation. You need the context of the draft class to make an accurate assessment. Belichick clearly saw the talent cliff in this draft class at around #75, so getting pick #76 likely didn't thrill him. Next year's class isn't setting up to be very deep so getting a future 3rd with the uncertainty of Juniors declaring probably wasn't appealing either. Getting a 2nd in what is looking like a superior (but top-heavy) 2012 class was his target and he couldn't get it.

 

[patchick]

Dowling would be there at #45...I'd rate this one as 50/50 at best.

Even that seems generous to me -- there was a huge dropoff in DB talent after Dowling & Williams.

 

[convertedpatsfan]

Even that seems generous to me -- there was a huge dropoff in DB talent after Dowling & Williams.

Agreed, especially with the very next pick being Williams. That very well could have been Dowling.

It also ignores the fact that DB-needy teams like Houston and Detroit were picking before 45. Both teams passed on corner in the 1st round despite it arguably being their biggest need.

I don't buy the trade offer report from King at all. And I certainly don't buy Dowling being available at 45.

If I had to guess, it was probably two separate offers, probably 45+76, and when that got shot down, 45+108 and others+next year's 3rd. And somewhere along the way, King heard it was all instead of separate transactions.

 

[Sfpat]

And Houston took a CB, Brandon Harris with their 2nd. Almost guaranteed they would have taken Dowling had he been available.

 

[Sfpat]

And Houston took a CB (Brandon Harris) with their 2nd pick. No way Dowling would have been available at 45

 

[Fencer]

Any negotiating strategy used by a mortal will have some combination of two aspects:

1. You take relatively fixed positions. Sometimes that means you leave a deal on the table that would be better than doing no deal at all. But it assures that any deal you do will be one you think is pretty favorable.

2. You take fluid positions. More deals get done. But often you'll take less favorable terms than you actually had to.

BB has always seemed to be pretty far toward the #1 end of the spectrum. That's been costly in cases like Asante Samuel. But it's also made for a bunch of favorable deals.

 

[DropKickFlutie]

Peter King has proven time and time again that he's just a moron with bad judgment. He's nothing more than a gossip queen at his best, but even doing that this idiot just falls for whatever he's fed by real insiders.

I'm completely certain that Patchick's assessment is spot on and King has no clue what he's talking about.

 

[MDHQ]

1. Dowling was going to be gone by pick 34, that's why Williams was the next pick. A CB was going there regardless.

2. The 49ers wanted Kaepernick as the Raiders were strongly trying to get back into the first for him, but just didnt have enough to get it done.

3. 49ers and Pats got their guys at the end of the day.

 

[The Scrizz]

Peter King is like the Inside Track only with more gossip and coffee. And estrogen.

 

[PatsFaninME]

I wouldn't have traded the #33 pick for anything less than a conditional #2 pick in '12. To me, the condition would be that if '12 pick was not at least 10 spots better, than a '12 3rd would be added. Patriots had no need for more mid-level picks so why would Belichick pass on a potential starter.

 

[Metaphors]

I wouldn't have traded the #33 pick for anything less than a conditional #2 pick in '12. To me, the condition would be that if '12 pick was not at least 10 spots better, than a '12 3rd would be added. Patriots had no need for more mid-level picks so why would Belichick pass on a potential starter.

Did a preliminary look over the 2012 draft class (way too early since not all eligible Jrs will declare) and it looks similar to 2011...top-heavy and very shallow. The talent cliff in 2011 looked to be at around #75 (confirmed by the Pats punting after the Mallett pick) and 2012 may even be earlier. That might explain Belichick's reluctance to deal for a 3rd next year.

 

[plk]

Since the NFL draft value chart has come up several times in the previous discussion, let me take this opportunity to recommend that you read the chapter in Scorecasting: The Hidden Influences Behind How Sports Are Played and Games Are Won on how it came to be. The chapter is Off The Chart.

Amazon.com: Scorecasting: The Hidden Influences Behind How Sports Are Played and Games Are Won (9780307591791): Tobias J. Moskowitz, L. Jon Wertheim: Books

I suggest that you look at it both for your own edification, and because I strongly suspect that Bill Belichick realizes that the chart is useless and does not use it. He undoubtedly uses the fact that other teams use it in his calculations.

 

[Shelterdog]

I suggest that you look at it both for your own edification, and because I strongly suspect that Bill Belichick realizes that the chart is useless and does not use it. He undoubtedly uses the fact that other teams use it in his calculations.

The draft room snippets they've shown in the past include Ernie Adams saying things like "next year's pick would have to be in the top 12 for this trade to be worth it"--suggesting he (and the Pats) have some kind of chart that they use. You sort of need one, at least as a rough guideline.

I assume they have a chart and they manipulate it over time based on salaries and the expected talent pool.

 

[Snake Eyes]

I suggest that you look at it both for your own edification, and because I strongly suspect that Bill Belichick realizes that the chart is useless and does not use it. He undoubtedly uses the fact that other teams use it in his calculations.

Blasphemy!

 

[plk]

I assume they have a chart and they manipulate it over time based on salaries and the expected talent pool.

Undoubtedly, but likely not the one that we know and love.

 

[MaineMan]

Since the NFL draft value chart has come up several times in the previous discussion, let me take this opportunity to recommend that you read the chapter in Scorecasting: The Hidden Influences Behind How Sports Are Played and Games Are Won on how it came to be. The chapter is Off The Chart.

Amazon.com: Scorecasting: The Hidden Influences Behind How Sports Are Played and Games Are Won (9780307591791): Tobias J. Moskowitz, L. Jon Wertheim: Books

I suggest that you look at it both for your own edification, and because I strongly suspect that Bill Belichick realizes that the chart is useless and does not use it. He undoubtedly uses the fact that other teams use it in his calculations.

Haven't read the book and what you say about BB not strictly adhering to the Chart value guidelines may well be true.

Since 1995, teams trading OUT of the #1 overall pick have usually done so at a substantial discount to chart value (33% avg). Teams trading UP into the bottom of the first round have usually paid a fairly steep premium (around 20%-25%). However, except for a couple of "Ditkas" (outliers), the vast majority of pick trades have been within about 5% of chart values one way or the other, so a lot of teams actually DO adhere to it and, obviously, do NOT think it's "useless."

 

[Oswlek]

Haven't read the book and what you say about BB not strictly adhering to the Chart value guidelines may well be true.

Since 1995, teams trading OUT of the #1 overall pick have usually done so at a substantial discount to chart value (33% avg). Teams trading UP into the bottom of the first round have usually paid a fairly steep premium (around 20%-25%). However, except for a couple of "Ditkas" (outliers), the vast majority of pick trades have been within about 5% of chart values one way or the other, so a lot of teams actually DO adhere to it and, obviously, do NOT think it's "useless."

It all depends on your objectives. If you just want to slide back because you don't see a premium player then you'll accept the best offer you can find and be done with it.

If you see a guy who clearly deserves selection, then you'll only move if someone really offers enough juce. This example was pretty clear with #33 this past year when BB had some reasonable offers but just went with his man when he couldn't get a 2012 2nd.

As you say, every situation is different.