NFLN replay: Pats vs. NO constructive analysis

[maverick4]

Our secondaries played them with the assumption that Brees was some Joe Schmoe QB.

Meaning they played off the line or close to it? Because we pretty much play off the line all the time no matter who the QB is, no assumption.

 

[mayoclinic]

Watched the replay tonight- found it helpful that they spliced in some bird's eye footage so you could see how the coverages were deployed and how they motioned up to the snap.

I have narrowed the critical aspects to three factors and will present my arguments below. First I would like to point out a few things.

Factors:

1. Our defense had big-game jitters/Brees performance:

As you can see, that is a fatal combination. First off, Brees was flat out lights out. He was on top of his game and easily had one of the best games of his career. Only 5 incompletes and a perfect passer rating. His throws were just right on the dime, backshoulder, lead, short. His mechanics were flawless: closed hips, shoulders closed to target, step-through. No wasted motion. I don't think that we expected such a sharp game from an elite QB. we did not play true cover.

Frankly, our defense simply had the jitters. There is no other heading under which I can think of to group all the miscues, breakdowns, communication problems, especially with our secondaries, that occured.. However it is obvious this was set up by the utter lack of pass-rushing we exhibited the whole game. It was just non-existent. It shifted too much pressure on the secondaries and overworked them. Based on this diagnosis, I do not want to see any more 4 men fronts for the rest of this season. It just doesn't work. I would rather see blitzing out of the 3-4 than rushing out of the 4-3.

With the help of the bird's eye, I figured out the mystery of why Meriweather broke right and dropped coverage on the Wilhite fake man press to blitz Brees. As it turns out, Brees sold a fake left slant pretty hard (credit to him) and Meriweather felt justfied to gamble on the play. So it is not fair to say that Meriweather blew it- he gambled on it, but in retrospect, I wonder if there was not a miscommunication where he may have not realized Wilhite was in blitz option and therefore was responsible for the handoff in coverage.

On the TD Wilhite gave up to Meacham- it is not entirely on him. Bodden's man went idle (bad sell) and he should have known to instantly cut back as fast as he could on the deep read because the safeties sink to contain Shockey, leaving Wilhite on an island. You can see Bodden start to cut back too late.

Those are just two examples of the many mental errors- and as you can see those are training camp mistakes, basic mistakes; high school mistakes. You don't see breakdowns like this on the NFL level and the only logical explanation is that they simply must have had big-game jitters to forget so many, to have so many miscues and breakdowns.

2. Our playcalling is not "bad" it is a work in progress:

This is the reason BB will not fire O'Brien (outside of a big meltdown or IQ collapse). Playcalling is a trial by fire process where you learn by a thousand mistakes There are just too many small factors and and influence on the game and how it evolves. There is a distinct lack of in-game adjustments. They kept going trips wide, 2x, on MacKenzie's side of the field, and when you line X, Y, you know there is a hitch option and Mackenzie reads it like the 10 year vet he is and kills it time and again (e.g. the 4th and 4 quick slant to Moss).

Also the playcalling should have been more balanced. I would have liked to see more play actions, more draws with Faulk (see where he ripped off a big gain). It is just a matter of reading the rhythm of the game and getting a sense of what NO is trying to disguise by motioning so much.

3. Saints D/D planning:

In retrospect, I should have known that Williams was probably salivating over the chance to really stick it to BB. I do not think for a moment that it escaped him that BB has been eating him for lunch for quite a while.

And so to his credit, he came up with something that has not been done this thus far and something that worries me a bit- but also something that is dependent on a first rate DL. What he did was to focus on taking away our two weapons, Moss and Welker by double-teaming them in the general sense of the word in an over-under type of bracket coverage where the LBs play deep to anticipate the cross and only dropped after the cross to stop the underneath. In this way they cancelled the hi-low drag by hedging their bets on the underneath routes, and zoning the outsides. This is why they did mostly rush 3 drop 8, or 4/7 and the occasional blitz. It also didn't help that our OL was nowhere near 100%.

I would not be so fast to award Brees the game ball. I think part of it has to go to Mike MacKenzie, who remarkably was on the streets only last week. That man alone killed three drives. He is uncanny in the quick game and absolutely kills the quick slant. They motioned him sometimes as a hybrid LB, when Welker was in the slot. To me he was the big X factor. It was impossible to anticipate for him because he was on the streets last week. He was a big factor in killing Welker's ability to YAC.

Other minor notes:

Clear PI on Welker costed us a TD, and although the refs tried to make up for it by calling illegal contact on the next play, it was just a huge break for the Saints.

Also PI on Watson that would have got us into the RZ.

Stanback blew it in the EZ, he slowed up too soon, focusing too much on the catch.

Illegal formation was a stupid call. Technically you must not motion before a full count if someone else motions first (e.g. Watson moves to LOS to make Moss eligible). But to me, Moss didn't really motion right away. Dumb call to me.

For some reason, Mayo is just not himself. He is nowhere near 100%.

Despite all that, it was STILL a game until 10:23 of the 3rd quarter until Wilhite whiffed on that backshoulder throw to Colston that led to the monster YAC that just killed the momentum. The game just spiraled out of control after that point.

Game balls

Wilfork: The man busted his balls against a great OL, in double coverage quite a bit but kept making plays after plays.

Welker: This is one tough SOB who took a beating and just kept going, going, and going. I am afraid for his future and how long he can last playing like this.

Nerf balls

Brady: put in a stinker, just not clicking at all. More of the same 1-2 option and not enough exploitation of the soft outside zone coverage NO gambled on. Missed on long throws to Aiken, Moss, Watson, etc.

OL: I think this has been covered very extensively.

Passrushers: same here.

Fabulous analysis. A few other thoughts:

1. Shotgun, play calling, and pass/run distribution

-On our 1st drive of the game, we went 80 yards in 14 plays for a touchdown, chewing up 7:40. Only 3 of those 14 plays were from the shotgun (2 incomplete passes and a 19 yard completion to Kevin Faulk). We ran the ball 9 times for 47 yards, and 3/5 passes for 33 yards.
- On the 2nd drive we started in the shotgun and threw an INT on the first play.
- On the 3rd drive we went only 21 yards in 5 plays, and punted. 3 were out of the shotgun, with 2 incomplete.
- On our 4th drive we went 56 yards in 11 plays, using up 5:39, culminating in a 36 yard FG. 5 of the 10 plays prior to the FG were Maroney runs, for 20 yards. 4 of 5 passing plays were out of the shotgun, and 4/5 resulted in 2 yards or less.
- On our 5th drive we went 48 yards in 10 plays in 1:37, resulting in a missed Gostkowski 50 yard FG. All 10 plays were passes out of the shotgun, with Brady 5/10, the longest completion being 11 yards. From the NO 32 we took 3 shots at the end zone instead of moving the chains or making the FG attempt easier.
- On our 6th drive (to open the 2nd half) we went 81 yards on 9 plays for a touchdown, using up 4:16. 7 of the 10 plays were passes, 4 from the shotgun. 47 yards came on a Brady to Moss completion from the shotgun.
- On our 7th drive we drove 61 yards in 10 plays to the NO 10, turning the ball over on downs. There were 2 rushes and 8 pass attempts (7 out of the shotgun). The drive failed on 3 consecutive incomplete attempts out of the shotgun.
- On our 8th drive we went 3 and out, with 3 pass attempts out of the shotgun gaining 5 yards.
- On our 9th drive we ran 2 plays, both out of the shotgun, ending in a Darren Sharper interception. At that point Brady was pulled.

My conclusions: (1) We abandoned the run and play action, and became increasingly shotgun oriented; (2) every drive which was dominated by the shotgun formation resulted in 0 points, whereas drives which had balance resulted in points.

2. Momentum Killers

We didn't lose the game on any one play/series, as we were soundly beaten on both sides of the ball. But 2 series stand out:

- Having taken a 7-3 lead we stopped New Orleans. Wes Welker appeared to be gone on a punt return, but Courtney Roby caught him from behind, showing terrific speed. Brady threw an INT on the next play.
- Down 24-10 with 1:50 left and needing to get some momentum back before halftime, we drove 48 yards to the NO 32. Brady then took 3 unsuccessful shots at the end zone out of the shotgun, and Ghost missed a 50 yard fieldgoal. Huge momentum killer. Get even 3 points on the board and it becomes a 24-20 game when we open the 3rd quarter to score, and we have momentum behind us. Even the 68 yard pass to Colston leading to a TD would only have made it 31-20.

Game Balls:

Laurence Maroney: ran hard and aggressively, and was our best offensive player on the field.

Nerf Balls:

Stefan Ghostkowski: he's missed too many critical FGs this year. 50 yards is not a chip shot, but it's doable.

The Shotgun: it killed us. Whoever went almost exclusively to the shotgun (Brady or the OC) took our offense out of the game. Brady was 19/34 from the shotgun for 227 yards and 2 interceptions.

 

[Patriot Missile]

Fabulous analysis. A few other thoughts:

1. Shotgun, play calling, and pass/run distribution

-On our 1st drive of the game, we went 80 yards in 14 plays for a touchdown, chewing up 7:40. Only 3 of those 14 plays were from the shotgun (2 incomplete passes and a 19 yard completion to Kevin Faulk). We ran the ball 9 times for 47 yards, and 3/5 passes for 33 yards.
- On the 2nd drive we started in the shotgun and threw an INT on the first play.
- On the 3rd drive we went only 21 yards in 5 plays, and punted. 3 were out of the shotgun, with 2 incomplete.
- On our 4th drive we went 56 yards in 11 plays, using up 5:39, culminating in a 36 yard FG. 5 of the 10 plays prior to the FG were Maroney runs, for 20 yards. 4 of 5 passing plays were out of the shotgun, and 4/5 resulted in 2 yards or less.
- On our 5th drive we went 48 yards in 10 plays in 1:37, resulting in a missed Gostkowski 50 yard FG. All 10 plays were passes out of the shotgun, with Brady 5/10, the longest completion being 11 yards. From the NO 32 we took 3 shots at the end zone instead of moving the chains or making the FG attempt easier.
- On our 6th drive (to open the 2nd half) we went 81 yards on 9 plays for a touchdown, using up 4:16. 7 of the 10 plays were passes, 4 from the shotgun. 47 yards came on a Brady to Moss completion from the shotgun.
- On our 7th drive we drove 61 yards in 10 plays to the NO 10, turning the ball over on downs. There were 2 rushes and 8 pass attempts (7 out of the shotgun). The drive failed on 3 consecutive incomplete attempts out of the shotgun.
- On our 8th drive we went 3 and out, with 3 pass attempts out of the shotgun gaining 5 yards.
- On our 9th drive we ran 2 plays, both out of the shotgun, ending in a Darren Sharper interception. At that point Brady was pulled.

My conclusions: (1) We abandoned the run and play action, and became increasingly shotgun oriented; (2) every drive which was dominated by the shotgun formation resulted in 0 points, whereas drives which had balance resulted in points.

2. Momentum Killers

We didn't lose the game on any one play/series, as we were soundly beaten on both sides of the ball. But 2 series stand out:

- Having taken a 7-3 lead we stopped New Orleans. Wes Welker appeared to be gone on a punt return, but Courtney Roby caught him from behind, showing terrific speed. Brady threw an INT on the next play.
- Down 24-10 with 1:50 left and needing to get some momentum back before halftime, we drove 48 yards to the NO 32. Brady then took 3 unsuccessful shots at the end zone out of the shotgun, and Ghost missed a 50 yard fieldgoal. Huge momentum killer. Get even 3 points on the board and it becomes a 24-20 game when we open the 3rd quarter to score, and we have momentum behind us. Even the 68 yard pass to Colston leading to a TD would only have made it 31-20.

Game Balls:

Laurence Maroney: ran hard and aggressively, and was our best offensive player on the field.

Nerf Balls:

Stefan Ghostkowski: he's missed too many critical FGs this year. 50 yards is not a chip shot, but it's doable.

The Shotgun: it killed us. Whoever went almost exclusively to the shotgun (Brady or the OC) took our offense out of the game. Brady was 19/34 from the shotgun for 227 yards and 2 interceptions.

Agreed on most points here. There is a time and place for the shotgun. Some teams just can't stop it period so it is ok to use it against them the whole game. The Saints evidently could and for whatever reason we moved away from PA and Two TE sets. They worked suprisingly good. Now I want to know about the Indy game and how many times we ran Shotgun by comparison of halves in that game.

I know you are not supposed to speak out on this board about the one of the goat coaches but this has been his worst coaching year since he's been here. Does he realize how well some of these other formations are working? Why does he move from them?

 

[maverick4]

I know you are not supposed to speak out on this board about the one of the goat coaches but this has been his worst coaching year since he's been here. Does he realize how well some of these other formations are working? Why does he move from them?

He isn't. His coordinators are making decisions on their own that fall within Belichick's pre-game-planning. I doubt he's ever explicitly said, 'stop using shotgun on 75% of your passes O'Brien', so O'Brien keeps doing it. I wonder if anyone on the Patriots is scouting themselves as a team...

 

[maverick4]

My conclusions: (1) We abandoned the run and play action, and became increasingly shotgun oriented; (2) every drive which was dominated by the shotgun formation resulted in 0 points, whereas drives which had balance resulted in points.
.

Killer statement right there. The Saints game was too similar to how the offense was stopped by the 07 Giants.

If you look at the Saints game play by play, almost ALL the plays were shotgun passes from 3rd quarter 10:30 left until the team pulled Brady in the 4th with 5:30 left. This is also when the lead got out of hand. Connection? I think so.

 

[mayoclinic]

Now I want to know about the Indy game and how many times we ran Shotgun by comparison of halves in that game.

The Indy game:

First Half

- Opening drive: 3 and out with a punt. One Maroney run for 2 yards. Brady 1/2 out of the shotgun for 8 yards, missing on 3rd and 2.

- 2nd series: 73 yards in 6 plays for a TD in 3:32. 5 runs for 8 yards, including 2 Faulk runs out of the shotgun formation for 9 yards. One playaction pass to Moss for 55 yards.

- 3rd series: 58 yards in 11 plays for a FG in 4:52. 3 Kevin Faulk runs out of the shotgun formation for 30 yards. Brady completed 1/3 passes for 15 yards. 5 of 11 plays were run out of the shotgun - 3 Faulk runs, a 20 yard completion to Moss and a Brady sack by Mathis which stalled the drive in the red zone and forced a FG.

- 4th series: 75 yards in 2 plays for a TD in 0:51. Brady 2/2 with passes of 12 yards to Welker and 63 yards to Moss (play action). No shotgun was used.

- 5th series: 57 yards in 5 plays for a TD in 2:12. 4/5 plays were passing (one Maroney 5 yard run), with Brady 2/2 out of the shotgun, including a 36 yard completion to Watson and a 9 yard TD pass to Edelman.

- 6th series: Pats 3 and out (0 yards gained) in 0:15. 3 incomplete passes out of the shotgun.

- 7th series: Brady kneel down to end the half.

Second Half

- Opening drive: Pats drive 59 yards in 5 plays, turning the ball over on a TB interception (play #6). Brady passed on 5/6 plays, and the last 4 were out of the shotgun, including the interception.

- 2nd series: Pats go 86 yards on 12 plays in 7:51 to the Indy 1, ending the drive on a Laurence Maroney fumble. Brady completed 5/5 passes out of the shotgun for 39 yards. Kevin Faulk also run 3 times out of the shotgun for 23 yards. Brady completed 1 pass under center to Moss for 13 yards. The other 3 plays were Maroney runs, including the fumble at the goal line.

- 3rd series: After a 69 yard Wes Welker punt return to the Indy 9, the Pats go 7 yards in 2 plays: a 2 yard Kevin Faulk run out of the shotgun, and a 5 yard Brady to Moss TD out of the shotgun.

- 4th series: NE goes 27 yards in 7 plays in 4:12, ending in a Hanson punt. 2 plays were Maroney runs. The other 5 were pass attempts out of the shotgun, with Brady 3/4 for 25 yards but the drive ending on a Mathis sack of Brady for 5 yards and an incomplete pass, both out of the shotgun.

- 5th series: Following an interception to the Indy 31, Pats go 13 yards in 7 plays in 3:32, settling for a FG. 3 runs (1 out of the shotgun) result in 1 total yard. Brady is 1/2 passing out of the shotgun for 8 yards. The biggest play is a 16 yard pass completion with Brady under center in run formation. Drives ends with an incomplete pass out of the shotgun on 3rd and 6. A TD would have put the game out of reach.

- 6th series: Pats go 4 and out in 0:23, gaining 9 yards and turning the ball over on downs. A first down would have put the game out of reach. Pats run once out of the shotgun and then throw 3 passes out of the shotgun formation, using up almost no time.

- 7th series: Brady is 1/1 out of the shotgun to Wes Welker for 9 yards with 0:13 left. Game over.

Again, I see the following pattern:

1. Better mixing up of plays earlier in the game, with more play action and running plays.

2. In this game, the Pats ran effectively out of the shotgun formation (vs. not at all in the Saints game). But their use of the run from the shotgun tailed off significantly in the 2nd half.

3. A lot of drives stalled when Brady went to a predominately shotgun approach - the interception in the 3rd quarter, the sack and incompletion forcing a FG in the 4th quarter when we started on the Indy 41, the 3 consecutive passes out of the shotgun when we needed one 1st down to ice the game.

Again, I conclude that we become more predictable in our play calling over the course of the game, that we abandon the running game and play action, and that the shotgun racks up passing yards but also leads to a lot of drive killing plays.

 

[javajunky]

I think the team opted to shotgun when Neal went out. The shotgun lets Brady see the rush and O.C. knew the O.L. was in trouble. Simply put, we went shotgun out of necessity.

 

[maverick4]

- 5th series: Following an interception to the Indy 31, Pats go 13 yards in 7 plays in 3:32, settling for a FG. 3 runs (1 out of the shotgun) result in 1 total yard. Brady is 1/2 passing out of the shotgun for 8 yards. The biggest play is a 16 yard pass completion with Brady under center in run formation. Drives ends with an incomplete pass out of the shotgun on 3rd and 6. A TD would have put the game out of reach.

- 6th series: Pats go 4 and out in 0:23, gaining 9 yards and turning the ball over on downs. A first down would have put the game out of reach. Pats run once out of the shotgun and then throw 3 passes out of the shotgun formation, using up almost no time.


Again, I see the following pattern:

1. Better mixing up of plays earlier in the game, with more play action and running plays.

2. In this game, the Pats ran effectively out of the shotgun formation (vs. not at all in the Saints game). But their use of the run from the shotgun tailed off significantly in the 2nd half.

3. A lot of drives stalled when Brady went to a predominately shotgun approach - the interception in the 3rd quarter, the sack and incompletion forcing a FG in the 4th quarter when we started on the Indy 41, the 3 consecutive passes out of the shotgun when we needed one 1st down to ice the game.

Again, I conclude that we become more predictable in our play calling over the course of the game, that we abandon the running game and play action, and that the shotgun racks up passing yards but also leads to a lot of drive killing plays.

Yet more devastating analysis.

Rob0709 and Deus_Irae are crying right now.

 

[maverick4]

I think the team opted to shotgun when Neal went out. The shotgun lets Brady see the rush and O.C. knew the O.L. was in trouble. Simply put, we went shotgun out of necessity.

This team goes to shot gun when we lead, this team goes to shot gun when the opposing team hasn't scored many points, this team goes to shot gun when we trail....this team goes to shot gun no matter what. 75% of ALL OUR PASS ATTEMPTS are from shot gun.

 

[Patspsycho]

Mayo, do you have DVR?

 

[Pat the Pats Fan]

Out of frustration, I deleted the game from my PVR. I wish I hadn't.

Did our corners play the WR's tough at the line or did they play scared?

Me too, the seconds hadn't even gone to 00:00 and it was deleted.

 

[Pat the Pats Fan]

Patspsycho.

Thanks, great post with very good Xs and Os.

I too thought MacKenzie played lights out, completely taking away any YAC from Welker. Mighty Mite was hit the moment he caught the ball numerous times, killing drives.

 

[hyperpat]

Patspsycho.

Thanks, great post with very good Xs and Os.

I too thought MacKenzie played lights out, completely taking away any YAC from Welker. Mighty Mite was hit the moment he caught the ball numerous times, killing drives.

This is also a good point. The Saints LBs kept Welker in front of them and closed on him rapidly when he dragged across the middle. He made the catch but the YAC was zero. It seemed that this was part of the Saints' plan: to present space to Welker with the idea of closing down on him as soon as he made his cut. I commented to my son during the game that Welker could have faked to the inside and then spun to the outside middle. It seemed like he could have gotten big gains up the seam between the LB coverage and the corners. This would not only have gained some yardage but might have forced the Saints to adjust their linebacker drops and possibly opened things up in the middle.

 

[maverick4]

This is also a good point. The Saints LBs kept Welker in front of them and closed on him rapidly when he dragged across the middle. He made the catch but the YAC was zero. It seemed that this was part of the Saints' plan: to present space to Welker with the idea of closing down on him as soon as he made his cut. I commented to my son during the game that Welker could have faked to the inside and then spun to the outside middle. It seemed like he could have gotten big gains up the seam between the LB coverage and the corners. This would not only have gained some yardage but might have forced the Saints to adjust their linebacker drops and possibly opened things up in the middle.

Like how the Pats stopped the 01 Rams receivers. Know where they're going, tackle them right after.

 

[mayoclinic]

I think the team opted to shotgun when Neal went out. The shotgun lets Brady see the rush and O.C. knew the O.L. was in trouble. Simply put, we went shotgun out of necessity.

The shotgun also lets other teams know we are passing (especially when there is no back in the backfield) and lets them tee off with their pass rush. Brady may be able to see the rush coming at him, but he may not have time to find the open receiver, which seemed to be the case in the 4th quarter against Indy and in the Saints game.

 

[maverick4]

The shotgun also lets other teams know we are passing (especially when there is no back in the backfield) and lets them tee off with their pass rush. Brady may be able to see the rush coming at him, but he may not have time to find the open receiver, which seemed to be the case in the 4th quarter against Indy and in the Saints game.

As a D-lineman when you have to respect the run you can only (or should only) pass rush into certain gaps because you still have gap responsibility. The blocker also knows you should only be rushing into certain areas, it makes his life easier too to pass block.

When there is no threat of run, all bets are off. The pass rusher can move and juke into any space he wants. It is MUCH tougher for a blocker.

4 pass-only rushers can probably defeat 5 blockers at a rate significantly higher than 4 D-linemen who have to pass rush near their gap responsibility. Probably the same success rate as blitzing against a QB under center...

 

[oldskool138]

When there is no threat of run, all bets are off. The pass rusher can move and juke into any space he wants. It is MUCH tougher for a blocker.

Okay, so how come Dante (one of the best O-Line coaches in the league so I'm told) isn't bringing this up in team meetings or to BB personally...or short of that, getting his guys to be able to counter a consistent pass rush?

 

[Patspsycho]

This confirms my initial assessment that the NO D had a new type of coverage to contain Welker/Moss:

Welker: Saints gave a new twist - Patriots Blog - ESPN Boston

 

[Rob0729]

Fabulous analysis. A few other thoughts:

1. Shotgun, play calling, and pass/run distribution

-On our 1st drive of the game, we went 80 yards in 14 plays for a touchdown, chewing up 7:40. Only 3 of those 14 plays were from the shotgun (2 incomplete passes and a 19 yard completion to Kevin Faulk). We ran the ball 9 times for 47 yards, and 3/5 passes for 33 yards.
- On the 2nd drive we started in the shotgun and threw an INT on the first play.
- On the 3rd drive we went only 21 yards in 5 plays, and punted. 3 were out of the shotgun, with 2 incomplete.
- On our 4th drive we went 56 yards in 11 plays, using up 5:39, culminating in a 36 yard FG. 5 of the 10 plays prior to the FG were Maroney runs, for 20 yards. 4 of 5 passing plays were out of the shotgun, and 4/5 resulted in 2 yards or less.
- On our 5th drive we went 48 yards in 10 plays in 1:37, resulting in a missed Gostkowski 50 yard FG. All 10 plays were passes out of the shotgun, with Brady 5/10, the longest completion being 11 yards. From the NO 32 we took 3 shots at the end zone instead of moving the chains or making the FG attempt easier.
- On our 6th drive (to open the 2nd half) we went 81 yards on 9 plays for a touchdown, using up 4:16. 7 of the 10 plays were passes, 4 from the shotgun. 47 yards came on a Brady to Moss completion from the shotgun.
- On our 7th drive we drove 61 yards in 10 plays to the NO 10, turning the ball over on downs. There were 2 rushes and 8 pass attempts (7 out of the shotgun). The drive failed on 3 consecutive incomplete attempts out of the shotgun.
- On our 8th drive we went 3 and out, with 3 pass attempts out of the shotgun gaining 5 yards.
- On our 9th drive we ran 2 plays, both out of the shotgun, ending in a Darren Sharper interception. At that point Brady was pulled.

My conclusions: (1) We abandoned the run and play action, and became increasingly shotgun oriented; (2) every drive which was dominated by the shotgun formation resulted in 0 points, whereas drives which had balance resulted in points.

2. Momentum Killers

We didn't lose the game on any one play/series, as we were soundly beaten on both sides of the ball. But 2 series stand out:

- Having taken a 7-3 lead we stopped New Orleans. Wes Welker appeared to be gone on a punt return, but Courtney Roby caught him from behind, showing terrific speed. Brady threw an INT on the next play.
- Down 24-10 with 1:50 left and needing to get some momentum back before halftime, we drove 48 yards to the NO 32. Brady then took 3 unsuccessful shots at the end zone out of the shotgun, and Ghost missed a 50 yard fieldgoal. Huge momentum killer. Get even 3 points on the board and it becomes a 24-20 game when we open the 3rd quarter to score, and we have momentum behind us. Even the 68 yard pass to Colston leading to a TD would only have made it 31-20.

Game Balls:

Laurence Maroney: ran hard and aggressively, and was our best offensive player on the field.

Nerf Balls:

Stefan Ghostkowski: he's missed too many critical FGs this year. 50 yards is not a chip shot, but it's doable.

The Shotgun: it killed us. Whoever went almost exclusively to the shotgun (Brady or the OC) took our offense out of the game. Brady was 19/34 from the shotgun for 227 yards and 2 interceptions.

It isn't the shotgun. It was abandoning the run that was the problem. The Pats have been primarily in the shotgun before and not have this problem. The fact of the matter is the Saints didn't care about the Pats running the ball and just played pass for most of the game after the first quarter.

Of course the defensive woes also played into it. The Pats were grinding it down the field initially, but the Saints didn't need more than a minute or two to respond with a TD meaning the Pats couldn't even afford to grind out the ball anymore. Brees was throwing a TD pass about every four to five pass attempt.

Personally, I think this was an entire team failure. You are focusing too much in on the offense when the defense wasn't even a speed bump on the defense scoring. I think on both sides of the ball the players didn't execute and the coordinators failed to adjust.

 

[maverick4]

This confirms my initial assessment that the NO D had a new type of coverage to contain Welker/Moss:

Welker: Saints gave a new twist - Patriots Blog - ESPN Boston

It's like when Belichick figured out the 01 Rams went through Faulk. Once the Saints took Welker out of the game, we couldn't manufacture a win.